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What is this dissertation about?
When casual acquaintances ask the topic of my dissertation, I tell them it’s about
political blogging. This description is intuitive enough to paint a mental picture, and
it’s accurate in a literal way. My data are drawn from the blogosphere. Bloggers
feature in all the research questions, models, and theories: bloggers’ attitudes and
demographics, blogging as a form of political participation, tone of discourse in the
blogosphere, etc. Evidently—and superficially—this dissertation is “about political
blogging.”
However, it would be a mistake to stop there. The study of blogging also presents
exciting new opportunities to answer enduring questions about politics and society.
Thus, this dissertation is “about” the impact of the information revolution on politics:
changes in participation, representation, and power that are unfolding as new forms
of communication collide with old institutions. It is “about” norms and incentives in
journalism and civic discourse, and how they affect the flow of information through
society. It is “about” the scientific value of large-scale text-as-data statistical methods
for understanding social systems.
In short, this dissertation is about political blogging, and several other, harder-to-
explain things too. My purpose in this preface is to gather and explain these other
things, in order to establish a theoretical frame of reference. This framework will
be indispensible for making sense of the flood of data that will begin in the opening
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chapter.
With that groundwork laid, I collect a set of specific, unanswered research questions
that are within methodological striking distance. An overview of these questions and
my answers to them provides an outline for the remainder of the dissertation.
The practice of blogging
Blogging is the practice of maintaining a website with frequently updated entries
displayed in reverse chronological order1. Individual entries are called “posts.” In
addition, most blogs allow readers to add their own comments to blog posts. In some
blogs, discussion in comment threads is an important part of the medium’s appeal.
Several online platforms (e.g. Blogger, WordPress) allow users to publish their own
blogs, free of charge. Other platforms (e.g. Google’s AdWords) allow bloggers to
inject advertising into their sites, making blogs a potential source of revenue for those
with large enough readership.
The first blogs were created in the late 1990s by hobbyists with the web development
skills necessary to create and maintain their own web sites. In 1999, Pyra labs
developed the Blogger application, which streamlined and automated the process
of posting updates to the web. Blogger and other automated weblogging platforms
dramatically lowered the technical prerequisites to blogging, triggering a meteoric
increase in the popularity of the medium (Karpf, 2008). Today, over 168 million
blogs have been started (BlogPulse.com, 2011), and collective readership for top blogs
outstrips mainstream media outlets (Smith, 2008). A 2006 Pew survey found that
one in five American teens maintained a blog, and 39% of American adults read blogs
(Lenhart and Fox, 2006).
1Since the original advent of blogging, many variations on the genre have emerged. For the sake
of clarity, I follow most previous academic work (e.g. Drezner and Farrell (2008) and Pole (2009)) by




Most existing research on political blogging compares bloggers to journalist. In
this dissertation, I follow a different thread by comparing political bloggers to political
activists. If bloggers are activists, then theories of political participation can inform
the study of blogging. Conversely, data from the blogosphere can open new avenues of
research into political participation. Following this reasoning, this dissertation seeks to
answer three broad questions about political blogging. I chose these questions because
they have far-reaching theoretical implications, and are still methodologically feasible.
1. Who blogs about politics?
2. Why do they blog about politics?
3. How do bloggers’ motivations affect the content of their blogs?
I will not directly try to answer questions about who reads blogs, how blogs
influence mainstream media, or what effect blogging has had on specific political and
policy outcomes. These are important questions, and I hope my analysis will enrich
these lines of inquiry. However, as an empirical endeavor, this project focuses on
bloggers themselves, not the downstream consequences of blogging. As a result, the
structure of this research will most resemble studies of political communication in
context, such as gatekeeping and news production (e.g. Gans, 1979), motivations
behind political participation (e.g. Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995), and everyday
political discussion (e.g. Walsh, 2004).
Validate, update, and elaborate
Answers to these questions stand to make a substantial contribution to the theory
of political participation. The first question seeks to validate canonical theories of
participation in the context of political blogging. We know a great deal about the
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social factors that make some people more likely to sign a petition, join a protest, or
contact a government official about an issue. It seems reasonable to suppose that the
same factors would lead someone to blog about the issue. However, that assertion can
and should be tested.
The second question seeks to update theories of political participation to account
for advances in communication technology. Given that the costs and skill requirements
for blogging are different from previous forms of participation, it seems likely that
blogging fills a different niche in the participatory repertoire. Furthermore, since
access, socialization, and incentives for blogging are not distributed evenly across
society, it is unlikely that the voice of the blogosphere is fully representative of the
preferences of the electorate. Understanding how and why the blogosphere distorts
public preferences is an important part of understanding the political consequences of
this new medium.
The third question seeks to elaborate upon existing theories of participation. Most
past studies in this area have constructed the dependent variable in terms of levels of
participation: how much is one likely to get involved in politics? This is a valuable and
well-developed line of inquiry. However, it ignores other normatively important aspects
of participation. This limitation is driven in large part by methodological constraints
on data collection, due to the field’s reliance on cross-sectional surveys. Verba and
Nie’s (1987) older work on self-interested and community-oriented participation, Tilly’s
(1978) work on political repertoires, and Bowers’ (2003) work on life cycle and timing
in political involvement are exceptions that prove the rule. In each case, the researchers
elaborated the dependent variable, and struggled with the limits of available methods
and data, before arriving at interesting and suggestive findings about participation.
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Specific research questions
To summarize the agument so far, I am convinced that political blogging is worth
studying for two seemingly contradictory reasons. On one hand, blogging—and
new media more broadly—represent an important shift in the way the body politic
communicates, reasons, and decides about important political issues. These changes
are worth understanding, and understanding fully, so that we can adapt our norms
and institutions to the new realities of digital discourse.
On the other hand, political bloggers closely resemble activists who participate
politics through other venues. To the extent the bloggers are typical of other activists,
their blogs can provide insight into many aspects of political activism that are hard to
observe in other venues. Thus, rich content from the blogosphere offers the chance to
answer age-old questions about attention, opinion, communication, and participation
in democratic society.
In short, political blogging is worth studying because it is both the same and differ-
ent. My goal in this dissertation is to follow the both of these paths by investigating
patterns of activism in the blogosphere and exploring their broader implications for
democracy. This is the main subject of Chapter II: situating political blogging within
the democratic repetoir of activism.
Hybrid methodology
The richness of data on participation in the blogosphere also provides a unique
opportunity to re-imagine political participation as a phenomenon of interest. Publicly
available blog archives allow us to measure levels of participation (How frequently
did the blogger post, and at what length?), but they also allow us to elaborate the
dependent variable by directly observing other aspects of political participation. In
many ways, this is the most exciting part of the project, because it has the potential
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to break broad swaths of new theoretical ground.
However, in order to tap this rich new source of data, we must first develop
appropriate methods. A large portion of this dissertation is dedicated to doing so.
Chapter I tackles the problem of constructing representative sampling frames in
dispersed online populations, using an “automated snowball census.” Other studies
of political blogging have relied exclusively on convenience or prominence samples
that overrepresent popular bloggers and do not generalize to the population at large.
Developing methods to build a sampling universe and survey a representative sample
of bloggers enables us to obtain the first generalizable results about this population. It
also enables us to draw direct comparisons between popular and less popular bloggers.
Chapter III introduces a data pipeline for solving a different problem: subjective
content analysis at very large scales. Drawing on ideas from the literatures on
traditional content analysis, combinied expert forecasts, and crowdsourced workflows,
I show how we can generate reliable labels for millions of documents, even on tasks that
require a high degree of subjective judgment. The chapter introduces seven codebooks
for journalism and civility, and tests the process of scaling these measures using expert,
novice, and automated coding processes. Although I do not take advantage of these
measures in this dissertation, I strongly suspect that this kind of content analysis will
make a significant contribution to scholarship in coming years. Chapter III describes
enabling methods for this next wave of research.
ix
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ABSTRACT
Few venues span the spectrum of political ideas better than the blogosphere,
the sprawling online network of “web-logs” and their authors. Roughly 1.3 million
Americans blog at least occasionally about politics, with aggregate daily readership
exceeding that of major newspapers, and daily aggregate word counts in the tens
of millions. This incredibly diverse medium captures the daily thoughts of people
from all walks of life, from Senators to army wives to community activists to business
owners to conspiracy theorists, all lending their voices to a public forum that was
almost unimaginable a generation ago.
Previous research has focused primarily on how blogging is different, especially
how blogging is different from traditional journalism. In contrast, I show how political
blogging is strikingly similar—to political activism. The same social forces that lead
people to vote, protest, or write letters to public officials can also lead them to blog
about politics. Thus, bloggers are not journalists. They are activists, which means that
classic theories of political participation can inform the study of blogging. This project
explores these similarities, detailing the forces that drive participation in the political
blogosphere, and revealing where the blogosphere represents—and distorts—the voice
of the electorate. This research provides clues into behaviors that are hard to observe
in other contexts, but matter deeply for society and for democracy.
Conversely, data from the blogosphere can open new avenues of research into polit-
ical participation. Unlike most forms of communication, blogging leaves a permanent
data trail. Archives of thousands of political blogs exist online, complete with text,
dates, links, and comments. This project taps this wealth of social data using a
xvi
combination of techniques from social and computer science: survey research, content
analysis, web crawling, and automated text classification. Using this interdisciplinary
mix of tools, I survey hundreds of bloggers and analyze nearly eight million blog posts.
In the process, I build methodological bridges between social and computer science,
making software and data available for future research.
The manuscript includes three chapters.
Chapter I solves a persistent methodological problem for social scientists studying
the political web: representative sampling. Virtually all existing studies of the political
web are based on incomplete samples, and therefore lack generalizability. This chapter
combines methods from computer science and sampling theory to conduct an automated
snowball census of the political web. The methodology generates an all-but-complete
index of English political websites. I check the robustness of this index, use it to
generate descriptive statistics for the entire political web, and demonstrate that studies
based on ad hoc sampling strategies are likely to be biased in important ways. In
addition to creating a sampling universe for political websites, the methods and
open-source software introduced in this chapter can be used to create similar sampling
frames for other online content domains.
Chapter II investigates blogging as an act of political participation. In particular,
we wish to understand in what ways the social predictors of political blogging resemble
the predictors of participation in other modes of political activism. I find that bloggers
closely resemble other activists. There are minor dfferences in some demographic
characteristics, especially age and gender, and some suggestions that bloggers may
follow different paths to political socialization. We also see evidence that bloggers
respond to semi-professional motives in a Howewer, on the whole, bloggers fit the
profile for activists remarkably well, in terms of intentions, demographics, attitudes,
and behavior.
Chapter III returns to methodological issues, asking, “How can we reliably measure
xvii
constructive discourse in the text of political blog posts?” This chapter describes seven
codebooks used to measure important aspects of constructive discourse in blog posts.
I validate these codebooks progressively with expert coders, novice coders with no
prior exposure to the study, and automated coders—an exceptionally rigorous serious
of tests designed to ensure that my content coding process are fully replicable, up to
the scale of millions of blog posts. In the end, most (but not all) of the items from
the seven codebooks pass this test, and become available for further analysis.
xviii
CHAPTER I
An automated snowball census of the political web
This paper solves a persistent methodological problem for social scientists studying
the political web: representative sampling. Virtually all existing studies of the political
web are based on incomplete samples, and therefore lack generalizability. In this
paper, I combine methods from computer science and sampling theory to conduct
an automated snowball census of the political web. This methodology generates
an all-but-complete index of English political websites. I check the robustness of
this index, use it to generate descriptive statistics for the entire political web, and
demonstrate that studies based on ad hoc sampling strategies are likely to be biased
in important ways. In future research, this bias can be eliminated by using this index
as a sampling universe. In addition, the methods and open-source software presented
here can be used to creating similar sampling frames for other online content domains.
1.1 Introduction
I begin with a pressing problem, captured in quotations. “The vast amount of
human knowledge encoded online is the reason why the Web is such a valuable resource
for politics; but ironically, the very scale of this resource makes the Web extraordinarily
difficult to study” (Hindman, Tsioutsiouliklis and Johnson, 2003). “In the absence of
a known population, ... a truly random sample [of relevant web sites] is not possible”
1
(Miller, Pole and Bateman, 2011). “Sampling the entire World Wide Web is a virtually
impossible feat” (Soon and Cho, 2011).
Behind all of these quotations is an unstated understanding: without a complete
index of political web sites, social scientists studying the web are denied one of their
most powerful tools—sampling theory. Sampling theory is the keystone of an enormous
body of social science research. It enables us to draw conclusions from manageable
samples, and generalize them to whole populations. On the web—where we have
lacked a valid sampling frame—we have been unable to make such claims about
representative sampling and generalizability.
Instead, virtually all studies of the political web have focused on sites that are
easily accessible through search engines or tracking services. Such sites tend to be
prominent hubs within the online ecosystem, with frequent updates, high traffic, and
relatively complex organizational structures. For some research questions, it may
make sense to focus on sites where readership and attention are most concentrated.
But if we are interested in using the web to study aspects of social behavior such as
attention, attitudes, and speech, then ignoring the long tail of online participation is
a serious oversight.
Consider the following questions, all of which are severely hampered by the lack of
a representative online sampling frame.
1. Political blogging is a new form of participation in the political repetoire. Who
takes advantage of this new form of participation? What distiguishes them from
those who don’t participate, and those who participate in other ways? Under-
standing the composition of the political blogosphere requires an understanding
of all its participants, not just the most popular.
2. Why do some political sites become popular and others not? Answering this
question is key to understanding patterns of mediated influence and selective
2
exposure. If we are to take this question seriously, we cannot select on the
dependent variable and only investigate the sites that are already influential.
3. Most online sites receive little or no traffic. So why do their owners invest time
and effort to maintain them? In many ways, the unpopular sites present the
counterintuitive behavioral puzzle.
4. How and why does the distribution of public attention over political topics
change over time? Variants of this question have been the subject of speculation
since the dawn of mass media (e.g. Lippmann (1927), Iyengar and Kinder
(2010)). New data from the web present exciting possibilities for this line of
inquiry. But a complete answer will require a full understanding of all of the
participants in the political web, not just a handful of the most popular web
sites.
In this paper, I show how to solve the web-sampling problem for a broad class
of applications. Using a novel recombination of methods from computer science and
sampling theory, I conduct an automated snowball census of the English-language
political web. This technique constructs a comprehensive index of English political
websites. I check the robustness of this index, use it to generate descriptive statistics
for the entire political web, and demonstrate that studies based on ad hoc sampling
strategies are likely to be biased in important ways.
I hope that this index of nearly 800,000 web sites will facilitate future research
using surveys and content analysis to understand the Internet and its politically
minded inhabitants. For future studies of online politics, representative sampling does
not need to be a problem. Furthermore, any online content domain that is densely
linked and can be classified accurately by its content can be indexed in similar fashion.
I hope that the methods and software presented here will be useful for exploring and
sampling from other domains on the web.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section two reviews past attempts to sample the
political web, focusing on methodological limitations. Section three describes my
methodology, in detail. Section four reports results, including web crawling statistics
and robustness checks. Section five discusses the strengths and limitations of this
approach. Section six summarizes and concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
The web is a potential treasure trove of data about political communication and
behavior (Lazer et al., 2009). However, the scale of the available data have frustrated
previous attempts at sampling (Hindman, Tsioutsiouliklis and Johnson, 2003). To
the best of my knowledge, no previous study of political websites has 1) been based
on a fully representative sample and 2) made use of data available on the web. All
past studies have used convenience, prominence, snowball, or over-samples—strategies
that cannot achieve both goals simultaneously. This section describes these common
sampling strategies, gives examples, and highlights their limitations.
1.2.1 Convenience sampling
In a convenience sample, no attempt is made to ensure that the sample population
is representative of the population as a whole. Instead, researchers “look under the
light post” by gathering a sample that is close at hand. Examples of studies employing
convenience samples include Davis’ study of Usenet discussion forums (Davis, 2009);
Baum and Groeling’s analysis of news judgements on left- and right-leaning online news
sites (Baum and Groeling, 2008); and Johnson and Kaye’s study of news readership
among blog readers (Johnson and Kaye, 2004). In the first two studies, small sets of
well-known sites were chosen for study. In the third study, an opt-in sample of blog
readers was recruited for an online survey. Although studies of this kind may achieve
high internal validity, they cannot draw generalizations about the population as a
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whole.
Some convenience samples are very large. For example, in their “meme-tracking”
study of information flow, Lescovek, Backstrom, and Kleinberg mined over 90 million
blogs and news media sites for permutations on quotations (Leskovec, Backstrom and
Kleinberg, 2009). Similarly, Hopkins and King conducted an aggregate sentiment
analysis of content from over 1 million blog posts during the 2008 presidential election
(Hopkins and King, 2010). But just because a data set is large does not imply that it is
representative. For example, Hopkins and King tacitly acknowledge this fact by noting
that their data collection is not modeled on the representative sampling strategies used
in most modern opinion polls, “just as in earlier centuries when public opinion was
synonymous with visible public expressions rather than attitudes and nonattitudes
expressed in survey responses.1” This alternative conception of public opinion is
not without merit, but we should recognize that it sets aside the powerful research
paradigm of representative sampling. This is a philosophical and methodological
choice that should not be made lightly.
1.2.2 Prominence sampling
Prominence samples focus on the most visible sites according to some well-defined
metric. Prominence samples can be used to draw conclusions about popular sites—the
ones most likely to show up at the top of these rankings—but they can’t be used to
make inferences about the political web in general. For example, several studies of
political blogging have based their samples on lists of the most popular political blogs,
according to tracking companies such as Technorati or Truth Laid Bear2.
1Note that Hopkins and King are speaking of representativeness within the electorate. Within
the blogosphere, their sample may be nearly “representative,” because it appears to be close to
comprehensive. However, aside from noting that their data include over 1.3 million blogs, they do
not make (or attempt to justify) any claims about generalizability.
2Sampling frames derived from search engines are convenience samples, rather than prominence
samples, because methods for generating search engine rankings are customized and non-transparent.
Search engine results are increasingly conditioned on user id, browsing history, geography, random
usability experiments, and so on. Thus, two different users will likely see different results returned
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This method is very popular. Examples of studies employing prominence samples
include Adamic and Glance’s network analysis of ideological clustering in popular
political blogs (Adamic and Glance, 2005); Davis’ work on political blogging (Davis,
2009); and McKenna and Pole’s survey of “A-list” political bloggers (McKenna and
Pole, 2008). Perhaps the most thorough example is Wallsten’s content analysis of blog
posts, which is based on a random sample of 10,732 sites featured on popular blog
directories (Wallsten, 2008).
Like content analysis of newspaper articles and TV transcripts, prominence samples
may be appropriate for describing trends and patterns in widely read political content.
However, they are poorly suited to many other important research topics, such as
selective exposure, agenda setting, and content generation. Given that one of the
defining features of the web is its tremendous diversity of information, this is an
important oversight. To put it another way, prominence samples focus on the handful
of sites most likely to behave like traditional media outlets, rather than the vast
majority of political sites that act very differently. When our research interests extend
beyond A-list sites, prominence samples are inadequate.
1.2.3 Snowball sampling
Snowball samples start from a batch of known sites, then follow social ties or
hyperlinks to gather other sites for the sample. Conceptually, this approach has some
advantages over prominence sampling, because it potentially includes all sites, not
just the most prominent. However, snowball samples have traditionally been frowned
on as a kind of non-random convenience sample.
In recent years, researchers have sought to establish a sound statistical founda-
tion for representative inference from snowball samples. Of particular note is the
from the same search query. Similarly, the same user searching for the same terms at a different time
and location will likely receive different results. This lack of standardization undercuts the claim
that search engine results provide a well-defined and replicable metric for determining prominence.
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“respondent-based sampling” pioneered by Heckathorn. Heckathorn reasoned that
small sub-populations are often connected by relatively dense social networks, making
snowball-sampling a cost effective way to recruit respondents within rare or hidden
populations. Furthermore, following the links in the social network in a snowball
sample can be modeled as a Markov process. For networks with finite diameter,
this process is ergodic, so a sufficiently long chain of referrals can ensure thorough
mixing. Chain samples of this type are asymptotically independent of the initial seed
sample, and can be used to derive unbiased estimates of various population statistics
(Heckathorn, 1997). Alternatively, if the network and initial seed sample have certain
properties (e.g. an undirected network with initial sampling probabilities proportional
to edge degee), then even a short chain can produce unbiased statistics (Salganik and
Heckathorn, 2004).
In general, I am sympathetic to principled approaches to snowball sampling,
especially in situations where other approaches to sampling are infeasible. However, the
validity of respondent-driven sampling depends on some strong assumptions, especially
regarding random referrals. To quote directly from Salganik and Heckathorn:
In order to produce analytic results about the properties of the respondent-
drive sampling estimators we had to make assumptions that in some
cases may be violated. For example, nonrandom recruitment of friends
could influence the estimates in unknown ways. Additionally, differential
recruitment success by different types of people could bias the sample of
edges that we observe.
The methodology employed in this paper borrows many ideas from respondent-
driven sampling. As I will discuss later, my approach uses automation and exhaustive
search to conduct a full snowball census of political websites. Consequently, it shares
many of the strengths of Heckathorn’s methods, without having to rely on so many
assumptions.
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A few existing studies use snowball samples, but none that I know of has employed
a Heckathorn-style model to make claims about representativeness. See for example,
Hindman et. al’s early work on power laws in political web sites (Hindman, Tsiout-
siouliklis and Johnson, 2003); Karpf’s index of “authority” among prominent blogs
(Karpf, 2008); and Miller and Pole’s recent content analysis of health blogs (Miller,
Pole and Bateman, 2011).
1.2.4 Oversampling
The only existing studies that can make generalizable claims about online behavior
are those that rely on oversampling. Oversampling starts with a very large random
sample from the general population. After a short screening interview, respondents
matching certain criteria are selected into the final sample. Oversampling follows
a straightforward statistical methodology, but the cost of gathering a large enough
starting sample is often prohibitive. In addition, any bias in answers on screener
questions (e.g. from recall, social desirability, or interview fatigue) can skew the
composition of the resulting sample. Also, validating survey answers against actual
online behavior is very difficult—to the best of my knowledge, no study to date has
attempted to do so. Consequently, this approach fails to tap the potential of the web
as a rich source of political data.
Lenhart and Fox (2006) provides a good example of an oversampling strategy.
Over the course of a year, they added a screener question about blogging to the
end of 13,000 Pew phone interviews. The 233 respondents who said they blogged
were later called back and interviewed at length about their blogging habits. This
approach worked reasonably well for gathering bloggers in general, but to identify a
statistically significant sample of political bloggers would have required a much larger
sample—almost certainly too large for most research budgets.
Similar recent studies include Schlozman, Verba, and Brady’s study of online
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participatory inequality (Schlozman, Verba and Brady, 2010), and Lawrence, Sides,
and Farrell’s survey analysis of blog readership (Lawrence, Sides and Farrell, 2010).
Both studies rely on sub-sample analysis of large phone surveys.
1.2.5 Summary
In summary, past studies of the political web have either made use of online data,
or employed representative sampling methods, but never both. This tradeoff has left
us in a methodological limbo, wanting to draw inferences from rich online data, but
unable to do so without sacrificing external validity.
1.3 Research Questions
This paper seeks to remedy that problem by introducing a methodology—an
automated snowball census—that satisfies the requirements of sampling theory and is
feasible even in the face of the technical constraints imposed by the enormous scale
of the web. This approach can help resolve the tension between exploiting easily
available online data, and making externally valid inferences about online behavior.
Consequently, it enables generalizable conclusions about many aspects of the political
web that were previously unknown, such as:
1. How many sites exist in the English political web?
2. To what extent are previous sampling frames representative of the political web
as a whole?
3. How do political sites with varying levels of popularity differ with respect to
organization, design, and content?
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1.4 Methodology
This section describes procedures to construct an all-but-complete index of English
political websites, to serve as a sampling universe in future studies of the political
web.
I should set expectations appropriately at the outset: the methods described
here construct a sampling index for English-language political websites, not a pop-
ulation of human beings. A web site is defined as the content found under a publi-
cally available domain-level, hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) uniform resource
locator (URL). In other words, a web site can be identified by a standard web ad-
dress starting with http:// up to the next slash: http://www.domain-name.com/.
Thus, http://www.google.com and http://images.google.com are different web
sites, and http://www.dailykos.com/faq.html would be a web page within the site
http://www.dailykos.com.
Web sites—as opposed to other possible sampling units, such as pages or users—are
attractive for several reasons. First, as described above, web sites have a precise
technical definition. Barring a complete overhaul of Internet content-sharing protocols,
domain-level URLs will continue to provide stable references to web content. Second,
web sites are clearly linked to publically available content. Since we seek to capitalize
on online content as a rich source of data, this link is essential. Third, web sites are
also usually linked to identifiable social units. To the extent that we can identify the
individuals and organizations that own and produce content for websites, the sites
constitute records of human social behavior. This link is essential to social scientists
intent on using the web as a window into psychology, attitudes, communication, and
so on. Finally, websites number in the hundreds of millions: daunting, but not totally
beyond the resources of social scientists to study.
Taking all these reasons into consideration, web sites are arguably the single best
unit of analysis for building theories of human behavior using online data. Constructing
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an index of sites provides a necessary link between the online space of web content, and
the social space of people and organizations. In section six, I will discuss additional
steps for using an index of political web sites to draw samples based on other units of
analysis.
1.4.1 An automated snowball census
First, we must construct the index. The intuition behind my approach is straight-
forward: all publicly available websites can be accessed over the Internet, and virtually
all websites are connected by links among webpages. In principle, we should be able
to build a sampling frame for the political web by following links among web sites,
and classifying them one by one.
In theory, this approach works. The practical problem is time. Experts estimate
that 255 million web sites existed as of 2010 (royal.pingdom.com, 2011). To borrow a
phrase from Matthew Hindman, exploring so many sites would be the work “of many
lifetimes.” To illustrate, roughly 59,000 new websites are started every day. Some
percentage of those are political. Just keeping pace with these new additions would
require reading 40 new sites every minute, forever. With so many sites to search
through, constructing a sampling frame by hand is not feasible.
Fortunately, this process can be automated. Instead of searching through millions
of websites in person, we can write software to search through millions of websites for
us. This process combines two common tools from computer science: web spiders and
text classifiers.
A web spider is a program that explores and downloads online content by following
links on web pages. Thus, the spider simulates the process of surfing the Internet
by clicking one link after another. Spiders can do this tirelessly, and—when prop-
erly designed—very fast. With a good Internet connection and parallel threaded
architecture, a spider can easily “crawl” dozens or hundreds of web pages in a second.
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A text classifier is a text-as-data algorithm that categorizes documents based on the
words that appear in them. Text classifiers have been used for information retrieval
and natural language processing (NLP) for many years (Maron, 1961), but their
use has dramatically accelerated with the rise of the Internet. Among classification
algorithms, bag of words classifiers are the most widespread. This family of classifiers
considers only the frequency or proportion of words within documents, and ignores
word ordering. Essentially, such classifiers count the occurrences of common words
with strong associations (or disassociations) to different categories. By aggregating
scores over all the words in the document, the classifier can arrive at a very good guess
as to the true classification of the document as a whole. As I will explain shortly,
text classifiers can be adopted to the needs of social scientists, yielding high-reliability
content coding on a virtually unlimited scale. See Manning et al. (2008) for a thorough
introduction to this field. See Laver, Benoit and Garry (2003) and Hopkins and King
(2010) for examples of applications in political science.
Combining web spiders and text classifiers allows us to conduct an “automated
snowball census” of the political web, as follows:
1. Start with a seed batch of likely political sites3.
2. Download this batch, and classify each site as political, or not.
3. For each political site, harvest all the outbound hyperlinks.
4. Place every previously unvisited hyperlink in the next batch of sites to be visited.
5. Repeat from step two until no new political sites are found.
3It turns out that the choice of seed sets does not typically matter very much. Most online
networks include a connected core of sites that can all be reached from each other. As long as at least
one site in that core is reachable from the initial seed site, all of the others—and all sites reachable
from the core—will be as well. This result is related to Heckathorn’s argument that thoroughly
mixed chain samples in ergodic graphs are independent of the starting sample.
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This logic behind this approach is reminiscent of Heckathorn’s rationale for snowball
sampling: the best place to look for political sites is close to other political sites in the
network. Computational tools allow us to follow this logic to its conclusion. Every
single site linked from at least one known political site is checked for political content.
Since this search is exhaustive, I call it a snowball census, rather than a snowball
sample.
By cataloging the sites visited in this search, we can create an index of political
websites. As long as two key provisions are satisified, virtually every political website
will be included in an index created this way. First, the classifier must classify
accurately. Any false positives or false negatives could distort the index. Second,
political websites must be adequately connected. If the political web is fragmented
into disjoint islands of content, the snowball might blanket one island but never reach
the others.
Fortunately, good evidence supports these provisions for the political web. As
we will see in the next few sections, the process of training the text classifier and
spidering the political web reveals a great deal about the reliability of the classifier
and connectedness of the network along the way.
1.4.2 Hand coding
My approach to training a text classifier combines best practice from traditional
content analysis with recent innovations in natural language processing. The main
idea is to define political content so that it can be reliably categorized by human
readers, then use statistical techniques to train an algorithm to mimic human coding.
I describe these steps here in turn4.
4Note: in addition to the political classifier, I also trained a language classifier to recognize English
text. The process is essentially the same, and the English-language classifier is extremely accurate
(100% accuracy over 200 documents), so for simplicity in exposition I focus on the more difficult task
of political classification.
Perhaps surprisingly, it is easier to train a classifier to recognize languages than to recognize topics.
The most common method (and the one I used here) is to classify text based on character uni-,
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I define political content as content “focus[ing] on who controls power in government,
and/or how that power is used.” This definition works well in practice, lining up nicely
with common intuition about political content, while also aligning with important
theoretical concepts about the authority of the state (Burns, Schlozman and Verba,
2001). This definition excludes non-state power relationships, such as gender dynamics
in the workforce5.
Using the crowd-sourcing service Amazon Mechanical Turk, I recruited English-
speaking U.S. residents to code 1,000 potentially political websites6. For each site,
coders were given instructions, a link to the website, and a simple form to fill out7.
Appendix A contains the instructions and codesheet. Coders were paid three cents
per site, regardless of whether it was political or not. An additional 200 sites were
coded four times each, in order to check inter-coder reliability. Final reliability scores
were respectably high, with Krippendorff’s alpha of .688 on a four-point ordinal scale
and .606 on a binary scale. When coders disagreed, I used the median value as the
final code for the site in the testing data. These 1,200 labeled sites served as training
(n=1,000) and testing (n=200) data for the classifier.
1.4.3 Training a text classifier
I used these hand-coded sites to train a text classifier. The training procedure
was designed to yield high accuracy, as well as unbiased document-level classification
bi- and tri-grams—strings of up to three characters in a row (Schmitt, 1991). For languages using
non-Latin character sets (e.g. Japanese, Russian), individual letters (unigrams) can inform us that
English is not the language being used. For languages using the Latin alphabet, short sequences
of letters are informative of the language being used. For instance, the trigram ‘ de’ is much more
common in Spanish than English. Since a text of any length includes many trigrams, and most
languages differ strongly by proportions of letter sequences used, language classifiers can be very
accurate.
5Of course, other researchers might prefer to use different definitions. If so, this method could be
replicated, starting from a different definition.
6These sites were a random sample of sites linked from a list of popular political web sites.
7Using novice coders is in keeping with best practice in content analysis (Krippendorff, 2004).
Repeated iterations of coding, discussion, and correction would probably yield higher reliability
statistics, but at the cost of relying on a non-transparent and difficult-to-replicate training process.
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probabilities. Most existing approaches to text classification focus on the first goal
and ignore the second. For this application, we want both. High accuracy gives us
confidence that the classifier correctly distiguishes between political and non-political
sites. Unbiased classification allows us to set thresholds and correctly weight results
in later analysis.
I approach this problem using a novel, two-step procedure. Following common
practice in applied text classification, we can treat documents as points in a high-
dimensional feature space. In the first step, we orient a hyperplane in this space to
achieve maximum classification accuracy. In the second step, we produce unbiased
classification estimates by projecting and rescaling documents along this axis. This
two-step procedure is useful because the data requirements are quite different for
orienting the hyperplane, and rescaling document-level estimates. Similar procedures
have been suggested by Hopkins and King (2010), for multi-category text classification,
and Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998), for regression analysis in the
presence of mislabeled data. See chapter 14 of Manning et al. (2008) for further
discussion and examples of the graphical intuition for hyperplane classifiers.
To formalize this intuition, it will be useful to introduce some notation. Let
i ∈ 1, 2, ..., n index a collection of documents D, and j ∈ 1, 2, ..., k index some
features, F , of those documents. Features are typically derived from words, but could
potentially include other information from document text or metadata. Accordingly,
each document can be described using a feature vector xi with k entries. Each
document belongs to one of two classes, denoted yi ∈ {0, 1}, with yi = 1 when i
is political, and yi = 0 otherwise. A classifier is a statistical model that defines
classification probability conditional on observed features: pr(yi = 1|xi).
I classify text using a logistic hyperplane classifier, applied to a feature space
of 5,646 maximally informative, case-insensitive, porter-stemmed8 words from the
8The Porter stemming algorithm (Porter, 2006) removes suffixes so that similar words (e.g.
“Senate,” “Senator,” “senatorial”) are grouped together.
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training set. From a statistical standpoint, this classifier is essentially the same as
logistic regression models that are familiar in social science. Within the model, the
parameter space consists of a vector of k feature weights, β, and an intercept term, α.
The classifier is “trained” by estimating α and β from hand-coded documents.
pr(yi = 1) = 1/ (1 + exp(−α− β · xi)) (1.1)
As mentioned previously, I train the classifier in two steps. Step one maximizes
classification accuracy by orienting the classifier hyperplane in feature space. The
difficulty here is that the matrix of training data is wide and sparse. The number
of word stems (k = 5, 646) exceeds the number of documents in the training set
(n = 1, 000), and many of the words are used very infrequently. Confronted with this
data structure, standard regression and logit estimators are often unbounded, and
therefore fail to converge. To solve this problem, I first estimate a regularized logistic
regression (RLR) model over the training data. RLR is similar to standard logistic
regression, except that it includes a regularization parameter, λ, which ensures that the
solution is identified, even on wide, sparse data (Ng, 2004). Essentially, that parameter
penalizes beta estimates based on smaller samples, by weighting them towards zero.
Equations 1.2 and 1.3 give the formal optimization problems for unregularized and


















Logistic regression has been shown to perform as well or better than other state-of-
9Readers familiar with RLR will recognize this expression as L2 regularization. Other regularization
terms are also possible. See Ng (2004) for a good description of the different forms of regularization.
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the-art class text classification algorithms on a variety of classification tasks. With a
small regularization constant, RLR asymptotically approaches the maximum likelihood
linear hyperplane classifier as sample size increases. In other words, we should expect
preliminary estimates of β to be close to optimal. Additionally, fast algorithms
for training regularized logit classifiers have been implemented in publicly available
software packages. I used the python library scikits.learn, which wraps the LIBLINEAR
library for fast classifier optimization. See Zhang and Oles (2001) for a detailed
technical exposition of these issues.
Table 1.1 reports estimated weights for a selection of word stems from the classifier.
Observe that words like “Obama,” “political,” and “Senate” are strongly associated
with political content, and therefore receive large positive scores. The obvious political
character of weights lend prima facie validity to the training process. Words like
“photo,” “home,” and “game” are weakly disassociated with political content, and
therefore receive negative scores. Note that most documents include at least a few
hundred words, and classification is performed by combining all of the words in a
document. Consequently, a few misleading words in a given document are unlikely to
lead to misclassification.
Despite these virtues, we cannot use the preliminary model as our final estimator
for two reasons. First, RLR estimates of prob(yi = 1) are sensitive to the choice of the
regularization constant, λ, which must be chosen without much theoretical guidance.
I experimented with constants on the range [10−10, 100] and finally chose 10−5 because
it seemed to give a small boost to classifier accuracy. However, estimated values of
prob(yi = 1) were clustered unreasonably tightly around p = .5, with a standard
deviation of only .058! Clearly, these estimates are too conservative.
Second and more importantly, the correct value of α is difficult to know until the
crawl is complete. If we follow the statistical logic of case-control research design
(as in chapter 5 of Agresti (2007)), α should depend on the proportion of political
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documents in the crawled set, which differs from the proportion in the training set.
Furthermore, this quantity depends on the topology of the network and the classifier
itself. Consequently, α—and prob(yi = 1) for each document—can’t be known prior
to the crawl.
I therefore conduct the crawl based on results from the preliminary model, then
recalibrate estimates after the crawl is complete, as follows. Using weights from the
preliminary, RLR model, I assign each document a score, ẑi.
ẑi = α̂ + β̂ · xi (1.4)
This procedure projects each document onto the axis normal to the classification
hyperplane. I then select a cutoff point, z̄, and execute the snowball census, retaining
any document with zi ≥ z̄. The choice of z̄ adjusts the search radius of the snowball
census. If z̄ is high, then only outlinks from sites that are almost certainly political
will be followed, resulting is a relatively narrow search. If z̄ is low, then even outlinks
from sites that are only marginally likely to be political will be followed, resulting in
a broader search. In the language of information retrieval, high z̄ favors precision,
and low z̄ favors recall. For the purpose of constructing a sampling frame, recall
is probably more important. For that reason, and to remain close to the spirit of
snowball sampling, z̄ should be selected so that pr(yi = 1)prelim is not much lower
than the final estimated value, pr(yi = 1), as measured in the next step. This may
require educated calibration over multiple crawls. For the crawl described in this
paper, I chose z̄ corresponding to a final probability cutoff of about 40 percent10.
Once the crawl is complete, we can conduct the second estimation step and rescale.
This is done by hand-coding a small set of documents selected at random from the
index. Applying unregularized, standard logistic regression values of ẑi for these
10To make this calculation, I used Hindman’s ballpark estimate for the proportion of political sites
on the web (1 in 300) in the case-control correction for α given in Agresti (2007).
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documents yields two adjustment parameters, α̃ and β̃.
prob(yi = 1) = 1/
(
1 + exp(−α̃− β̃ẑi)
)
(1.5)
These parameters can be used to construct unbiased estimates of α and β. Note
that these estimates are unbiased only if we believe that the logistic hyperplane
accurately describes the true data-generating process. This assumption is probably
not strictly true, but given the success of hyperplane classifiers, it seems reasonable to
suppose that this model is a good approximation of the underlying DGP.




−(α̃ + β̃α̂)− (β̃β̂) · xi
)]
(1.6)
Applying this correction to the entire index gives us final classification probabilities.
Where a binary classification is needed, sites with pr(yi = 1) ≥ 12 are classified as
political, and those with pr(yi = 1) <
1
2
are classified as non-political.
1.4.4 Classifier evaluation
Having described the process for generating an automated snowball census, we can
now turn to evaluation. A classifier that makes too many mistakes cannot be trusted
to categorize the whole political web. No classifier is perfect, and mine is no exception.
When evaluated against human coders, my classifier for political content agrees 80.1%
of the time, coding 34% of documents as political11. A naive reading of these results
is that the classifier is “about 80% accurate.” However, this puts the classifier in an
unfairly negative light. When compared to each other, the same human coders agree
only 80% of the time12. The computer agreed with the human coders more than the
11Following best practice in NLP, all accuracy and reliability statistics were generated by applying
the classifier to a testing set of documents separate from the training set. This approach reduces the
risk of overfitting.
12These results are from reliability tests performed on a random sample of sites encountered in the
snowball census. Therefore, they best represent sites in or near the political region of the World Wide
Web. For the web as a whole, the reliability of both humans and computers would probably improve.
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human coders agreed with each other!
The reason lies in the definition of “political” content. When applied to the
messiness of the real world, even the most clear and crisp definition has some gray
area where reasonable coders can disagree. This gray area accounts for most of the
difference between human coders. The computer does slightly better than the human
coders because the process of training leads it to balance across the coding styles of
many humans. In other words, automated coding for political content is dramatically
faster than human coding, and just as accurate.
1.4.5 Homophily
The second potential problem is isolated sites. If a given site or set of sites was
disconnected from the rest of the political web, the snowball spider would never find
it. My first defense against this claim comes from network theory. Like many social
networks, the political web exhibits a high degree of homophily. Political sites are
much more likely to link to political sites. Roughly 1 in 3 of the sites linked from a
political site are also political, despite the fact that only about 1 in 300 websites is
political. Links among websites are not random; the best place to look for links to
political sites is from political sites.
A second defense comes from the implicit scope of many web-related research
projects: for all intents and purposes, isolated sites are not part of the public sphere.
No other political site links to them13. If they have no in-links, then no search engine
can index them. Without search engine traffic or links, the only people who could
visit such sites are those who already know their exact web addresses. Therefore, it
seems fair to say that posting to an isolated site is a private action, not an act of
public political participation.
13The crawler used in this paper explores only the index page of any given web domain. Conse-
quently, it is possible that there exist sites that are not linked from any index page, but are linked
from internal pages. Results shown in the next section suggest that sites of this type are few and far
between, and mostly inactive.
21
1.4.6 Summary
So far, I have described a process for conducting an automated snowball census of
the political web. Conceptually, the same approach should work for any subdomain on
the web, as long as (1) the text classifier is accurate, and (2) the network is sufficiently
connected. The political web seems to meet both of these criteria. In the next section,
I describe results from the crawling process and supply additional robustness checks.
1.5 Results
I implemented the process described above in python. SnowCrawl, an open-source
python module, provides a common API for directed webcrawls using a single process,
multiple processing, or a client-server architecture. SnowCrawl also automates storage
of downloaded files, edge lists, and state backup. Source code, examples, and documen-
tation are available in a google code repository: http://code.google.com/p/snowcrawl/.
For a snowball census conducted in multiprocessing mode in August of 2010, the
code executed in less than 24 hours, crawling some 1.8 million sites, and classifying
about 800,000 as political.
This census was intended for evaluation purposes. Consequently, I started from a
relatively small seed set of 311 sites selected at random from the Technorati index
of top blogs. Using a small seed set allows for strong tests of the snowball census
methodology. We deliberately set aside existing lists of political sites, so that they
can serve as comparison samples later on.
1.5.1 Robustness checks
Does it actually work? Without another census to compare against, comprehensive
tests are impossible. However, we can run some “back-of-envelope” validity checks.
First, we can ask if the web spider found about the right number of political
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sites. Older work (Hindman, Tsioutsiouliklis and Johnson, 2003) based on patterns of
browsing traffic on the Internet, placed the percentage of political sites around a third
of a percent. Given last year’s estimate (royal.pingdom.com, 2011) of 255 million web
sites and monthly growth of 7.1 million sites, we should expect to find about 826,000
political sites in our August crawl. The total count from my snowball census is in just
the right ballpark: 789,818 political sites.
As a second robustness check, we can look to see if any known political sites are
obviously missing or misclassified. Prominent political sites show up early in the
sample: The Huffington Post, Daily Kos, whitehouse.gov, and so on. A quick search
within the index also reveals 497 house.gov sites and 217 senate.gov sites in the census.
These are the official websites of U.S. Congressmen, Senators, and committees—it
appears that the classifier found all of them.
Taken together, these checks provide reasonably strong evidence that this index is
close to complete. Next, I compare this sampling universe to those used in previous
studies.
1.5.2 Comparison with previous methods
In order to makes these comparisons, I obtained the sampling frames used in several
of the largest existing studies of the political web: the entire listings of political blogs
from the Yahoo! Directory, blogcatalog.com, and technorati, as well as the blog URLs
used in Adamic and Glance’s study of political homophily in the blogosphere (Adamic
and Glance, 2005). Although the sampling units are slightly different (political sites
versus political blogs), these lists of political blogs constitute the best available baseline
for comparison to the automated snowball census.
How does the census compare? Judged in terms of volume, the census is certainly
a more complete index. The four blog lists include 385, 4469, 2700, and 1490 blogs,
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Table 1.2: Comparison to previous sampling frames
index n Included Broken Ineligible Inactive Recall
Yahoo Directory 385 70.39% 5.71 5.71 2.86 89.14
Blogcatalog 4469 49.97 11.59 21.14 2.27 76.11
Technorati 2700 73.85 3.37 15.36 0.75 92.49
Adamic and Glance 1490 48.39 26.05 8.14 9.07 87.03
respectively. In contrast, the census includes some 470,000 blogs14, far more than any
previous study of blogs.
However, it might be the case that the census simply finds different political blogs,
and that none of the sampling universes is complete. To guard against this possiblity, I
searched the index generated by the automated snowball census to see what proportion
of sites was included. Initial results are strong, but not entirely encouraging. As many
as half of the URLs in the smaller lists were not included in the census. The first two
columns of Table 1.2 report list sizes and results from this search.
In order to make sense of these discrepancies, random samples were drawn from
each list. The URL and website of each sampled site not found in the snowball
census were inspected manually. As it happens, most of the sites not included in the
census were missing for one of the following reasons: the URL pointed to a broken,
nonexistent, or non-public (e.g. requiring password for access) site; the site was not
English or contained no political content; or the site was inactive at the time of the
crawl. All of these considerations place the blog URLs outside the intended scope of
the crawl. When we remove broken, ineligible and inactive URLs from consideration,
the final results are much more favorable: the census included between 76 and 92
percent of the political blogs in each list15. This level of coverage is comparable to
the percent of U.S. households reachable by phone using a landline (Blumberg, 2011).
Conversely, none of the other lists contains more than half a percent of the sites found
14This estimate comes from the sample and content analysis described in the next section.
15The list with the worst coverage here is blogcatalog, which allows users to self-subscribe: bloggers
can add their blogs to this list even if they have no other in-links. Consequently, a blog might be
featured on this list even if it fails the “public sphere” criterion mentioned earlier.
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in the snowball census. Although not perfect, the snowball census clearly provides
coverage is far superior to any online sampling frame existing previously. No available
online sampling frame is perfectly comprehensive, but the automated snowball census
is far more comprehensive than any previous list.
As an additional comparison, we can consider the distribution of political web sites
by popularity within each sample16. Figure 1.1 shows kernel density estimates for each
of these distributions, measured by logged in-degree. For convenience in visualization,
the maximum height of each distribution has been normalized to unity.
It is readily apparent that these lists are all skewed towards sites with far more more
in-links than average. The absolute differences are quite large. On average, a political
site from the snowball census has 89 in-links. In the other lists, the average value
ranges from 304 (BlogCatalog) to 796 (Yahoo)17. In terms of sampling probabilities,
the Yahoo index is 54 times more likely to include a site if it is among the top 5,000,
and 85 times more likely if the site is in the top 500. Previous studies based on these
lists have dramatically under-represented less linked-to sites.
All of this evidence strongly supports the conclusion that the new index is a
superior sampling universe for political websites. It includes vastly more political
sites, including large majorities of the sites on the best available comparison lists.
Moreover, when compared to the snowball census, it is clear that previous methods
have dramatically over-represented the most popular sites, largely ignoring the long
tail of the distribution.
1.5.3 Descriptive statistics
With this index in hand, we can generate the first fully representative description
of the political web. To do so, I sampled 150 websites from each of three strata
16Hindman has shown that in-degree, search engine ranking, and web traffic are all closely correlated
(Hindman, Tsioutsiouliklis and Johnson, 2003). I rely on in-degree within the snowball census as a
measure of site popularity.
17These values include self-loops–links from sites to themselves, and are therefore somewhat inflated.
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Figure 1.1: In-degree density for political blogs in different sampling frames


































within the census: the top 500, top 5,000, and full census of political websites. Strata
were determined by inlinks from sites found in the crawl18. For each site, workers
on Mechanical Turk were paid $0.10 to fill out a short codesheet including questions
about the ownership, organization, and content of the site.
Table 1.3 reports descriptive statistics for each stratum. For the purposes of
describing the political web, the important data are in the rightmost column, which
reports percentages for a sample of the full census. Thus we see that 55.6 percent
of political websites are personal websites run by individuals or informal groups,
as opposed to websites run by organizations such as news media outlets, political
campaigns, corporations, etc. 59.5 percent of political sites are formatted as blogs;
62.2 percent have more than one author; only 6.1 percent are updated multiple times
per day.
I also asked about certain design elements within pages. Half of sampled sites
include advertising, and nearly half include a “blogroll” or collection of links to related
sites. About one in five political sites features video content. Forty percent include
identifying information about their authors. Somewhat surprisingly, nearly a third of
sites include buttons or forms soliciting donations or recruiting volunteers.
In terms of political content, polls, public opinion, and elections appear to be the
most popular topics, followed by legislation and law-making, implementation and
execution of public policy, philosophical discussion of the role of government, state
and local government, political figures, and political parties. In general, foreign policy,
international relations, and decisions by courts receive less attention on political sites.
1.5.4 Comparison across strata
Since all previous studies have used less than fully representative samples, it is
reasonable to ask what difference, if any, a more complete sampling frame would have
18As Hindman (2010) has shown, inlinks are strongly correlated with other measures of popularity,
such as traffic and search engine rankings.
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Table 1.3: Characteristics of political websites by strata
Top 500 Top 5,000 Census
Organization
Personal websites 33.9%*** 46.9% 55.6%
Owned by organizations 66.1*** 53.1 44.4
Formatted as blogs 51.4 70.5 59.5
Multiple authors 75.2* 66.7 62.2
Multiple updates per day 43.4*** 19.4*** 6.1
Updated less than weekly 14.2*** 21.4*** 42.7
Design
Advertising 67.3** 57.1 51.2
Blogroll 57.5* 66.3*** 45.1
Videos 48.7*** 35.7*** 18.3
Identifying information 47.8 50.0 41.5
Forms for donations, etc. 36.3 32.7 30.5
Content
Polls and public opinion 70.8*** 65.3* 52.4
Elections and campaigns 50.4 45.9 51.2
Legislation and law-making 43.4 41.8 43.9
Implementation of policy 38.1 39.8 30.5
Decisions by courts 34.5*** 24.5 17.1
Political figures 46.0*** 39.8** 24.4
Political parties 38.9*** 32.7* 20.7
Philosophical discussion 26.5 29.6 25.6
State and local government 36.3* 38.8** 24.4
Foreign policy 42.5*** 38.8*** 15.9
International relations 31.9** 33.7** 18.3
Cell entries show the percent of sites that have certain organizational characteristics, or contain
design element or content types. Stars indicate significance levels in pairwise t-tests between Census
results and the Top 500 or Top 5,000 strata (∗p < .1)(∗ ∗ p < .05)(∗ ∗ ∗p < .01). Many aspects of
political websites differ significantly between sites in the head and tail of the distribution.
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made. Since previous studies overrepresent popular sites, I compared popular sites in
the head of the distribution against the entire population of English-language political
websites.
The first and second columns in Table 1.3 allow us to make these comparisons.
Each value that differs significantly from the corresponding census value (as measured
by a pairwise t-test) is marked with an asterisk. Each entry marked as such is a likely
source of bias in previous studies of the political web.
Thus, we see that the top 500 websites are more likely to be owned by organizations
and maintained by multiple authors, with far more frequent content updates. Popular
sites are also more likely to feature ads, links to other relevant sites, and video content.
In this sample, they were slightly more likely to solicit donations and volunteers, but
the difference between strata was not statistically significant.
A-list sites also differ in the kinds of content they cover. Popular sites include
more types of content overall: 4.74 types for the top 500, and 4.50 for the top 5,000,
versus 3.46 for the full census. Most of the difference comes from increased coverage
of foreign policy, political figures, polls and public opinion, and court decisions. These
differences in attention are substantively large: compared to sites in the full census, a
top 500 site is twice as likely to discuss decisions by courts and nearly three times as
likely to discuss foreign policy.
These results underscore the importance of proper sampling. Without a proper
sampling frame, substantive conclusions about the political web are likely to be
biased—in some cases, severely.
1.6 Discussion
This section discusses contributions, limitations, and directions for future research.
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1.6.1 Contributions
Given that many aspects of snowball census are similar to snowball sampling, it is
reasonable to ask what we gain by using a census. My answer is twofold. First, the
validity of a census relies on fewer assumptions. Current statistical frameworks for
snowball sampling rely on assumptions about random recruitment among social ties,
and the asymptotic mixing properties of random walks on social networks. In contrast,
a snowball census relies only on the weaker condition of connectedness within the
subpopulation of interest.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, a census is easier for non-technical
researchers to use. Constructing the index takes specialized software and com-
puting power, but once generated, it can be used as needed, with little techni-
cal expertise. Like a phonebook provides an off-the-shelf method for sampling in
phone surveys, this index provides an easy way to sample from the political web.
The full census and various sub-samples of interest are available for download at
http://www-personal.umich.edu/~agong/resources.html.
Furthermore, researchers with the requisite programming expertise have the option
of running the snowball software again. In this case, different classifiers can be trained
and used to explore different subdomains on the World Wide Web.
1.6.2 Improving coverage
The simplest way to improve coverage from the automated snowball census would
be to expand the list of seed sites. For the sake of evaluation, I seeded the crawl with
a small batch of political sites. The resulting index contained most, but not all of the
sites in other indices. Of course, we can easily include all those other sites in the seed
set for subsequent crawls, guaranteeing that they are included in the overall census.
Another simple way to improve the coverage of the census would be to conduct
repeated crawls. The crawl evaluated here was conducted once, scanning the front
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pages of political sites within a 24-hour period. If a given site was not linked from
another site’s front page on that day, or didn’t feature political content on its front
page, it might have been missed. Executing repeated crawls would improve coverage
among sites of this kind.
Both of these improvements to the methodology are relatively straightforward,
requiring no new training data, software, or evaluation.
1.6.3 Classifier accuracy
As described above, the classifier described here performs quite well—as well as
human coders. However, there are several means by which incremental improvements
in classifier accuracy might be obtained. First, better instructions and training for
human coders could eliminate some errors in the training data used to calibrate
the classifier. This approach would likely improve both human-human and human-
computer reliability scores. Second, in a similar vein, additional training data would
likely lead to modest improvements in classifier accuracy. Third, an expanded feature
space including more words or perhaps bigrams and trigrams, would probably improve
the classifier a little bit as well. Fourth, experimentation with different classifiers
(e.g. nonlinear SVM kernels) might also improve the classifier slightly. Overall, given
the already-high accuracy of the political classifier, we should expect incremental
improvements in performance at best.
In a more promising direction, the classifier could be redesigned to incorporate
other forms of information. At present, the classifier only makes use of text on the
main page of a web site. Consequently, short pages (i.e. those containing less than 100
words) offer less material for classification and are more likely to be misclassified. With
some additional effort, the classification algorithm could be trained to incorporate text
from other pages within the site, the structure of the hyperlink network surrounding
the site, and so on. For sites with few words, these additional information sources
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might substantially improve classification accuracy.
1.6.4 Alternative units of analysis
An automated snowball census generates an index of web sites. Of course, for
some applications, we might prefer other units of analysis: users, voters, blogs, web
pages, etc. As argued previously, sites provide a bridge between socially meaningful
and content-based units of analysis. Therefore, the index described here can help
generate sampling frames for these units as well. However, the conversion requires
some extra work.
For example, consider a population used in several previous studies: political blogs.
As a first approximation, we might assume that blogs are a strict subset of web sites.
In that case, we can obtain a random sample of political blogs by drawing a random
sample of political web sites from the index, and filtering out non-blogs19. Since this
approach allows us to sample first and filter afterwards, we only have to search through
a few hundred or thousand blogs—not the whole web. As a result, using the index is
much easier than starting from scratch.
A more nuanced approach to sampling political blogs would acknowledge that the
mapping from sites to blogs is not one-to-one. Some sites, such as The Daily Kos and
Fire Dog Lake, host multiple blogs in a “diary” format. In this case, we can employ
a cluster sampling strategy, treating political sites as clustering units, and drawing
subsamples of blogs from sites as needed. Weighting will be more complicated, but as
long as we are confident that all (or virtually all) political blogs are contained within
political web sites, this approach will generate representative samples.
A third challenge would be to sample political bloggers, rather than blogs. In
this case, we could generate a sample of blogs using the process described above.
Following the usual process for sampling within households, we could identify all
19Depending on the intended application of the sample, it might be desirable to weight on the
probability of filtering (e.g. conditional on in-degree).
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bloggers associated with a given blog, and use a Kish grid to select among them.
Bloggers who maintain more than one blog could be reweighted appropriately.
The common thread through these examples is that starting from a comprehensive
index of political web sites can simplify sampling, even when sampling on a different
unit of analysis.
1.6.5 Directions for future research
At the end of a technical and methods-oriented paper, it is worth pausing to
consider the value of the methods to the field at large. The web is one of the richest
sources of political data in all history, capturing the ideas, opinions, messages, and
reactions of a broad cross-section of society in networked panel form. Out of necessity,
previous studies of the political web have focused on a small percentage of easily
accessible popular web sites. A full census of political web sites, plus a methodology
for constructing similar sampling frames for other online content domains, equips us
to more effectively interrogate and draw social inferences from the web. Following are
thoughts on future directions for research in this area.
First, rich description of the political web. With a sampling frame in hand, it
should be easy to draw a sample, measure the properties of web pages and their
authors using content analysis and/or surveys, then make generalizable inferences to
the political web as a whole. This paper includes preliminary results in this direction,
but much work remains to be done.
Second, investigation of organizational structure within sites. Results presented
here hint at the diversity of organizational structures in the political web. Different
sites have different ownership structures, design elements, and means of content
production. Understanding this heterogeneity in online content production will be
essential to making valid inferences about the attitudes, incentives, and goals of content
producers.
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Third, a more thorough study of network properties. The homophily and edge
density statistics presented here offer only a cursory analysis of the structure of the
political web. Because the snowball spider automatically generates an edge list for
all sites searched, it opens exciting possibilities for studying the political web as a
complex network. Such research could add greatly to our understanding of information
flow, social connectivity, and political involvement.
Fourth, change and stability over time. The snowball census takes a snapshot of the
political web. Revisiting political web sites across months would create a longitudinal
panel uniquely suited to measuring changes in attention, attitudes, and speech in the
public sphere. Given the difficulty of conducting direct experiments in this sphere,
such a panel is a promising vehicle for testing causal claims.
1.7 Conclusion
In summary, this paper demonstrates how a combination of tools from computer
and social science can be used to conduct an automated snowball census of the
political web. I have argued that this process generates an all-but-complete index of
the political web, providing strong theoretical and empirical support for that claim.
Consequently, it seems reasonable to use the resulting index as a sampling universe for
the political web, solving a persistent methodological problem in recent social science.
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CHAPTER II
Blogging as an act of political participation
2.1 Introduction
In the last decade, blogging—maintaining a web page of posts in reverse-chronological
order—has developed as an important part of the American political landscape1. Po-
litical bloggers number in the hundreds of thousands, with aggregate daily readership
exceeding that of major news outlets (Smith, 2008). This shift in the political in-
formation environment has been linked to important changes in the dynamics of
American politics: the decline of traditional media (Meyer, 2009), disintegration of
traditional norms of journalism (Keen, 2007), increasing political polarization (Prior,
2007), the rise and fall of prominent politicians and journalists (Drezner and Farrell,
2008; Hindman, 2010), and changes in elite tactics for fundraising, constituent services,
and mobilization (Coleman, 2005). Many debates about the structure, reach, and
impact of the political blogosphere remain open.
In order to understand the blogosphere, its evolution, and its likely long-term
impact on politics, we must understand the social forces that drive this new medium.
This chapter contributes to this line of research by situating political blogging within
1Blogging, social networking, and other new media seem to be having some impact in politics
elsewhere around the world as well (Rheingold, 2003) (Coleman, 2005) (Harb, 2011). For the
purposes of this paper, I set aside questions about the impact of new media in authoritarian regimes,
parliamentary systems, and so on. Instead, I focus squarely on the political outlier that is the United
States.
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the democratic repetoire of participatory acts. Within this framework, we describe
the contours of political blogging as a mode of participation, compare and contrast
blogging to other forms of activism, and explore dimensions of participation that are
difficult to study in other contexts. This combination of representative description
and direct hypothesis testing opens new avenues for understanding the relationship
between activism, journalism, and new media.
To this end, I constructed the first representative sample of active, English-language
political bloggers (Gong, 2011) and surveyed these bloggers alongside a comparison
sample of U.S. residents. This case-control research design (Schlesselman and Stolley,
1982) enables direct comparisons between representative samples of bloggers and U.S.
residents at large. Stratification within the sample enables further comparisons of
bloggers by level of popularity.
In terms of substantive conclusions, I find that the decision to participate in
the blogosphere is largely explained by the same forces that explain other modes
of participation: engagement with politics, mobilization through social networks,
and resources (e.g. time, money, and skills). However, the balance of relevant
resources differs somewhat for blogging. In particular, whether a person blogs is
strongly influenced by political interest and education, and only barely by income
and traditional measures of civic skills. Relative to other kinds of activism, political
blogging skews younger and male.
Setting aside these differences in emphasis, political blogging fits comfortably
within the resource theory of political participation. Additional supporting evidence
comes from the fact that bloggers’ expressed motives for blogging are largely consistent
with activist motives. This conclusion is further strengthened by the close resemblence
that political bloggers bear to offline activists.
When we draw comparisons among bloggers by levels of readership, some unex-
pected patterns emerge. Not surprisingly, popular “A-list” bloggers report substantially
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more attention from policymakers and the mainstream media. They also put much
more effort into their blogs, and earn substantially more revenue. However, there is
no statistically significant relationship between popularity and ideology, partisanship,
offline participation, or self-expressed reasons for blogging. These results cast light on
the increasingly blurry professional boundaries around journalism and activism, and
open intriguing possibilities for studying the flow of information through democratic
politics.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the literature on political
blogging, especially studies relating to blogging as an act of political participation.
Section three draws lays out a set of seven research questions to investigate political
blogging from several complementary directions. Section four describes my methodol-
ogy, with special attention to collecting comparable survery data, measuring popularity,
and sample weighting in the political blogosphere. Section five relates results for
our seven research questions; section six discusses and synthesizes these results with
existing theories of political participation and media. Section seven concludes.
2.2 Literature review
This section reviews the relevant literature on political blogging, with emphasis
on blogging as a mode of political activism. The first half of the section reviews
early hopes and fears for the new medium of blogging, and the evidence to date.
The second half focuses on theories that categorize and explain political bloggers’
behavior. It compares and contrasts the two primary frames (blogging as journalism,
versus blogging as activism), argues that activism is the better frame, and points out
limitations within existing blogging-as-activism research.
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2.2.1 Early hopes and fears
When “new media” first emerged, proponents predicted utopian impacts. Imag-
ining the great new possibilities of a World Wide Web, analysts and commentators
rhapsodized about the wisdom and creative potential of crowds (Surowiecki, 2005;
Howe, 2009; Tapscott and Williams, 2008), and the wealth latent in networks and long
tails (Benkler, 2006; Anderson, 2008). In the new ecology of online media, “web-logs”—
a new genre of web site featuring frequent posts displayed in reverse-chronological
order—had a particular role to play as town criers. Blogs, it was thought, would invig-
orate participation, transparency, and accountability in industry and government by
empowering many-to-many communication among a critical mass of citizens (Shirky,
2009; Jarvis, 2009). Bloggers themselves derided “Big Media” as technologically
obsolete and institutionally defunct (Reynolds, 2007; Gillmor, 2006).
As the positive effects of blogging failed to materialize on the scale first imagined, a
negative backlash developed. Some worried that citizens obsessed with the ideological
convenience of “the daily me” (Negroponte, 1995) would wrap themselves in insular
cocoons of likeminded opinion (Bishop, 2009). Within this framework, blogging
came to be seen as a vehicle of selective exposure, partisan vitriol, and ideological
Balkanization (Sunstein, 2007; Prior, 2007). Others worried about a rising tide of
intellectual mediocrity, with attendant civic disengagement from difficult issues (Keen,
2007; Bauerlein, Walesh et al., 2009; Carr, 2011); or an Internet-driven centralization
of control over information in society (Postman, 1993; Carr, 2008; Zittrain, 2009).
Although these debates remain unresolved, several consequences—good and bad—
of blogging have now been well-documented. Perhaps the clearest change is in the
offline media environment: loss of advertising revenue to online media has driven many
paper-and-ink newspapers out of business (Chen 2009; Arango 2009). Bloggers are
probably partly responsible (Karpf, 2008); in any case, they have filled an information
niche by attracting a broad base of readers. Daily blog readership may be as high as
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24 million per day (Smith, 2008), and revenue for advertising and subscriptions in the
blogosphere is in the hundreds of millions of dollars (White and Winn, 2009)2.
From this vantage point, bloggers have taken an active role in politics (Coleman,
2005). Political bloggers were largely responsible for Trent Lott’s precipitous fall from
power in the Senate after his purportedly racist comments in 2002, Howard Dean’s
unexpected emergence as a serious competitor in the 2004 Democratic primaries, and
Dan Rather’s loss of credibility and eventual resignation after the controversy over
forged memos he presented on 60 Minutes (Davis, 2009). These examples demonstrate
that bloggers have the ability to keep issues on the media agenda, raise awareness
(and funds and volunteers) for causes and campaigns, and put substantial pressure on
prominent politicians and journalists, at least some of the time (Drezner and Farrell,
2008).
2.2.2 Blogging as activism versus journalism
Early academic and popular work frequently asked, “Are bloggers journalists?” Of
course, the conclusion depends on one’s definition of journalism, but for the most part,
the answer was a resounding no. Most bloggers do not see themselves as journalists
(Lenhart and Fox, 2006), and the vast majority of bloggers have audiences much
smaller than typical journalists3. Moreover, the content, practices, community, and
norms of political blogging differ in clear and important ways from those of mainstream
media (Perlmutter, 2008; Davis, 2009; Pole, 2009).
A second wave of research encouraged a kind of detente between bloggers and
mainstream journalists. The two information channels fill different roles, both crucial
to the modern news media ecology (Lasica, 2003). Following this reasoning, researchers
2Precise estimates of blog readership and revenue are hard to come by. Estimates for the political
blogosphere are even harder. The numbers reported here are conservative projections from Pew and
Technorati data for the whole blogosphere.
3Hindman (2010) observes that “only a few dozen blogs get as many readers as a typical college
newspaper.”
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have asked how bloggers compare to traditional journalists in their ability to attract
audience share (Graf, 2006), inform and persuade readers, frame issues (Woodly,
2008), and ultimately influence political and policy outcomes (Drezner and Farrell,
2008). Prominent topics include the credibility of blogs relative to traditional media
(Johnson and Kaye, 2004) and the role of blogging in agenda setting (Wallsten, 2008;
Leskovec, Backstrom and Kleinberg, 2009).
In recent years, the perspective has begun to shift. Instead of treating bloggers as
journalists, some researchers have begun to study bloggers as activists4. Given that
bloggers are engaging with political issues in a public forum, it seems reasonable to
think of political blogging as a form of political participation (Karpf, 2008). According
to this line of thought, blogs have joined votes, boycotts, protests, petitions, etc. in
the repertoire of political behavior (Tilly, 2004).
This “blogging as activism” approach is satisfying because it grounds political
blogging in existing models of activism. However, systematic empirical work on blog-
ging as a form of activism is just beginning. To date, two approaches have dominated
this field: descriptive analysis, and tests of cannonical models of participation. For
reasons I will discuss, neither of these approaches provides a fully satisfactory method
for explaining why bloggers do what they do.
Most of the early studies of political blogs and blogging had a descriptive, ex-
ploratory flavor. They were intended to introduce readers to the format, participants,
norms, and folkways of the blogosphere. See Karpf (2008), Wallsten (2008), Pole
(2009), and Davis (2009) for particularly thorough studies of this kind. This “guided
tour” approach is entirely appropriate for acquainting and orienting readers to the
new world of online political participation. These authors’ analysis of content in
the blogosphere is particularly noteworthy, since it captures an important aspect of
4A note on terminology: following Burns, Schlozman and Verba (2001), I will use the words
“activism” and “participation” more or less interchangeably to mean “activity that has the intent or
effect of influencing government action.”
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activism—what activists say—that is difficult to observe in other contexts, and has
therefore been undertheorized. With that said, it is also worth noting several important
features that most studies in this area are missing: representative sampling and the
resulting ability to draw generalizable conclusions; reliability statistics and procedures
for replication; and—most importantly—explicit testing of important hypotheses.
On the other hand, a second branch of research focuses on testing canonical models
of political participation (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen
1993)in online modes of activism. If political blogging is a form of activism, then
these models predict that involvement in the political blogosphere is largely a function
of one’s political engagement, resources (time, skills, and money), and recruitment
through campaigns and social networks.
To date, the most thorough analysis of the resource model in online activism comes
from two studies: Best and Krueger (2005) and Schlozman, Verba and Brady (2010).
Both of these studies were based on surveys of on- and off-line political participation.
Both studies find that online participation continues to be stratified by income and
education—representational distortion is alive and well on the Internet. However,
in a somewhat surprising reversal, Schlozman, Verba, and Brady show that age is
negatively correlated with most online political acts. In a similar vein, Best and
Krueger show that internet skills (designing webpages, using email) are predictive of
online participation, but traditional civic skills (writing letters, chairing meetings) are
not.
Broadly speaking, the evidence in these papers supports the classic “civic vol-
unteerism model” of political participation (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995).
However, the papers focus primarily on low-intensity online political acts, such as
sending an email, signing a petition, or donating money. Blogging is not addressed at
all by Best and Krueger5, and only in passing by Schlozman, Verba, and Brady. Fur-
5Their survey was fielded before political blogging came to prominence.
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thermore, these studies seem designed to confirm existing theory, with small allowance
for discovery of new features. All the main results concern the “average participant,”
with virtually no exploration of heterogeneity in participants’ motives, ideology, or
interests. Moreover, the studies barely engage with the qualities that make blogging
unique, such as potential for advertising revenue, and competition for attention, traffic,
and popularity. These studies include little discussion, and no data or analysis at all,
about the content of online political participation.
The same criticisms could be applied to many other such studies as well. As
a general rule, researchers investigating blogging through the lens of the resource
model and its variants have contented themselves with replicating well-established
findings from the study of political participation, sometimes with the addition of
Internet-specific skills. This is worthwhile and important groundwork, but it misses
the opportunity to extend and elaborate theory based on new information from online
participation.
Stepping back, we can see that existing research into online political participation
falls largely into one of two approaches. One approach focuses on thick descriptions of
new media; the other, hypothesis tests of old theories. In this paper, I aim to fill a
niche in the emerging literature on online political activism by combining the best
of these two approaches. To date, these two branches of the literature have not fully
engaged with each other.
2.3 Research Questions
If we accept the premise that political blogging is a form of activism, then there are
at least three distinct directions we can pursue the relationship. First, we can explore
the contours and dynamics of blogging in its own right. Second, we can compare and
contrast blogging with other modes of activism. Third, we can investigate aspects of
participation that were previously difficult to observe, but are easily measured in the
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blogosphere. To meet our goal of situating blogging within the Democratic repetoire
of participation, we need to do a little bit of all three. This approach fills a niche in
the literature on online political participation by integrating aspects of hypothesis
testing and thick description. Hypothesis tests are valuable because they allow us to
fit blogging into the framework of existing theory. Description is valuable because it
can reveal directions for theory to grow and change.
Accordingly, this section introduces seven specific research questions to answer
in the course of our analysis. These questions are framed in empirical terms, but
each contributes to our theoretical understanding of blogging as an act of political
participation. My hope is that these seven questions will collectively (1) add texture
and depth to our exploration of the political blogosphere, (2) highlight areas where
blogging may depart from traditional activism, and (3) provide the basis for discoveries
that can inform future theories and models of activism.
With those considerations in mind, here are the seven questions.
1. How do the demographics of the political blogosphere differ from those
of the electorate at large? Demographics provide an intuitive baseline for compar-
ing bloggers to other populations of interest. Since demographics are also often strong
proxies for other theoretically important variables, they can point us in the direction
of noteworthy new patterns. In addition, socioeconomic status is traditionally the
best predictor of representational distortion in politics, making these demographic
variables the first place to look to understand whether blogging is likely to increase
or decrease inequalities in participation and representation. Given past research into
online activism, I hypothesize that bloggers will have more education and earn more
income than U.S. adults on average, and are more likely to be white and male (Best
and Krueger, 2005). Following Schlozman, Verba and Brady (2010), I also hypothesize
that bloggers will be younger than other activists, but older than the population at
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large.
2. Are bloggers representative of the electorate in terms of ideology and
partisanship? This question is important for understanding the impact of blogging
on representation. Karpf (2009) and others have argued that the blogosphere leans left.
More broadly, the popular stereotype of a political blogger is a relative extremist—a
“wingnut” or “moon bat.” If digital participation lends greater volume to progressive
or extreme voices, we would certainly want to know it. With the first representative
sample of political bloggers in hand, we are in a position to test these hypotheses for
the first time.
3. To what extent do bloggers participate in offline politics? Understanding
bloggers patterns of off-line behavior is an important step to understanding the role
that blogging plays in modern activism. There are two competing viewpoints here:
on one hand, critics (e.g. Keen, 2007) often paint bloggers as reclusive introverts,
“activists” who only get involved from behind the safety of a computer screen. On
the other hand, Reynolds (2007), Shirky (2009), and others contend that blogging is
about communication and connection. According to this story, bloggers are typically
mobilized within dense social networks, both on- and off-line. In many ways, this
question parallels one of the ancillary questions asked by Verba, Schlozman and Brady
(1995): are political participants specialists or generalists? Participation in offline
modes of activism is one good way to judge between these two caricatures of bloggers.
4. Which aspects bloggers’ of demographics, ideology, and political partic-
ipation are correlated with popularity? Since “popularity” is unmeasured in
most previous research, existing theories have little to say on this topic. It seems
reasonable to suppose that popular bloggers are closer to political elites (Zaller, 1992),
but there are at least two categories of elites to consider. If popular bloggers resemble
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professional journalists, we might expect them to be more centrist and politically
neutral than other bloggers. Conversely, if popular bloggers resemble professional
political operatives, then we would expect them to be more partisan and ideologically
extreme. In either case, it seems reasonable to suppose that bloggers’ education and
income would increase with popularity, although I would expect the gains to be minor.
5. How much revenue and attention do bloggers report for their blogs?
Traditionally, the two strongest incentives for joining a profession are money and
prestige. Studies of political participation have largely focused on volunteer activism6,
and have therefore ignored these professional incentives. However, the structure of
blogging enables even part-time bloggers to realize some of these rewards by building
an audience and earning advertising revenue (Davis, 2009). If bloggers are influenced
by these motivations, we must understand them in order to understand the shape and
likely direction of participation in the blogosphere.
6. What reasons do bloggers themselves offer for political blogging? Ask-
ing bloggers directly about their reasons for blogging can shed a great deal of light
on the goals they are pursuing and the constraints they face. From a qualitative
perspective, this analysis can help us see if the answers bloggers give are similar to
those we would expect from activists. Accordingly, we will replicate two batteries of
questions about motivation from the landmark study by Verba, Schlozman and Brady
(1995), as well as an additional battery of similar questions from the 2009 Technorati
“state of the blogosphere” survey (White and Winn, 2009).
7. Does the resource model accurately describe patterns of participation
in the political blogosphere? This line of inquiry calls for replication of classic
6A parallel tradition investigates quasi-professional activism, often focused on the opinions and
demographics of local party members. See, for example, Katz and Eldersveld (1961), Jennings and
Farah (1981), and Huckfeldt and Sprague (1992).
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studies of participation in order to see whether time, money, skills, and political interest
and efficacy are important predictors of blogging. Demonstrating this similarity
would establish a deep theoretical connection between blogging and these other acts.
Falsifying this claim would prove that engaging in political blogging is genuinely new
and different, a critical step towards establishing online exceptionalism in theories
of political behavioralism. As described previously, others have already provided
suggestive evidence in favor of similarity, so I expect to find that blogging is driven by
the same social forces that influence other acts in the participatory repertoire. My
first aim for this question is to fill in the details and provide conclusive evidence, so
that debate can move on. My second aim is to take stock of any important differences,
because these will be key to understanding the new niche that blogging has come to
occupy.
2.4 Methodology
In order to answer the research questions outlined in the previous section, we need
to set up comparisons among several groups: bloggers, U.S. adults, and the subset
of U.S. adults who are active in politics. In addition, we need to be able to compare
bloggers across levels of popularity.
Our ability to set up these comparisons depends crucially on obtaining represen-
tative samples from both the U.S. population in general, and political bloggers in
particular. Good methods for obtaining samples of the first type of been part of the
practice of survey methods for many years. However, drawing a representative sample
of the second type is only possible because of the methods developed in chapter I.
Because we have a representative sample, rather than a convenience or prominence
sample, we can draw conclusions about the blogosphere as a whole, not just popular
A-list bloggers.
This section outlines my methodology for conducting surveys among representative
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samples each of these groups. First, I describe the parallel surveys that supply the
data that makes up the backbone of our analysis. Second, I address important issues
in measuring popularity among political bloggers. Finally, I describe methods for
applying appropriate sample weights.
2.4.1 Parallel Surveys
Our analysis is based on surveys of two populations, which I describe here in turn.
One survey, called the Evaluations of Government and Society Survey (EGSS), was
conducted around the 2010 midterm elections by the American National Election Study.
Administered by the survey firm Knowledge Networks, the survey was conducted using
an online self-administered questionnaire. Respondents were drawn from Knowledge
Networks’ respondent pool, a nationally representative panel of U.S. adults recruited
by phone and maintained over time. The questionnaire included many common items
from political surveys, as well as batteries of questions suggested and reviewed by
the research community. In addition to the EGSS questionnaire, results from the
Knowledge Networks general profile and Public Affairs profiles are also included in
the data set. These profiling questionnaires were administered to respondents prior to
the EGSS questionnaire, and include items about general demographics, as well as
political attitudes and behavior.
I conducted the other survey shortly afterward. For notational convenience, I will
refer to this survey by the name the survey team used internally: the Online Political
Speech Project (OPSP) survey. Also a self-administered online survey, the OPSP
survey was directed specifically towards political bloggers. Respondents were asked
about their blogging habits and reasons for blogging, as well as standard batteries
of political questions on voting, party identification, media consumption, attitudes
towards groups and policies in society, and so on. Crucially, many of the items in
the OPSP survey instrument were copied verbatim from the EGSS. This duplication
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enables us to compare results from one survey to the other. I also replicated items from
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady’s classic study of political activists (Verba, Schlozman
and Brady, 1995), the 2009 Technorati “State of the Blogosphere” survey (White and
Winn, 2009), and a few other items from the 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election
Study.
The OPSP survey was administered to a representative sample of authors of
active, English language blogs about U.S. politics. Although the technical details
of constructing this sampling frame and contacting bloggers are quite involved, the
gist is simple. First, I used web-crawling software guided by a highly accurate text
classifier to conduct a census of English-language political web sites. From there,
I drew a sample of sites, stratified by popularity, and filtered out those that were
not blogs, not active, or not about U.S. politics. Finally, I gathered email addresses
from the remaining sites and contacted bloggers with requests to participate in the
study. Response rates among the contacted bloggers were reasonably high (around 25
percent), and post-hoc analysis suggests that non-response was largely random. We
will address the potential for response bias in section 2.4.3. For further details on the
survey administration, readers are referred to Appendix B for details. The full survey
instrument is contained in Appendix C.
Because so much turns on the comparability of these two samples, it is important
to stress the similarities between them. Both surveys were conducted using the same
mode, a self-administered, online questionnaire. Both surveys shared many items in
common: many question wordings and answer categories for the OPSP survey were
copied directly from the EGSS. Finally, the surveys were conducted at around the
same time. The EGSS was fielded in late October, shortly prior to the 2010 midterm
elections. The Knowledge Networks general profile and Public Affairs profiles had
been conducted previously, in most cases around February 2010. The OPSP survey
was fielded in three waves, two pilot waves (total n = 173) in October and November
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2010, and a second wave in May 2011 (n = 603). Since most of the variables that will
be analyzed are essentially static among fully socialized adults, the passing of a few
months is unlikely to make much difference.
2.4.2 Measuring popularity
Since a substantial portion of our analysis will be dedicated to understanding
differences among bloggers by popularity, it is important that we have accurate
measurements for popularity. By popularity, I mean “the total amount of attention
that the blog receives.” Within our data set, we have three possible measures of
popularity to choose from: page views, unique visitors, and inbound links. This section
describes each of these variables briefly, and then explains why I selected page views
as the primary measure of popularity.
Page views are the most direct measure of site traffic. Each time a user clicks on a
link or otherwise directs her browser to a URL within a given site, the site’s servers
record a single page view. Clicks within the site also count as page views: it doesn’t
matter whether the traffic originates externally or internally. Generally speaking, page
views are private information known only to a site’s administrators. To obtain this
information, our survey asked each blogger, “About how many page views did your
blog receive last month?”
Unique visitors is a somewhat messier metric. In theory, it measures the number
of people who visited the site within a given timeframe. Unlike page views, a user who
visits multiple pages within the same site should only be counted once. Moreover, a
visitor who leaves the site and returns later should still be counted only once. However,
a sites’ ability to track users across sessions depends on several outside factors such
as browser settings and third-party cookies, and is rarely 100 percent reliable. We
measured unique visitors through another survey question: “About how many unique
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visitors did your blog receive last month?”7
Our measure of inbound links comes from our census of political web sites. It is the
number of hyperlinks direction to the site in question, from other sites visited in the
course of the snowball census. Past research has demonstrated that inbound links are
correlated with site traffic, especially among top web sites: Hindman, Tsioutsiouliklis
and Johnson (2003) found a .71 correlation between inbound links and site traffic as
measured by the web-tracking company, Alexa. As a measure of popularity, inbound
links have the unique virtue of being based on objective data, not just bloggers’
self-reported statistics. However, links are only a proxy for the total attention that a
blog receives.
Which of these measures should we use in our analysis? Ideally, we would prefer
to use page views, because it is has the best theoretical motivation. But since the
variable is self-reported, we should take care to validate it carefully first.
As a first step for validation, I checked for outliers, finding two. The first site
claimed exactly 1 billion monthly page views, and the second claimed an even larger
number: 1.828494e+48. A quick web search showed that neither site is a popular,
well-known blog. Given that the next most popular site claimed less than 2 million
monthly page views, I felt safe excluding these two from analysis.
As a second step for validation, I replicated Hindman, et. al’s analysis by comparing
correlations between all three potential measures of popularity. Our primary goal
in this analysis was to check our (self-reported) measure of blog popularity against
our (objective) measure of inbound links. A secondary goal was to understand the
relationship between self-reported page views and unique visitors. For all blogs in the
sample, page views and unique visitors are tightly correlated (r = .90), and each is
weakly correlated with inbound links (r = .24 and .26, respectively.) For sites with at
7In retrospect, this question wording was probably a mistake. Most web analytics report unique
users by day, not by month. In comments on the survey, a couple bloggers mentioned being confused
by this difference. Judging by the numbers, many others probably reported unique daily visits, not
monthly visits. These issues further cloud an already complicated measure.
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least a thousand inbound links (n=68), the correlations are considerably stronger .997,
.620, and .593, respectively. For the 17 sites with over 2,000 inlinks, the correlations
are all above .99. These findings validate our self-reported measure for page views
against a credible, objective metric. In addition, the patterns of correlation match
those of Hindman, et. al. quite closely
Taken together, these facts are persuasive evidence that user-reported page views
are a reasonable measure of real web traffic. Accordingly, I adopted self-reported page
views as the primary measure of blog popularity for all analysis in this chapter. As a
robustness check, I also replicated all analysis using unique visitors.
2.4.3 Sample weighting
From the perspective of sampling theory, our research questions call for three
different types of analysis, each of which requires a different approach to sample
weighting. Accordingly, I used two types of sample weights: design and response
weights. This section begins by describing these two types, then proceeds to explain
which weights were applied in which analysis.
The first type of sample weight is design weights reflecting our sampling strata.
In order to guarantee a sufficiently large sample of “A-list” bloggers, I deliberately
oversampled popular bloggers, based on inbound links8. This stratification was
essential for drawing comparisons among political bloggers by levels of popularity.
However, it also makes it is necessary to down-weight cases from the upper strata
when computing statistics for the average blogger. Because of the long tail in blog
popularity, our sampling proportions are quite unequal, leading to unusually severe
downweighting. Bloggers in the most heavily oversampled stratum were roughly 6.5
times more likely to be sampled than bloggers in the next stratum, and 108 times
8For sample stratification, bloggers’ responses were unavailable, of course. Both my and Hindman
et. al.’s analysis show that inbound links are an effective way to identify very popular web sites, so
this application is reasonable for our purposes.
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more likely than those in the final stratum, leading to sampling weights of .009, .060,
and 1.000, respectively.
The second type of sample weight is response weights intended to correct for the
possibility of selective nonresponse (Groves et al., 2002)9. I accomplished this with a
propensity score approach: using data available for both respondents and nonrespon-
dents, I modeled the probability of individual-level responses, and re-weighted the
sample to give more emphasis to bloggers of underrepresented types. The net result is
population-level estimates that are more reflective (in expectation) of the underlying
population (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).
In theory, many surveys would benefit from response weights estimated via propen-
sity scores (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). The main reason that propensity scores are
not used more often is that researchers typically lack data on the non-responding
population. In this case, studying the blogosphere gives us a bit of an advantage: we
can use the contents of blogs to generate propensity scores and sample weights, using
the following procedure. First, for each blog in the intended sample (both respondents
and non-respondents), crawl the homepage of the blog. Second, tokenize the page
and extract presence vectors for all common features10. Third, calculate propensity
scores by regressing blog features onto survey nonresponse in a binary logistic model11.
Finally, take the inverse of the propensity score as the response weight on each blog.
This approach to sample weighting is unconventional, but follows the familiar
logic of propensity scores12. The key assumption is that any biasing variables leaves
9In addressing the issue of onresponse, we have one important advantage: our target population
universally has access to the Internet. This is one of the most important threats to validity in many
Web-based surveys (Couper, 2000). Still, the causes of nonresponse in Internet surveys are not fully
understood. See Appendix B for a description of the procedures I used to maximize response rates.
10I accepted all alphanumeric strings as valid tokens, and retained the 6,000 most common tokens
for use in the model.
11After some experimentation, I used L1 regression with a .01 regularization constant. This model
had a modest pseudo-R-squared of .12. To avoid overfitting, propensity scores were calculated in
the style of a 25-fold cross-validation: in each iteration, 24/25ths of the sample was used to train
the model, and propensity scores were generated for the remaining 25th. Propensity scores for
respondents and nonrespondents showed sizable overlap between groups.
12Actually, it is not so different from propensity score matching as used to maintain web panels, as
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an imprint on the text of the blog. Unlike the problem of unbalanced stratification
described previously, weights assigned via propensity scores are not so dramatically
unbalanced. Therefore, they do not have as much of a negative impact on effective
sample sizes.
Having discussed these types of sampling weights, we now turn to types of analysis.
This chapter contains three major types: population averages, comparisons of bloggers
by strata, and comparisons of multivariate partial effects.
First, several of our research questions call for comparisons of population averages :
typically, the average blogger versus the average U.S. adult. In this case, we want our
mean statistics and surrounding confidence intervals to represent the population as
accurately as possible, without bias. Therefore I apply both sampling and response
weights13.
Second, a number of our research questions concern comparisons of bloggers across
strata. For questions of this type, I used response weights but not design weights.
This approach is appropriate, because we wish to correct for nonresponse bias, but
preserve sample stratification in order to draw comparisons across popularity levels.
Finally, the final piece of analysis requires comparisons of multivariate partial
effects. This analysis tests the resource model in the context of the blogosphere. For
this analysis, I use unweighted data, for three reasons. First, the analysis hinges on
comparisons of multivariate partial effects. Unlike comparisons of group averages, it
is not clear whether applying sampling weights will yield more accurate estimates.
Second, given the presence of many correlated variables in the regression models, the
penalty for sample weighting on effective sample size becomes more problematic. In
other analysis, we can afford to use conservative weighting schemes, even at the cost
of inflated standard errors, because sample sizes of a few hundred are still sufficient to
in Lee (2006) and Rivers (2007). The main difference is using text as covariates, rather than previous
survey resposnes, to correct for non-response and attrition.
13I created combined weights by multiplying design weights and response weights. This approach
assumes that nonresponse is unconditional (or approximately unconditional) on strata.
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yield conclusive results. The same is not true in this multuvariate analysis. Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, our primary hypotheses for this analysis focus on
differences between blogging and other forms of activism. Adopting overly conservative
methods, and erring on the side of false negatives can potentially confuse our results
even more than small differences due to lack of sample weights.
A final thought on sample weighting: it should be mentioned that none of these
weights has much effect on the substantive conclusions of the chapter. There are small
differences in nuance, of course, but the major results seem to hold up whether we use
design weights, response weights, both, or neither. As a rule, sample weights yield
larger standard errors, and make our estimates more conservative, but do not affect
the overall patterns in the data.
2.5 Imputing civic skills
Results for our final research question require measures of civic skills for both
bloggers and U.S. adults. Following classic participation studies (e.g. Verba, Schlozman
and Brady 1995) and more recent replications (e.g. Burns, Kinder and Ortiz 2002), the
OPSP survey included several complementary measures of civic skills acquired through
organizational participation: “In the last six months, have you given a presentation or
speech in the following settings?”, and “In the last six months, have you planned or
chaired a meeting in the following settings?” Settings included “At work,” “At your
church or place of worship,” “In some other organization.”
Unfortunately, the EGSS did not include comparable measures. To compensate for
that shortfall, I imputed values for civic skills with a two-stage auxilliary instrumental
variables (2SAIV) model (Franklin, 1989). Using data from the OPSP survey, I
estimated parameters for a simple regression model of civic skills based on measures
of news consumption, trust in government, church attendance, and political discussion
in various settings. Since each of these variables is included in both surveys, I was
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able to generate imputed values for civic skills among both U.S. adults and bloggers.
To maintain parity, we then use the imputed variables as our measures of civic skills
within both data sets.
As discussed by Franklin (1989), the key assumption for this procedure is that
the relationship between civic skills and its predictors (e.g. news consumption, trust
in government) is the same between bloggers and U.S. adults. This is an admittedly
strong assumption, but the limits of the EGSS data make 2SAIV the only feasible
approach for this estimation. Moreover, as seen in column one of Table 2.2, results
from the procedure are quite reasonable. Consequently, in the spirit of making the
best use of available data, I report the 2SAIV results even though the procedure
depends on strong statistical assumptions.
2.6 Results
We now turn to results. This section presents answers to our seven specific research
questions. For the most part, this section describes the outcome of analysis without
interpretation. Discussion is saved for Section 2.7.
2.6.1 Demographics
Demographic comparisons of bloggers and the U.S. population reveal some striking
differences. Over 80 percent of the political blogosphere is male, and 62.7 percent is
white14. Oddly, 1 in 4 bloggers do not identify as white, black, or Hispanic. The open-
ended “other” category included several bloggers who declined to state an ethnicity,
some multiracial bloggers, and at least two “humans.”
Bloggers tend to have much more formal education and substantially higher income
14A note on standard errors and confidence intervals: all standard errors in this section are based
on 5,000 bootstrapped iterations with appropriate weights; unless otherwise noted, dotplots and
tables report 95% confidence intervals, based on the same bootstrapping approach. As with weighting,
bootstrapped intervals had little impact on substantive results.
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than the rest of the population. The median blogger has a Bachelors’ degree and has
a household income over $60,000 a year. As many as 48.1 percent of bloggers have
advanced degrees, compared to 10.9 percent in the general population.
Somewhat surprisingly, the mean age (45.6) among political bloggers is almost
exactly the same as the population average (49.1). Comparing the distribution of
ages, we find that political bloggers are concentrated between the ages of 30 and 60.
There are few very young or very old bloggers.
Table 2.1 reports comparative proportions for all of these demographic categories.
Chi-squared tests reveal that all of these differences are significant with p < .0001.
2.6.2 Partisanship and ideology
In terms of partisanship, bloggers are somewhat less likely to identify as Republicans
and Democrats. Independents and “others” comprise 32 percent of the blogger sample,
compared to 18.2 percent in the EGSS. This pattern is more pronounced on the right
side of the aisle: only 14.6 percent of bloggers self-identify as Republican, compared to
26.6 percent in the general population. Several bloggers who self-identified as “other”
volunteered that they consider themselves libertarians. On the whole, bloggers seem
reluctant to identify with either major party.
This pattern is somewhat at odds with bloggers’ self-identification on the liberal-
conservative scale. When asked about ideology, bloggers are much more likely to
identify as relative extremists. In particular, the “extremely liberal” category includes
almost a quarter of political bloggers, compared to only 6 percent of the population
at large. We see the same trend in reverse at the middle of the distribution: nearly a
third of respondents on the EGSS said they were “neither liberal nor conservative,”
compared to only 16 percent of the blogger sample. Taking these results at face value,
it most political bloggers express stronger affinity for ideology than party.
In terms of balance, bloggers appear to be reasonably representative of the pop-
56
Table 2.1: Demographics among U.S. adults and bloggers
Variable Categories U.S. Bloggers
Gender Male 48.2 84.6
Female 51.7 15.3











Education Less than high school 13.2 0.0
High school/GED 29.2 3.6
Some college 18.6 12.3
Associates degree 7.5 8.3
Bachelors degree 20.2 27.3
Masters degree 8.3 17.7
Professional or PhD 2.6 30.4
Income Less than $10k 9.9 2.0
$10k - $19k 13.5 7.4
$20k - $29k 11.5 6.1
$30k - $39k 15 6.9
$40k - $49k 8.9 8.7
$50k - $59k 10.7 7.8
$60k - $99k 21.6 21.0
$100k - $149k 5.3 24.0
More than $150k 3.2 15.6
Statistics are weighted means from the EGSS and OPSP surveys, collected around the 2010 midterm
elections, with sample sizes of 1,240 and 776, respectively. See Appendix B for details.
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Liberal   Conservative Liberal   Conservative
These graphs show partisan and ideological distributions for the weighted EGSS and OPSP surveys.
Data were collected around the 2010 midterm elections, with sample sizes of 1,240 and 776, for U.S.
adults and bloggers, respectively. See Appendix B for details.
ulation at large. If we classify leaners with their parties, we find that 37.6 percent
of bloggers favor the Democratic party and 30.2 percent favor the Republican party,
compared to 45.3 and 36.4 percent, respectively. By these numbers, 55.4 percent of
partisans in both populations support Democratic party. In ideology, we find evidence
of moderate overrepresentation of liberals in the blogosphere: 54.4 percent, instead of
40.5 percent. Figure 2.1 illustrates distributions for party ID and ideology for bloggers
and the general population.
2.6.3 Political engagement
Earlier, we raised the question whether bloggers are “loners,” or involved in other
modes of political participation as well. The answer is unambiguous: the typical
blogger is a frequent participant in other political venues. Three out of four political
bloggers (75.5%) report phoning, e-mailing, writing to, or visiting a government official
in the last year. Nearly sixty percent (56.9%) attended a political speech, rally, or
demonstration. More than a third of bloggers (35.4%) advertised for campaigns, and
30.4 percent gave money to political causes. As shown in Figure 2.2, comparable
statistics for the US population were all 25 percent or lower. Bloggers are politically
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Figure 2.2: Political participation among U.S. adults and bloggers
This figure is a comparative dot plot showing average political participation among bloggers and the
U.S. population as a whole. Each of four political acts is shown as a pair of rows. On the upper row,
the percent of political bloggers who engaged in that form of participation is marked by a triangular
dot. On the lower row, the percent of U.S. adults is marked by a round dot. In each row, 95 percent
confidence intervals are shown by horizontal bars.
active off-line as well as online.
Bloggers’ other attitudes are consistent with this pattern of political engagement.
Bloggers are very interested in politics, with 92.0 percent saying they are “very” or
“extremely” interested in government and politics. The population baseline is 40.2
percent. Bloggers also have higher than average political self-efficacy, with 35.6 percent
of bloggers answering “a great deal” or “a lot” to the question “How much can people
like you affect what the government does?” Among U.S. adults, the statistic is 21.4
percent.
2.6.4 Differences in demographics, ideology, and participation by blogger
popularity
This question is easily answered: there are virtually no important differences
in demographics, ideology, or participation by blogger popularity. In a bivariate
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regression, gender is slightly correlated with logged page views (β = −.030; t = −2.41).
Loosely speaking, we can interpret the coeficient as “a 100 percent increase in blog
traffic is associated with a 3 percent increase in likelihood that the author is male.”
Aside from this small effect, none of our other demographic variables are correlated
with our measure of popularity.
The same null result holds true for partisanship, ideology, ideological extremism
(i.e. distance from the midpoint on a seven-point ideological scale), interest in
politics, political efficacy, and participation in each of the modes described in the
previous section. This conclusion was frankly surprising, but it holds up under
multiple specifications and related variables for popularity. Evidently, popularity
in the blogosphere is essentially uncorrelated to demographics, ideology, and offline
participation.
2.6.5 Self-reported reasons for blogging
One way to learn why people blog about politics is to ask them directly. Direct,
self-reported reasons can help us understand the culture of political blogging: the
stories bloggers tell each other—and themselves—about why they blog. They can also
help us understand important differences among political bloggers.
The blogger survey included two batteries of questions about motivations for
blogging. The first battery was based on the 2009 Technorati “State of the Blogosphere”
survey. Respondents were asked how important each of several factors is in their
decision to maintain a blog. Of these, the most popular answers were “I blog to speak
my mind on areas of interest,” with 95.3% “somewhat” or “very important” (Reported
percentages in the next four paragraphs are all for the same answer categories) and “I
blog to encourage social change on issues I care about” (87.4%). Figure 2.3 reports
results from all the items in this battery.
The second battery of questions was replicated from the 1990 study of political
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Figure 2.3: Self-reported reasons for blogging: Technorati questions
This dot plot shows the percent of bloggers who agree with each statement, estimated using sample
weights across the OPSP survey (n=776). Bootstrapped 95 percent confidence intervals are shown
by horizontal bars.
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activists conducted by Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995). Bloggers were asked to
respond to 15 statements about reasons for blogging15. Of these, the most popular was
“When I blog about politics, I do it for the chance to make the community or nation a
better place to live” (85.1%), followed by “for the chance to work with people who
share my ideals” (73.8%), “because it’s my duty as a citizen” (68.6%), “for the chance
to influence government policy” (68.5%), “to learn about politics and government”
(65.3%), and “because I find it exciting” (57.3%). Figure 2.4 reports results from all
the items in this battery.
Through these questions, political bloggers express a wide array of motivations.
Many bloggers claim to be intent on policy change, as evidenced by the “encourage
social change” and “influence government policy” questions. Large numbers of bloggers
also cite social (e.g. “to meet and connect with like-minded people,” “to work with
people who share my ideals,” “to be with people I enjoy,”), emotional (“to express
myself creatively,”), and civic (“to learn about politics and government,” “because
it’s my duty as a citizen”) reasons as their key motivations for blogging. Few (but
not zero) bloggers listed particularized benefits (“to promote my business, product, or
resume,” “to further my job or career,” “to get help from an official”) as reasons for
blogging about politics.
Because they are self-reported, these answers should be taken with a grain of
salt. Most likely, they reflect bloggers’ internal justifications for participation in the
political blogosphere. They don’t necessarily reflect all the underlying causes and
motivations for blogging. Still, these answers provide corroborating evidence for the
“blogging as activism” thesis: they closely resemble the kinds of explanations we would
expect from political activists.
Interestingly, none of the motivations seems to be correlated with popularity.
Three of the survey items16 show small correlations (two negative, one positive) with
15Questions were reworded slightly to accommodate the self-administered survey format.
16The three items are “to share my experiences with others,” “to make money or supplement my
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Figure 2.4:
Self-reported reasons for blogging, questions from Verba, Schlozman, and
Brady
This dot plot shows the percent of bloggers who agree with each statement, estimated using sample
weights across the OPSP survey (n=776). Bootstrapped 95 percent confidence intervals are shown
by horizontal bars.
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page views, but the relationships barely cross the p < .1 threshold for statistical
significance. When I attempted to replicate the analysis using unique visitors, none of
the correlations was statistically significant. I conclude that bloggers’ self-expressed
motivations are largely unrelated to their popularity.
2.6.6 Revenue and recognition
Having investigated structure and goals, let us turn now to two of the most tangible
rewards of blogging: revenue and recognition. As noted earlier, most bloggers are
unpaid amateurs. However, a significant fraction do earn money from their blogs.
Figure 2.5 shows the portion of bloggers who earn money from various sources. By far
the most prevalent source of income is advertising, with 13.9 percent of bloggers making
money through ads. Other sources of income from blogging include (in decreasing
order of prevalance), outside employment (8.4%), tip jars (3.2%), selling items through
the blog (2.3%), and premium content (less than 1 percent; only three bloggers in the
sample.) There is some overlap between these categories: collectively 12.7 percent of
bloggers earn money through means other than advertising, and 22.6 percent total of
bloggers earn money by any of these means.
Among bloggers earning revenue, the distribution of revenue is highly uneven, as
shown in Figure 2.6. Of political bloggers who made any money at all through their
blog, more than a third (34.7%) made less than $50 last year, and roughly two-thirds
(63.9%) made less than $1,000. However, a significant fraction of bloggers (18.2%)
made more than $2,000 by blogging last year. Given that some of our respondents were
full-time professionals, it seems reasonable to believe that their earnings amounted to
at least tens of thousands of dollars17.
Political bloggers’ self-reported advertising revenues closely reflect total revenue,
income,” and “for the chance to influence government policy.”
17Unfortunately, I didn’t anticipate the number of full-time bloggers who would respond to the
survey, and so the answer scale does not go high enough to capture their responses in any detail.
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Figure 2.5: Revenue sources for political bloggers
This dot plot shows the percent of bloggers who reported revenue agree with each statement,
estimated using sample weights across the OPSP survey (n=776). Bootstrapped 95 percent
confidence intervals are shown by horizontal bars.
suggesting that ads make up the lion’s share of income for bloggers. All told, 88.8%
of bloggers with any revenue made at least some of that money through ads.
Political bloggers also incur expenses running their blogs, but these expenses tend
to be small. Only 51.8 percent of bloggers reported spending any money running
their blog last year. Of these, 29.5 percent spent less than $50 and 61.3 percent spent
$500 or less. A small handful of bloggers (18.7%) reported expenses exceeding $2,000.
Intriguingly, the number of bloggers losing money on their blogs (29.9%) far exceeds
the number that we can unambiguously determine are making money (5.7%).
Not surprisingly, popular bloggers are more likely to report earning revenue on their
blogs. Of the six possibilities for generating revenue, advertising is the only category
that shows a significant difference by levels of popularity (β = 0.0244; t = 2.45)18.
Popular bloggers are also more likely to report higher figures for total revenue, ad
revenue, and expenditures19.
18Once again, I used logged page views to measure popularity.
19Unfortunately, the lack of an interval-level answer scale leaves us unable to estimate dollar
amounts.
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Figure 2.6: Ad revenue, total revenue, and expenditures among bloggers
Values are based on the weighted OPSP sample (n=776).
66
Figure 2.7: Sources of attention for political blogs
Values are based on weighted averages from the OPSP survey (n=776). Bootstrapped 95 percent
confidence intervals are shown by horizontal bars.
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We saw earlier that many bloggers post their views with the goal of influencing
others. In contrast to the relatively small number of political bloggers making money,
large majorities of political bloggers report that their blog has “received attention
from or been mentioned by” a variety of people, as shown in Figure 2.7. Far and away
the most important source of attention for political bloggers is other bloggers. Fully
three out of four bloggers (78.2%) report interactions with other bloggers last year.
Interestingly, mentions by other blogs seem to be a gating factor for mentions by other
sources: only 3.6 percent of bloggers received attention from other sources without
receiving attention from other bloggers.
From the perspective of policymaking, two other categories are particularly note-
worthy. First, 41.7 percent of bloggers report attention from “traditional news media.”
Second, 40.1 percent report attention from “public officials, politicians or campaigns.”
These numbers are surprisingly high. In addition, these figures are correlated with
popularity, with a 2 to 4 percentage-point increase in likelihood of attention each
type of source for each doubling in monthly page views. Even accepting that bloggers
may be optimistically overreporting their own influence, this level of contact with
influencers and policymakers is impressive.
2.6.7 Replicating the resource model in the blogosphere
As a second way to look at the data, we can compare political bloggers, political
activists, and U.S. adults in general. This approach enables us to move beyond most
of the limitations of self-reported data. Here, I classify as an activist anyone who
participates in at least two civic acts from the following list: voting, donating money
to a political cause or campaign, advertising (e.g. wearing a button or posting a yard
sign), attending a political rally or event, or contacting a government official. I will
use the term “others” to refer to those who are not bloggers or activists.
Simple descriptive statistics and pairwise t-tests suffice for this analysis. Both
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bloggers and activists are more interested in politics than others (35.4% somewhat or
very interested), with bloggers (89.1%) even more interested than activists (78.3%),
and all differences statistically significant at the .01 level. Responding to the question,
“How much can people like you affect what the government does?” activists reported
higher political efficacy (76.7% answering “a moderate,” “a lot,” or “a great deal”)
than bloggers (63.6%, t=3.39), who were higher in turn than others (47.0%, t=6.99).
Bloggers are more likely to be wealthy, with 61.9 percent earning over $60,000 per
year, compared to activists (52.3%, t=2.35) and others (37.6%, t=3.82). Bloggers
are also much more likely to hold an advanced degree (81.5%) than activists (46.5%,
t=10.27) and others (29.1%, t=24.52). Bloggers are more likely to be male (77.3%)
than activists (51.3%, t=7.25) or others (47.1%, t=13.08).
The relationship between blogging, activism, and age is somewhat more complicated.
On average, activists are about 8 years older than others (t=6.57), and bloggers are
about 2 years younger than activists (t=2.80). However, political bloggers are also
underrepresented in the under 30 category. Thus, the overall pattern for age among
political bloggers can be described as “younger, but not too young.”
Overall, bloggers fit the demographic profile of activists quite nicely. With the
exception of age, in every category where activists differ from the population at large,
bloggers also differ in the same direction. These head-to-head comparisons help us
understand the general similarities and differences among bloggers, activists, and the
population at large. However, they cannot tell us which factors have the largest effects,
conditional on the others.
To unpack partial effects, I set out to replicate Verba, Schlozman, and Brady’s
civic volunteerism model of participation (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995) in the
blogosphere. In order to mirror the original study as closely as possible, I included
variables for political interest and efficacy, civic skills acquired through organizational
affiliation, income, education, and age. Since not every variable of interest was available
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in the EGSS study, I followed the lead of Burns, Kinder, and Ortiz’ careful replication
study, and included several demographic variables: work status, an indicator variable
for age greater than 65, marital status, race, and gender (Burns, Kinder and Ortiz,
2002). Because we understand the causal structure behind political participation
reasonably well, these demographics can help serve as proxies for quantities that were
not adequately measured in the EGSS.
Table 2.2 reports results from this model of participation applied to seven different
measures of political participation20. In the first column, the dependent variable is the
sum of participatory acts for respondents in the EGSS sample. These results serve as
a sanity check: as expected, political interest and efficacy, organizational participation,
income, education, and age are all positively correlated with one’s overall level of
political participation. These results closely replicate those of Burns, Kinder, and
Ortiz. Despite the missing variables, they also capture the important theoretical
results from the original resource model.
Column 2 in Table 2.2 reports results from a model that has the same covariates,
but takes political blogging as the dependent variable. This model combines the EGSS
and OPSP samples in a case-control design. It provides the primary test of several
of our important hypotheses. Implicitly, we are comparing differences between the
OPSP sample of political bloggers and the EGSS sample of U.S. adults, in order to
see which characteristics are most strongly associated with political blogging21.
Most of the broad strokes of this analysis are consistent with what we already know
about political participation, but there are some surprises. Political interest is a strong,
20Note that the first model differs slightly due to the structure of the dependent variables. In order
to fit a counted DV, the first model is a Poisson GLM. The other models are all logistic regressions,
with binary dependent variables. Therefore, we can compare the direction and significance, but not
the exact magnitudes, of coefficients from the first model against the others.
21This analysis assumes that all respondents in the OPSP sample are political bloggers (a safe
assumption that was thoroughly verified in the sample construction process), and that none of the
respondents in the EGSS sample are political bloggers. This second assumption might be violated,
but only slightly. Based on our earlier estimate that one in 500 adults is a political blogger, we would
expect no more than a small handful of bloggers in the EGSS sample. Moreover, any measurement
error due to miscounting these cases is likely to attenuate regression estimates toward zero.
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Table 2.2: Resource models of participation in blogging and other types of activism
All acts Blog Vote Donate Advertise Contact Attend
(Intercept) −1.46∗∗∗ −7.39∗∗∗ −3.01∗∗∗ −7.61∗∗∗ −5.29∗∗∗ −5.32∗∗∗ −5.45∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.50) (0.41) (0.71) (0.47) (0.44) (0.53)
Pol. interest 1.03∗∗∗ 5.19∗∗∗ 2.01∗∗∗ 1.96∗∗∗ 1.88∗∗∗ 2.93∗∗∗ 3.87∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.46) (0.39) (0.53) (0.42) (0.37) (0.53)
Pol. efficacy 0.35∗∗∗ −0.03 1.34∗∗ 1.12∗∗ 1.36∗∗∗ 0.53 0.44
(0.10) (0.29) (0.41) (0.40) (0.35) (0.30) (0.37)
Civic skills 0.23∗∗∗ 0.18 0.58∗∗∗ 0.64∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗
(0.05) (0.15) (0.35) (0.24) (0.21) (0.20) (0.22)
Income 0.42∗∗∗ 0.46 1.49∗∗∗ 1.75∗∗∗ 0.57 0.55 1.56∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.31) (0.41) (0.52) (0.40) (0.36) (0.49)
Education 0.28∗∗ 3.65∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 0.28∗ −0.45 0.32∗∗ −0.77
(0.09) (0.40) (0.40) (0.41) (0.36) (0.33) (0.39)
Working −0.10 0.03 −0.11 −0.08 −0.26 −0.57∗∗ −0.61†
(0.06) (0.20) (0.20) (0.29) (0.24) (0.21) (0.28)
Age 0.54∗∗ −0.94∗ 2.72∗∗∗ 4.20∗∗∗ 1.43 1.61† −0.52†
(0.19) (0.58) (0.65) (0.96) (0.71) (0.63) (0.80)
Over 65 0.11 −1.09∗∗∗ 0.58 0.12 0.38 −0.11 0.51†
(0.08) (0.32) (0.20) (0.36) (0.31) (0.27) (0.35)
Married 0.05 −0.12 0.38† 0.32 0.22 0.24 −0.36†
(0.06) (0.18) (0.20) (0.25) (0.21) (0.19) (0.25)
Race: white 0.03 −0.07 −0.17 −0.12 −0.15 0.30† −0.14
(0.07) (0.21) (0.25) (0.28) (0.24) (0.22) (0.27)
Female 0.11∗ −0.89∗∗∗ 0.41† 0.03 0.50∗ 0.38† 0.35
(0.05) (0.17) (0.19) (0.21) (0.19) (0.16) (0.21)
N 1101 1564 1101 1101 1101 1101 1101
Standard errors in parentheses
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
Values are drawn from regression models with acts of participation as the dependent variable.
Column two is based on the combined EGSS and OPSP samples, both unweighted; other columns
are based solely on the EGSS data. Due to missing data, sample sizes are somewhat smaller than for
other analysis.
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positive predictor of political blogging, but political efficacy is not. Income is not a
significant predictor, but education is. After controlling for other factors, work status,
marital status, and race are not significant predictors of whether a person will blog.
However, consistent with the recent findings of Schlozman, Verba and Brady (2010),
age is a negative predictor of political blogging. Finally, women are significantly less
likely to blog than men, even controlling for other factors.
Columns 3 through 7 in Table 2.2 report results from the same model applied
to other forms of activism. In this analysis, all the independent variables remain
the same, but the dependent variable changes. Therefore, interpreting coefficients as
odds ratios, we can compare coefficients across models22. Compared to other forms
of participation, income and efficacy both have relatively small predictive power for
blogging. On the other hand, political interest, education, gender, and age all have
unusually large coefficients. The big surprise in this analysis is the substantively
small and statistically insignificant coefficient on civic skills—blogging is the only
participatory act for which civic skills are not a significant, positive predictor. I will
discuss possible interpretations of this result in the next section.
2.7 Discussion
These results in hand, we turn now to implications for political blogging, participa-
tion, and communication. Following the directive to develop “theories in the middle
range” (Merton, 1968), this section gathers stylized facts and integrates them with
other important ideas in the literature on political participation and media. From a
methodological perspective, this discussion is the first payoff for all the work done to
construct a representative sample of bloggers and survey them in parallel with the
U.S. population.
22The exception is the intercept term in the blogging model, which is skewed upwards because of
our oversample of bloggers. This is a standard feature of case-control designs.
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Section 2.7.1 begins by collecting evidence about the social forces that drive
political blogging, arguing that—in the broad strokes, at least—they are remarkably
similar to those that drive other modes of political activism. From there, Section 2.7.3
pivots to a discussion about socialization and how paths to political participation
may differ in the world of online activism. Together, these first two sections explore
the notion of blogging as activism: how blogging is similar to, and different from
traditional modes of political participation.
Section 2.7.4 develops the theme of quasi-professionalism in the blogosphere,
arguing that the blurring of professional boundaries complicates existing theories of
political participation and media. Section 2.7.5 concludes by arguing that a similar
blurring of boundaries is occurring within political activism and suggesting directions
for future research.
2.7.1 Blogging as activism
In a broad sense, the leading finding from this study—the jumping-off point for
future theory building—is that for all intents and purposes, political blogging is a
form of political activism. Bloggers think like activists; they look like activists; they
act like activists. The same constellation of social forces is in play. This is largely a
confirmatory result, bringing results from previous work together with new data and
systematic analysis.
However, we find that the balance of motivating factors is different in the blogo-
sphere. Relative to most other forms of political participation, blogging is correlated
more with political interest and less with political efficacy. This finding suggests that
for many bloggers, posting about politics online may be a form of civic sensemaking
(Walsh, 2004), rather than a goal-driven form of activism. An alternative possibility is
that bloggers hold realistic assumptions about the difficulty of bringing about change
in politics, but are interested in participating for intrisic reasons (Li, 2005).
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In contrast to most other political acts, income has a negligible effect. Two other
acts have similarly small coefficients for income: advertising for political causes, and
contacting an elected official. This pattern is consistent with the resource model: after
controlling for other variables, acts that make no direct demands on money, and small
demands on time are equally accessible to low- and high- income citizens.
From the perspective of representation, this would seem to paint an optimistic
picture: blogging is accessible to almost anyone, with little regard for wealth or status.
However, as we will discuss in Section 2.7.3, formal education—also an important
driver of social stratification—is an unusually strong predictor of participation through
blogging. On possibility is that by requiring facility with words but little monetary
input, the blogosphere introduces a cross-cutting element into the usual dynamics
of socioeconomic status. Another more pessimistic possibility is that the rising
generation of online activists is already advantaged by formal education, and will grow
into additional earning power as time goes on, leading to even more stratification and
representational distortion.
Age also has a negative coefficient, a finding consistent with Schlozman, Verba and
Brady (2010). This appears to be the result of a cohort effect among would-be activists.
It seems reasonable to suppose that when blogging became a viable political medium,
many younger activists adopted it as one of their primary means of political expression.
At the same time, some older activists picked up blogging, but the adoption rate
among this group was much lower. Very few older adults adopted blogging as a form of
participation, even though this group is the most politically active. Given the “young,
but not too young” pattern we saw among bloggers earlier, plus the relative novelty of
blogging as a medium, this is really the only explanation that fits the available data.
This begs the question whether political blogging (and other online activities) are
replacing or augmenting other modes of participation. On one hand, the “slactivist”
hypothesis speculates that among young adults, online participation acts as a low-cost
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substitute, crowding out more meaningful forms of participation (Morozov, 2012).
The opposing viewpoint is that online participation complements and enhances offline
participation by enabling rapid dissemination of information and tactics, and providing
low-overhead channels for maintaining relationships and mobilizing as the need arises
Karpf (2009). The debate between these points of view is far from over, but the evidence
to date leans in favor of complementing and enhancing (Ogilvy and Georgetown, 2011).
This chapter’s finding that bloggers are also avid offline participants lends weight to
that position.
2.7.2 Democratic bandwidth
Assuming that blogging is complementing and not substituting for traditional
modes of participation, what consequences should we expect? As a high-bandwidth
activity23, political blogs create new channels for input into both elections and the
policymaking process itself.
By reading blogs, policymakers can learn about likely policy outcomes and public
preferences. By maintaining their own blogs, they can float ideas and get feedback. In
addition, the format of blogging encourages linking, “following,” and reposting, making
it possible for ideas to disseminate through the blogosphere and reach policymakers
indirectly.
Focusing on inputs to policymaking provides a nice (partial) refutation to one of
the most serious criticisms leveled at political blogging so far. Hindman (2010) has
argued that readership among political blogs is low, and even more stratified and
unequal than readership among newspapers. These facts are worrisome if we think of
blogs solely as a means of informing the public. They are much less troublesome if
23By high-bandwidth, I mean “capable of conveying a complex message.” Channel capacity in
Shannon’s information theory offers a precise and conceptually useful technical definition of bandwidth
in the context of engineered information transmission (Shannon and Weaver, 1949). Verba, Schlozman
and Brady (1995) discuss essentially the same characteristic of participation under the header of
“capacity for conveying information.”
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we think of blogs as means of informing policymakers. In the case of policymaking,
an audience of one can be sufficient, as long as that one person can influence the
final decision. If we allow for non-electoral inputs into public policy, then a fact can
influence policymaking without many people knowing it. Overlooking this possibility,
Hindman conflates readership with influence.
Readers familiar with the theory of networked civil society put forward by Benkler
(2006) will recognize several common elements. In Benkler’s framework, many-to-many
communication invigorates the public sphere, leading to broader intake of ideas, better
discussion, and ultimately better governance. Benkler is very critical of the media
oligopoly of the mid-20th century, which he says was heavily influenced by money and
ideology, and exercised outsized control on public access to information. According to
his account, the current proliferation of online information sources is better than being
dependent on a handful of corporate broadcasters, even if it still falls short of utopia.
This picture of the public sphere is appealing and not entirely untrue. Unfortunately,
Benkler’s model ignores the electoral input to public decision making. Benkler treats
“government” as a unitary actor, and makes only passing reference to elections and
political parties. This is an important omission in a political system where legislators
and executives are elected in two-party, zero-sum, partisan elections. Policymakers
are influenced not only by the ebb and flow of ideas in public debate, but by their
ability win re-election (Mayhew, 2004). We have strong reason to believe that access
to additional channels, selective exposure, and ideological pandering are leading to
increased polarization in the electorate. (For example, see Prior 2007 and Lawrence,
Sides and Farrell 2010). What if this polarizing electoral effect dominates the enriching
discursive effect that Benkler outlines?
To summarize, focusing on democratic bandwidth leads us to ask where the
information used to make policy decisions comes from. Of particular interest is
how society closes the information gap between low-bandwidth elections and high-
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bandwidth policymaking. As high-bandwidth modes of political participation, blogs
and other online media have the potential to provide an important new input into the
democratic policymaking process. However, the consequences of this new bandwidth
are unclear, because many of the likely effects are cross-cutting and hard to observe
directly. In order to understand the normative consequences of this new bandwidth, we
need to better understand the ways information interacts with democratic institutions.
2.7.3 New paths to online participation?
Returning to the main argument, most of the differences we’ve seen are small
deviations from the canonical model of political participation. Blogging stretches the
resource model in places, but all of these changes seem reasonable given what we
know about the format of blogging. One of the centerpieces of the resource model of
participation is the notion that people acquire useful civic skills at work, at church,
and through other organizations. These non-political institutions have long been
incubators for important political skills.
The biggest apparent difference between blogging and older forms of activism is
the fact that after controlling for other variables, traditional measures of civic skills
do not predict political blogging. This significant finding stands in contrast to the
moderate to large statistical effects for every other form of participation measured
in these surveys. Best and Krueger (2005) discovered a similar pattern in their 2003
study of online participation. Two explanations are possible: either blogging requires
different skills, or bloggers acquire the same set of skills by other means24.
To the first explanation: the questions asked in the original activist survey focus on
giving presentations and speeches, and planning and chairing meetings. In a general
sense, these activities may be useful for cultivating interpersonal skills. However, these
24I admit the possibility of a third explanation: the insignificant coefficient on civic skills for
political blogging is an artifact of the 2SAIV regression estimation strategy. For the reasons given
previously, this does not seem the most likely explanation.
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activities are not direct prerequisites for political blogging. Perhaps, as Best and
Krueger argue, the skills required for online participation are simply different than
other forms of activism.
To the second explanation: perhaps other institutions can substitute for work,
church, and civic organizations as civic incubators. The “church, work, and other
organizations” typology was developed in the early 1990’s, before telecommuting,
outsourcing, and the Internet began affecting social institutions. It may be that
such social technologies have enabled other institutions to acts as socializing paths
to political participation. For instances, perhaps online “institutions” such as search
engines, online communities, and social networking sites are able to impart skills and
interest in politics.
An alternative hypothesis is that formal educational institutions are filling this
training and socializing niche for bloggers. Given that bloggers tend to be younger
and are far more likely to hold advanced degrees, it is likely that a larger portion
of their habits and worldviews have been shaped at universities. The unusually
strong relationship between political blogging and education adds some weight to
this hypothesis. If so, inculcation of online skills could become a valuable source of
“social returns” (Hout, 2012) from formal education. Whether these skills would act
as a form of “democratic enlightenment” or a more self-serving form of “democratic
engagement” is another question (Nie, 1996).
Reframing political blogging as a form of activism points us in the direction of
a host of interesting questions from the normative theory of political participation.
In this light, the question of who blogs becomes a question of representation not
unlike the question of who votes (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). Normatively, we
would hope that the mix of ideas and interests discussed in the blogosphere would
be representative of the community at large (Burns, Schlozman and Verba, 2001).
We would also hope that bloggers’ voices would be “clear, loud, and equal.” (Verba,
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Schlozman and Brady, 1995).
2.7.4 Blogging as quasi-journalism
The empirical results in this chapter also have strong implications for the old
debate about whether blogging is a form of journalism. Based on the evidence we’ve
seen, the “average blogger” is clearly an activist. Traditional norms of objective
journalism enforced a barrier between the two roles: with few exceptions, one could be
an activist or a journalist, but not both at the same time (Schudson, 2001). Therefore,
if activism and journalism are mutually exclusive activities, then then average blogger
is not a journalist. Either way, the best available evidence demonstrates that bloggers
are activists first, and journalists second, if at all.
But are activism and journalism mutually exclusive? A few years ago, we might
have been content to answer “yes,” and close the debate on the nature of blogging.
However, these days, the distinction is less clear. Mainstream media channels like
Fox News and MSNBC have made ideology an integral part of their business models
(Iyengar and Hahn, 2009). Millions of young adults rely on Comedy Central as
their primary source of news (Baym, 2005); the same comedians who host these
fake news shows sponsor super-PACs and stage rallies in Washington, D.C. From the
evidence presented in this chapter, we know that a large percentage of non-professional,
ideologically motivated bloggers—activists—create news-like content that attracts
significant revenue and readership. These patterns point to a trend of increasing
overlap between activism and journalism.
What is causing this trend? A full exploration of all the possible explanations is
well beyond the scope of this chapter. For now, let us pursue one line of argument
which I will call the professional-technological hypothesis.
The basic premise of the professional-technological hypothesis is that journalism,
like most other professions, derives prestige and revenue by creating and enforcing
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boundaries around a given domain of work. Like doctors, lawyers, and accountants,
journalists have developed standards for the day-to-day work of professional reporting.
These standards are embodied in professional norms, style guides, codes of conduct,
etc. and are enforced through institutional control of training, hiring, membership
in professional communities, awards, and so on. However, as Zaller (1999) writes,
the boundaries of such “professional cartels” are “difficult to maintain, particularly
under conditions of rapid social or technological change, and they are doubly hard to
maintain in the presence of free market competition.”
Again from Zaller:
Elite journalism is under fire—more-or-less continuous fire—from a mass
audience that isn’t much interested in politics, lower-status journalists
willing to meet the mass audience on its own level, and politicians vying
to control their own communication and increasingly adept at doing so.
Elite journalists are no patsies in this struggle ... [b]ut they are in a more
precarious position than many outsiders realize, and they know it.
These words, written in 1999, have proved prescient. Since then, pressure from
cable TV and Internet-based media (including blogging) have dramatically reduced
the economic clout and public impact of professional journalists (Prior 2007; Hindman
2010.) This has led to a blurring of professional boundaries, with many quasi-journalists
supplying news-like information without adhering to the practices of 20th-century
professional reporting (Keen, 2007; Shirky, 2009). Among other changes, many
prominent quasi-journalists speak from explicitly partisan or ideological viewpoints,
combining reporting and “journalism” with advocacy and activism (Karpf, 2009).
This state of affairs that could not have existed under the old rules of journalism.
So, are bloggers journalists? Unlike activism, journalism has been defined in terms
of professional boundaries. As these boundaries blur and evolve, the semantics of the
question become difficult. One reasonable answer is that bloggers are not journalists
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according to any traditional definition—but the same is true of many prominent voices
that provide news in the modern American media ecosystem.
If we accept the professional-technological hypothesis, then blogging is best seen as
part of a growing movement of technologically enabled quasi-journalism that competes
with traditional journalism for revenue and influence. Which, if any, forms of quasi-
journalism will be included within future definitions of professional journalism remains
an open question.
2.7.5 Research implications of the professional-technological hypothesis
As we segue into the conclusion, it is worth developing the professional-technological
hypothesis in one additional direction: blurred professional boundaries for political
activists. Political activists have never institutionalized professional boundaries in the
manner of journalists. Nevertheless, activism in the late 20th-century was marked by
a reasonably clear divide between professionals and volunteers (Bimber, 2003)25.
This conceptual division between volunteers and professionals has provided a
convenient theoretical and methodological line for researchers. Within the field of
public opinion, the professional boundary is demarcated by the theoretical distinction
between “political elites” and “the mass public” (e.g. Stimson (2004); Zaller (1999)).
Interestingly, research methods for studying each group have tended to diverge:
interviews, ethnographies, and close reading of primary documents for elites, in
contrast to surveys and experiments for the mass public. Both approaches have
produced useful results, but in terms of volume of research and citations, it seems fair
to say that surveys and experiments are the dominant methodology in public opinion.
Consequently, most of the theory of public opinion explain nuances of behavior in the
mass public, with considerably less attention to the behavior of political elites.
A similar divide is evident in the field of political participation. Once again, re-
25As Bimber notes, this divide was probably the product of many of the same mass-media
technologies that led to the rise of professional journalism.
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searchers have drawn a conceptual line at the boundary between professional activists
and volunteers, and again, surveys of nonprofessional activists have been the primary
research methodology. A brief review of theory-building studies and political partici-
pation literature illustrates this pattern quite forcefully: Wolfinger and Rosenstone
(1980); Verba and Nie (1987); Rosenstone and Hansen (1993); Verba, Schlozman and
Brady (1995); Burns, Schlozman and Verba (2001). Each of these studies is based
on survey methods, and close methodological reading reveals that each is primarily
focused on nonprofessional activists.
This common theoretical and methodological underpinning deserves attention
because it presents both a threat and an opportunity to this literature. The threat arises
from the fact that virtually the whole field hangs on a common assumption: we can draw
a clean distinction between professional and volunteer activists. Blurred boundaries
around “elite” or “professional” activism would challenge this core assumption. A
priori, it is not clear whether and to what extent theories of activism developed in the
context of nonprofessional participation will explain the behavior of quasi-professionals.
Our findings on political blogging demonstrate that the lines are blurring. What
should we make of a political blogger who earns several thousand dollars per year,
while working full-time in an unrelated position? Or a blogger who devotes dozens of
hours a month to following and reporting on city politics? Beyond blogging, other
forms of online activism show a similar uptick in participation. For example, the 2012
Presidential campaign shattered records for online donations, volunteer hours, and
events organized online (Scherer, 2012). Beyond huge numbers of small participatory
acts, the campaigns worked actively to engage supporters repeatedly, transforming
donors to canvassers to volunteer organizers.
Such quasi-professional activists have always existed; anecdotal evidence suggests
that they are becoming increasingly common. As a percentage of the population,
quasi-professional activists probably remain a small minority, but it seems reasonable
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to suppose that they exert outsized influence on campaigns, media, and policymaking.
Moreover, as a group on the border between political elites and the mass public,
activists are likely to be disproportionately affected by these trends.
In order to address this threat to the validity, theories of political participation
will need to consider professional incentives and socialization more carefully. This
chapter has taken a first step in that direction by examining revenue, attention,
and popularity among political bloggers. Exploring these incentives and their effect
of bloggers’—and other activists’ patterns of behavior—strikes me as an important
avenue for further research. In a different vein, our discoveries about the unusually
high predictive power of education and unusually low predictive power of civic skills
for explaining participation in the blogosphere are also suggestive of the types of
training and socialization necessary to be active in the blogosphere. One promising
line for future research would be to explore skill transfer from educational settings
to new forms of political participation, in the spirit of Schlozman, Burns and Verba
(1999).
2.7.6 Future directions
In closing, let me highlight on the opportunity that strikes me the single most
promising direction for future research. Given that political bloggers fit the profile of
political activists, it seems reasonable to suppose that we can use behavior observed in
the blogosphere to extend theories of participation. As noted above, the vast majority
of research on political participation focuses on levels of participation: Who shows
up and how much do they contribute? Very little research attends to the content of
participation: What do people actually say and do once they arrive on the public
stage?
In future research, content analysis could investigate aspects of participation such
as civility (Sanders 1997; Carpini, Cook and Jacobs 2004; Sobieraj and Berry 2011),
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selective exposure (Frey 1986; Lawrence, Sides and Farrell 2010), adherence to norms
of traditional journalism (Schudson 2001; Gillmor 2006), and attention to different
topics over time (Lippmann 1927; Iyengar and Kinder 2010; Leskovec, Backstrom and
Kleinberg 2009). These aspects of participation matter deeply for democracy, but have
been difficult to study in other contexts. Success in this line of research could combine
the best of Walsh’s ethnographic studies of informal political discussion (Walsh, 2004)
with Mutz’ detailed investigation of cross-cutting political exposure (Mutz, 2006). It
could measure directly the forces of “elite discourse” that have typically been inferred
indirectly from time series or panel data (e.g. Zaller 1992; Stimson 2004; Prior 2007,
Page and Shapiro 2010).
Because the political blogosphere offers a wealth of easily validated, high-bandwidth
data, it provides a natural laboratory for studying the content of participation. This
laboratory would enable us to take many aspects of the social system surrounding
public opinion and political participation and observe, measure, and theorize about
them directly.
2.8 Conclusion
This chapter establishes a crucial link between political bloggers and political
activists. Multiple lines of evidence demonstrate that bloggers think like activists,
look like activists, and act like activists. These results pave the way for new directions
in the study of political participation: the content of participation, bandwidth, and
the role of information in democracy.
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CHAPTER III
Methods for very large-scale content analysis
3.1 Introduction
By its nature, content analysis presents special difficulties for scientifically valid
measurement. The process is inherently subjective, and must therefore be based on
the judgments of human coders who make mistakes, get bored, try to game the system,
and often have very different perceptions. All of these human factors complicate the
process of deriving valid measures from text. In this project, we have the additional
requirement of applying those measures to millions of blog posts.
This chapter details methods for meeting the twin challenges of validity and
scale in content analysis. The main story in this chapter is about reliability and
accuracy. I describe the process of expert, novice, quorum, and automated coding, and
demonstrate that most of our codebook items perform quite well in terms of intercoder
reliability. Along the way, I take short detours to discuss practical issues related to
gathering data and assessing reliability: data structures, identifying spammers, and
specific items with poor reliability scores.
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3.2 Research questions
This chapter describes (1) a series of codebooks for journalistic writing and civility
in blog text, (2) tests to ensure that those cookbooks yield reliable measures, and (3)
methods for scaling those measurements to millions of blog posts. In this endeavor we
have three primary research questions:
• Can expert coders reliably measure newswriting and civility in the text of blog
posts?
• Can novice coders with no prior exposure to the theory of constructive discourse
and journalism also reliably measure the same variables?
• Can automated text classification replicate expert and novice coding with high
accuracy and low bias?
To ensure that our measures are both valid and scalable, each of these steps must
be completed successfully. Reliable coding among experts is necessary for primary
codebook development. Reliable coding among novices is necessary to guarantee
that the methodology satisfies the scientific criteria of transparency and replicability.
Accurate and reliable coding by automated classifiers is necessary in order to apply
the measurements to a corpus of millions of blog posts.
3.3 Methodology
3.3.1 Expert codebook development
The content of political blog posts can be evaluated along countless dimensions.
For purposes of this dissertation, I choose to focus on two dimensions in particular:
newswriting and civility. These concepts occupy important positions in many theoreti-
cal debates about political discourse and new media. For our purposes in this chapter,
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Table 3.1: Items for the four newswriting codebooks
Neutral voice
Does the author use the first person (e.g. I, we, our) outside of quotes?
Does the author express his/her opinion directly in this text?
Public import
This article is about a topic that affects many people.
The article is about an issue of government policy.
This article talks about what government should or should not do.
This article is about a political issue.
This article is on a lifestyle topic, such as fashion, entertainment, food, etc.
This article focuses on offering helpful advice to readers.
Information gathering
Outside facts, sources, and evidence are an important part of this article.
Personal experiences from the author’s own life are an important part of this article.
The author appears to have spent significant effort gathering information for this
article.
This article is based on information that is not available on the Internet, such as
interviews and on-the-ground reporting.
Sources and evidence
Direct quotations from people other than the author
Personal experiences from other people’s lives
Statements by experts
Statements by eyewitnesses, or people who have been directly affected by the topics
discussed in the article.
Quantitative information, such as percentages, prices, poll results, etc.
they will serve as a diverse set of measures to test new methods for large-scale content
analysis.
By newswriting, I mean “patterns of writing that reflect the norms, traditions, and
professional standards of mainstream American 20th century journalism” (Schudson,
1981). Newswriting in blogging is important because the news industry is changing
rapidly, with blogging encroaching on a media niche that used to be occupied by
professional journalists (Meyer, 2009) (Hindman, 2010). Therefore, the long-term
impact of blogging is closely tied to the ways in which bloggers choose to follow or
defy the tradtional conventions of newswriting (Karpf, 2008).
Table 3.1 lists items for each of the four newswriting codebooks: neutral voice,
public import, information gathering, and sources and evidence.
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Civility is harder to define, in large part because the boundaries and dimensions
of the concept are contested in deliberative theory (Sanders, 1997) (Mutz, 2008). For
our purposes, I focus on three relatively well-defined aspects of civility: divisiveness,
respect for others, and appeals to anger and fear1. These concepts are closely related
to the normative ideals of inclusion, veracity, transparency, and rationality in public
discourse. Although various schools of thought debate the relative importance of these
aspects of civility, they all agree that certain patterns of communication are essential
for opinion formation and healthy democratic self government.
Codebook development was an iterative process, centered on a group of “expert
coders.” Throughout this chapter, I will use the term “expert coder” to refer to those
involved in creating the codebooks: myself, plus undergraduate research assistants.
This research team went through multiple rounds of testing and evaluation for each of
the seven codebooks. In each round, we sought to revise codebooks to (1) capture
the core concepts of theories of constructive discourse, and (2) enable high-reliability
content coding within the team.
Once codebook development was complete, I evaluated intercoder reliability on
the final versions of each codebook as follows. First, I drew random samples of 60
previously unseen blog posts containing at least 1,500 characters (approx. 250 words)2.
Next, for each codebook, a pair of expert coders independently coded each blog post
in the sample. Finally, we measured intercoder reliability using the Krippendorff’s
alpha statistic.
1In addition to these codebooks, I also attempted to create codebooks for other aspects of civility,
including reciprocity (Gutmann and Thompson, 2009) and violent rhetoric (Kalmoe, 2011). However,
these proved extremely difficult to measure reliably in blog content, even among expert coders.
2Our early experiments in codebook development showed that very short blog posts don’t contain
enough content for either human or automated coders to produce reliable labels. In addition, these
very short posts tend to be of less substantive interest.
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Table 3.2: Items for the three civility codebooks
Divisiveness
The author takes a clear stance on the issue.
To what extent does the author frame the issue as an “us against them” situation?
On the issues discussed in the article, the author seems open-minded.
This author blames specific people or groups for bad outcomes.
The author sounds like s/he would be open to compromise on this issue.
The author of this article seems like a reasonable person—someone you could have
a good discussion with, even if you disagreed
Respect for others
This text mentions opposing viewpoints.
The author shows respect for people holding opinions that oppose his/her own.
The author shows respect for opposing viewpoints.
Much of this text is spent criticizing others’ motives (e.g. “he’s out to get us,” “she
can’t be trusted,” “greedy,” “dishonest,” etc.)
Much of this text is spent criticizing others’ competence (e.g. “he’s an idiot,” “she
is clueless.”)
The author uses derisive labels for people.
Appeals to anger and fear
The author tries to make the reader feel angry about this issue.
The author uses emotionally-charged language.
The author talks about threats to cherished values (e.g. political, religious, moral
ideals).
The author talks about threats to physical well-being and safety.
The author talks about threats to personal economic interests (e.g. jobs, income,
tax rates, etc.).
The author uses exaggeration and/or hyperbole (“the worst idea ever,” “everyone
is talking about it.”)
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3.3.2 Novice content analysis
The advantage of expert coding is that it is relatively easy to develop a common
language, achieve consensus, and label documents with high reliability. However,
the process isn’t fully replicable, and it doesn’t scale well—it’s one thing to organize
research assistants to code dozens or hundreds of articles, and something else to
persuade them to code thousands or tens of thousands. To scale up the volume of
coding by two orders of magnitude, I took the same codebooks to the crowdsourcing
site Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), and recruited workers to code a comparable
set of blog posts. I will refer to these workers as “novice coders” or “turkers.”
The decision to use Mechanical Turk as a platform for content analysis was driven
by two primary considerations. First, MTurk provides a practical means of ensuring
replicability. Workers on MTurk have no prior exposure to my codebooks or the
objectives of the study. Employing them is an effective way of “double-blinding” the
content analysis portion of study against subconscious bias. A second advantage of
MTurk is its cost-effectiveness: piece rates on MTurk are low enough that I was able
to recruit dozens of coders to assign labels for thousands of blog posts. For each of
the seven codebooks, a corpus of 2,380 documents was labled on MTurk. As described
in Section 3.3.4, many of these documents were labeled by multiple coders.
The downside of MTurk is that intercoder reliability is typically much lower,
especially on nuanced and subjective tasks. Accordingly, I developed an MTurk
task interface designed to be user-friendly, intuitive, and clear, in order to minimize
distractions, confusion, and ambiguity that could lower intercoder reliability. Figure
3.1 shows a screenshot of the MTurk task for the neutral voice codebook. Other
codebooks followed the same format; screenshots can be found in Appendix D.
To further improve reliability, I restricted the task to turkers who had completed
at least 100 tasks with an acceptance rate of 90 percent. Futhermore, only turkers
90























with accounts in the United States were allowed to participate3. For the first five
codebooks, I paid $0.06 per task with the promise of “up to 100% bonuses” based
on each coders’ quality and quantity of work. On the remaining two codebooks, I
raised the rate of base pay to $0.10. Additional details were supplied in a FAQ (see
Appendix D). In the end, turkers earned an average of $0.1124 per task, with an
average base rate of $0.0726 and an average bonus rate of $0.0397.
In addition, I took steps to remove spammers from my population of workers,
and to combine worker scores using a technique I call “quorum coding.” Together,
these techniques are sufficient to bring novice intercoder reliability scores up to levels
comparable with expert coding. I will discuss the details of these methods in the
results section of this chapter.
3.3.3 Automated coding
By reporting intercoder reliability and conducting our content coding with novice
coders, rather than experts, we have already established a higher bar for replicability
than the vast majority of published content analysis studies. However, we’re not done
yet, because we have “only” coded a few tens of thousands of blog posts. Ultimately,
the research design calls for reliable coding of millions of blog posts. The last step
is to train text classifiers that mimic the novice coders. If we can build accurate
enough text classifiers, then there’s nothing stopping us from applying them to as
many millions of blog posts as we want.
Accordingly, I trained a separate classifier for each codebook item. Each classifier
was based on a LASSO regression model4 with a regularization constant of .0155. The
3Other researchers have found that turkers outside the U.S. often produce less reliable results
(Shaw, Horton and Chen, 2011). This finding agrees with my own experience as well.
4As a member of the regression model family, LASSO models expect the dependent variable to be
a continuous, interval-level score. Since our data are technically ordinal, an ordinal classifier would
be a better statistical fit. However, training such models is computationally prohibitive. In practice,
treating ordinal scales as interval data seems to work well enough.
5Classifier accuracy could probably be improved slightly by tuning this parameter for each model.
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feature set includes 3,112 characters, character bigrams, and alphanumeric words that
occurred in at least 100 documents within the training and testing corpus. I mapped
the text to lowercase, but did not apply any other stemming or stopping to the feature
set6. Following common practice, I used binary presence vectors (“Did the feature
occur or not?”) rather than count vectors (“How many times did the feature occur?”).
After each classifier was trained, I applied linear recalibration to correct for
overfitting—or possible underfitting due to the regularization constant—as follows7. I
first fit a bivariate linear model regressing predicted values onto actual labels within
the testing set8. This model yields two parameters, a slope and an intercept, and can
be applied to all classified values to ensure that they are measured on the same scale
as the original labels assigned by human coders. By construction, rescaling does not
affect the correlation between human and automated coding.
This fact is important because it provides a convenient way for us to measure the
reliability of classifiers9. It happens that the Krippendorff’s alpha and Pearson’s R
statistics are exactly equal, in the special case of continuous measures with labels
assigned by two coders with the same means and standard deviations, and no missing
values. After recalibration, our measures satisfy all of these criteria. Therefore, we
can use the Pearson’s R statistic as a measure of classifier accuracy. The statistic is
directly comparable to the Krippendorff’s alpha scores we use to evaluate intercoder
reliability among expert and novice coders. This unexpected mathematical equivalence
is a useful byproduct of this interdisciplinary statistical investigation.
6On the whole, my goal was to achieve reasonably high classifier accuracy, without perfectly
honing each individual text classifier.
7This technique is very similar to the one described in Chapter I. The only difference there is a
minor adaptation required to suit a classifier to a binary variable rather than a continuous variable.
8Applying this regression to the testing data does not introduce any significant risk of overfitting,
because the number of parameters (two) is very small relative to the number of observations (typically,
several hundred).
9When discussing automated text classifiers, I will use the terms “reliability” and “accuracy”
interchangeably, to refer to the classifiers’ ability to match novice coding.
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3.3.4 Data structures for scale and reliability
Before proceeding with the rest of this chapter, is worth describing in detail the
data structures which I used for novice coding. Like most content analysis projects,
this research design presents two competing criteria for data collection. First, we
need to assess intercoder reliability—ideally, reliability for each coder individually.
Second, we want to label as many documents as possible for further statistical analysis
(e.g. trainining text classifiers). The first criterion implies that we should code each
document as many times as possible. The second says we should code each document
only once. Given a limited budget for content coding, how many times should we
code each document?
To meet both of these needs, I developed a structure that I call “5-by-25 replication.”
Specifically, 25% of the blog posts were coded 5 times, and 75% were coded once.
Assignment to the five-coded or once-coded condition was random, and novice coders
did not know whether any given document was once- or five-coded. In terms of cost,
this approach is equivalent to coding each document twice, but this structure gives us
additional analytical leverage on our key problems. The five-coded documents allow
us to assess intercoder reliability, and the once-coded documents give us plenty of
training cases for the classifiers10.
I find that 5-by-25 replication is a much more effective data structure than tradi-
tional 2-by-100 replication, for three reasons. First, intercoder reliability is typically
calculated using pairwise comparisons among coders. When two coders code a single
document, we gain one coding pair (coder A vs coder B). When five coders code a
10For other content analysis projects, other similar approaches (e.g. 4-by-33, 10-by-20) might
be appropriate. I have made no attempt to identify the optimal balance for replicated coding.
Instead, my goal here is to show that for this research project, 5-by-25 dominates traditional 2-by-100
replication.
With that said, I strongly suspect that this problem is subject to optimization, given a modest
amount of information about coder and document characteristics. Lamberson and Page (2012)
provide analysis of optimal coder accuracy and diversity relative to sample size. This approach,
combined with the estimation techniques of Welinder et al. (2010), seems like a good jumping off
point.
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single document, we gain 10 coding pairs (A vs B, A vs C, B vs C, A vs D, etc...)
On average, coding each document twice generates one code pair per document, and
5-by-25 coding generates 2.5 code pairs per document—a 150% improvement at no
additional cost.
Second, if we decide that a given coder’s work should be removed from the data
set, 5-by-25 coding is much more resilient than pairwise coding. For documents coded
five times, losing one coder removes 40% of our coding pairs. For documents only
coded twice, losing one coder leaves us with a single score and no pairs at all.
Third, 5-by-25 replication enables us to average document coding across quorums
of five coders, rather than quorums of two. As we will see, this allows us to construct
testing sets with higher underlying reliability.
There is one minor drawback to 5-by-25 replication: individual coders may need
to code more documents before we can accurately assess their reliability. If only one
in four documents allows for assessments of reliability, and we need a sample of k (e.g.
∼ 20) documents to judge individual coders, then each coder must code at least 4k
documents. In a come-as-you-please setting like Mechanical Turk, coders might quit
before finishing the requisite 4k tasks, leaving us unable to estimate coder-specific
reliability. This could leave a serious gap in our chain of evidence, and cast doubt on
the validity of our measurements.
Fortunately, another characteristic of Mechanical Turk mitigates this problem: the
workload distribution on MTurk is strongly skewed, with a small number of turkers
completing far more assignments than the others. Since these turkers complete so
many tasks, we have no trouble assessing their reliability. And since most of our
coding is completed by these high-volume turkers, most of our coding is covered by
these reliability checks.
In the end, 5-by-25 replication is a cost-effective means of balancing the competing
needs of scale and reliability assessment. It introduces substantial new efficiencies
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with only minor drawbacks, allowing us to stretch our research dollars much further
than they would otherwise go.
3.3.5 Errata
To close the methodology section, I highlight two aspects of data collection that
will be important later in the chapter.
First, experts and novices coded different sets of documents. Expert documents are
a sample from blogs parsed early in the data collection effort. The novice documents
are a random sample of all blog posts. This data decision was made so that expert
codebook development could proceed in parallel with blog parsing. As a result, the
two sets are similar enough to enable comparisons of levels of intercoder reliability,
but direct comparisons of novice and expert coding are not possible at the document
level.
Second, in addition to blog posts, experts and novices both coded articles from a
variety of non-blog sources drawn from Lexis-Nexus. These articles play a small role
in this research project, but might provide a useful reference set for future research.
Reliability scores for most codebook items were comparable for Lexis-Nexis articles
and blog posts. On average, expert and novice intercoder scores were slightly higher
for Lexis documents than blog posts.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Reliability among expert and novice coders
The first column of Table 3.3 shows expert intercoder reliability scores for all
codebooks items. For most of the codebook items, expert intercoder reliability
was quite high: in the .6 to .8 range, with a handful of lower reliability items.
These results are encouraging, because they suggest that many of the important
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theoretical constructs underlying newswriting and constructive discourse are amenable
to measurement.
Unfortunately, intercoder reliability on MTurk is much lower, in the .2 to .4 range,
even after I removed coders who were clearly not bothering to read the articles.
Columns two and three of Table 3.3 report intercoder reliability scores for codebook
items, assessed before and after excluding very low-reliability turkers, as described in
the next section.
3.4.2 Coder-specific reliability and filtering
Spamming (or scamming) is an important concern for crowdsourced data collection.
On MTurk and similar sites, it is not uncommon for workers to skim quickly through
tasks, producing a high volume of very low-quality work. From the perspective of
the workers, spamming can be a “rational” way to improve hourly income. Some
spammers choose answers purely at random; others skim directions and content and
make rapid guesses. In either case, the high volume and poor quality of work produced
by spammers can cripple a crowdsourced research project. In order to reduce this
threat to the validity of our research design, we must be able to identify and filter out
spammers.
Fortunately, the same data structures and statistics that we used to measure
intercoder reliabilty lend themselves nicely to this task. To identify spammers, we
need to measure two variables at the level of individual coders: volume of coding
(“How many documents did this coder complete?”) and reliability. Volume is easy to
measure using the administrative records generated by MTurk. To estimate reliability,
I calculated the pairwise Krippendorff’s alpha for each coder. That is, I applied the
normal Krippendorff’s alpha calculation to each coder’s labels and all other labels
on the same set of documents. This is identical to the normal Krippendorff’s alpha
statistic, except that each pairwise comparison involves the coder in question.
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Table 3.3: Intercoder reliability for codebook items by coding type
Item Expert Novice No spam Quorum Auto.
First person .781 .671 .699 .921 .634
Neutral voice .713 .519 .547 .858 .685
Affects many people .440 .150 .330 .712 .405
Government policy .814 .165 .471 .817 .520
What gov’t should do .709 .098 .402 .771 .514
Political issue .777 .476 .543 .856 .617
Lifestyle topice .657 .106 .400 .769 .535
Helpful advice .534 .066 .154 .477 .305
Scope .646 .412 .474 .819 .466
Outside facts .660 .098 .120 .406 .349
Personal experiences .755 .288 .305 .687 .551
Effort gathering .894 .272 .267 .646 .674
Non-Internet info. .615 .042 .047 .197 .261
Direct quotes .908 .378 .378 .752 .637
Others’ experiences .804 .249 .266 .644 .385
Expert statements .719 .059 .089 .328 .302
Eyewitness statements .875 .149 .224 .591 .296
Quantitative info. .769 .500 .517 .843 .586
Clear stance .619 .128 .136 .441 .198
Us versus them .790 .363 .363 .740 .335
Open-minded .785 .083 .100 .358 .091
Assigns blame .759 .326 .332 .713 .381
Open to compromise .835 .041 .052 .215 .043
Reasonable person .783 .078 .090 .331 .000
Opposing viewpoints .551 .214 .378 .753 .540
Respect for people .680 .009 .221 .587 .094
Respect for viewpoints .667 -.007 .255 .631 .107
Criticizes motives .361 .227 .428 .789 .407
Criticizes competence .176 .163 .316 .698 .251
Derisive labels .645 .128 .348 .728 .130
Feel angry .825 .190 .389 .761 .438
Emotional language .680 .206 .324 .706 .457
Values threat .849 .227 .347 .727 .477
Physical threat .887 .225 .310 .692 .335
Economic threat .701 .192 .338 .719 .590
Exaggeration .420 .074 .145 .459 .249
Mean (All items) .697 .210 .309 .642 .385
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Figure 3.2 shows reliability and coding volume for each coder on the neutral
voice codebook. This reliability-versus-volume scatterplot follows a typical pattern.
Reliability scores are heteroskedastic with respect to volume: the more documents a
coder has completed, the more precise our estimate of his/her intercoder reliability.
Therefore, among coders with many completed tasks, reliability scores converge to
a narrower range. However, there still exist substantial differences among coders’
reliability scores. Because these differences are estimated across hundreds or thousands
of comparisons with other coders, we can be confident that they reflect real differences
in the quality of individuals’ coding.
When a coder produces a high of volume coding with substantially lower accuracy
than normal, we can deduce that he/she is a spammer. In Figure 3.2, the two coders
in the mid-left section of the graph are spammers. These are turkers who completed a
moderately large volume of coding (around 50 tasks each) with much lower reliability
than average11.
I used two criteria to filter spammers out of my coding pool: statistical significance
and substantive significance. In order to be labeled a spammer, a turker had to fail
both tests. I will describe both tests in turn.
First, statistical significance: “Can we reject the null hypothesis that the coder’s
reliability score is equal to or greater than the mean?” This first criteria is important
because we want to be confident that a worker is spamming before rejecting his/her
work. Also, dropping any turker with below-average intercoder reliability would
artificially inflate our estimates of reliability. (For this reason, I’ve reported intercoder
11I strongly suspect that this pattern of moderately high volumes of very low quality work is part
of a calculated approach to scamming on MTurk. On MTurk, requesters have the option to reject or
accept any task. Rejected tasks are not paid for, and hurt the turker’s accept/reject ratio, which can
make it harder to find work in the future. However, few requesters actually reject HITs, because of
the practical difficulty separating honest turkers from spammers.
Given this incentive structure, it makes sense for spammers to spread their work across tasks from
many requesters. They focus enough to get fast at specific task types, but don’t invest so much time




Scatter plot: Volume and reliability by reliability, for novice coders of the
neutral voice codebook
The dashed horizontal lines denote 20 and 100 posts coded, respectively. The solid vertical bars
denote the mean score for the group, and mean score minus two standard deviations. The two
coders in the middle-right section of the plot are scammers.
reliability scores both with and without spammers.) I used a p-value of .1—low enough
to reduce the likelihood of false positives, but high enough to catch most spammers.
Second, I filtered based on substantive significance: “Was the coder’s reliability
score at least two standard deviations worse than the mean?” The second criteria is
important because we want to distinguish between the coders who are merely mediocre,
versus those who are truly unreliable.
Univariate outlier detection is a notoriously difficult problem. However, for this
application, we have three reasons to believe that this solution worked reasonably well.
First and most importantly, most of the turkers identified as spammers had reliability
scores that were two or three standard deviations below from the mean. These coders
weren’t just worse than average, they were a lot worse.
Second, reliability scores skew downward. There were several high-volume coders
with reliability scores far below average, but none with reliability scores far above
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average. This is consistent with spamming as a mechanism for unreliability: coding
by spammers generates reliability well below average, but there is no analogous source
of coding with reliability well above average.
Finally, a piece of anecdotal evidence: not one turker complained when I labeled
their work as “unreliable.” In the past, I’ve found turkers to be a vociferous lot,
angrily firing complaints and emails back if they feel that their work has been unjustly
rejected. The fact that I sent warning emails and rejections to so many turkers without
getting a single reply suggests that these reliability checks did a good job identifying
spammers.
3.4.3 Quorum coding
As we saw earlier, the intercoder reliability scores from novice coding scores are
quite poor. Removing spammers from the mix improves reliability scores, but not
enough to be fully confident in all our measures. Fortunately, 5-by-25 replication and
the law of averages gives us another avenue for improvement. Consider the following
thought experiment: “If several groups of k novices each coded documents, and then
we averaged the codes within each group, what level of intercoder reliability would we
expect among the group averages?” When we average across groups, it turns out that
even small groups have much higher intercoder reliability than individuals. This is
the familiar logic of sample sizes, power analysis, and confidence intervals from survey
and experimental research. Similar approaches have been used successfully in the
field of expert forecasting (Clemen, 1989) and more recently in the emerging field of
crowdsourced data collection (e.g Sheng, Provost and Ipeirotis, 2008, Welinder et al.,
2010, Karger, Oh and Shah, 2011). With properly structured content coding, we can
apply the same logic to content analysis.
Let us introduce some formal notation in order to clarify this logic and add precision
to the argument. Let x
Hj
i denote the label for variable x assigned to document i by
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coder j. We model x
Hj
i as the sum of two random components: xi and εij, the true
value of the document with respect to x, plus a coder-specific error for that document.
x
Hj
i = xi + εij (3.1)
Let us use XH as shorthand for a process of generic novice coding: “random
coders from our pool of novices assign labels for codebook item X to a random set of
documents from our corpus.” Here we are less concerned with the individual document
labels, and more concerned with the properties of novice coding as a generic process.
We assume that coders are assigned to documents at random, and that the number of
documents coded by any one coder is small relative to the total number of documents.
If we replicate this process with the same documents and new coders, we can use
subscripts to denote the replication: XH1 , XH2 , etc. To extend the notation, let XkH
denote a process on generic novice quorum coding : “k random coders from our pool
of novices assign labels for codebook item X to a random set of documents from our
corpus, and we average these labels to get a quorum label.” Quorum coding is identical
to generic novice coding, with the added step of averaging within document scores
across multiple coders.
So far this is all notation—an almost fully generic model of coding. The only
substantive assumptions that we’ve made are that a large pool of novice coders exists,
documents are assigned to coders at random, and coder labels are measured such that
they can be averaged together into a quorum label.
Let us introduce one further assumption: x and ε are drawn independently from
separate distributions was finite means and finite, non-zero standard deviations. The
means will not concern us much12; we will refer to the standard deviations as σ
and τ , respectively. In the context of MTurk, these independence assumptions seem
12For certain applications, unbiased errors (i.e. E[ε] = 0) will be important. However, we can draw
a surprising number of conclusions even from data collected from biased coders. We will take up this
question again in our discussion of subjective novice coding in section 3.5.2.
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quite reasonable. Turkers never see each others’ labels, and the process for assigning
documents to turkers is largely random, outside the turkers’ control.
With this formal framework in place, we can derive some fairly strong conclusions
about intercoder reliability. Let R(XH1 , XH2) denote the correlation between XH1 and
XH2 : the intercoder reliability of novice coding. Then, R(XH1 , XH2) can be expressed
quite simply in terms of σ and τ .
R(XH1 , XH2) =cov(XH1 , XH2)/var(XH1)var(XH2) (3.2)
=cov(x+ ε1, x+ ε2)/
√
(σ + τ)(σ + τ) (3.3)
=cov(x, x)/(σ + τ) (3.4)
=σ/(σ + τ) (3.5)
Similarly, the intercoder reliability of a novice quorum of size k (R(XkH1 , XkH2))
can be expressed as a function of σ, τ , and k.
R(XkH1 , XkH2) =cov(XkH1 , XkH2)/var(XkH1)var(XkH2) (3.6)
=cov(x+ ε1/k, x+ ε2/k)/
√
var(x+ ε1/k)var(x+ ε2/k) (3.7)
=cov(x, x)/
√
(σ + τ/k)(σ + τ/k) (3.8)
=σ/(σ + τ/k) (3.9)
With both of these formulae in place, we can derive an expression for R(XkH1 , XkH2)
in terms of R(XH1 , XH2) and k. In other words, R(XH1 , XH2) is a sufficient statistic
for R(XkH1 , XkH2) for any k: if we know the intercoder reliability for individual novice
coders, we can project the intercoder reliability of novice quorums of any size. (For
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this derivation, we will abbreviate R(XkH1 , XkH2) as Rk.)
Rk =σ/(σ + τ/k) (3.10)
Rk(σ + τ/k)/(σ + τ) =σ/(σ + τ) (3.11)
Rk(kσ + τ)/(σ + τ) =kσ/(σ + τ) (3.12)
Rk [(k − 1)σ/(σ + τ) + (σ + τ)/(σ + τ)] =kR1 (3.13)
Rk [(k − 1)R1 + 1] =kR1 (3.14)
Rk =kR1/ [(k − 1)R1 + 1] (3.15)
Rk =kR1/(kR1 −R1 + 1) (3.16)
Quorum coding has some useful properties. First, as the size of the quorum
grows, inter-quorum reliability improves. In the limit of an infinitely large quorum,
inter-quorum reliability approaches 1—a perfect score.
Another elegant feature of quorum coding is that it does not require extra data to
estimate the effective reliability of a quorum. If we can assess intercoder reliability
among individuals, we can calculate intercoder reliability among quorums of any size.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the improvement to intercoder reliability among quorums as the
size of the quorum increases. The x-axis denotes reliability among individual coders,
and y-axis gives the estimated reliability among quorums of size 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, and 20.
The fourth column of table 3.3 applies this reasoning to the items in our codebooks.
It gives estimated reliability scores for quorums of size five. Most of the estimated
group scores for our codebook items are in the range of .6 to .8, scores considered quite
strong by the usual standards of content analysis. The lesson is that small groups of
novices can effectively match expert-level reliability. Whether or not they are coding
for exactly the same things is another question, which I will take up in section 3.4.5.
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Figure 3.3: Quorum reliability curves
3.4.4 Automated coding
From the perspective of text classification, all of the work we’ve done so far has
been to label documents and train classifiers. After all this work, the crucial question
is, “How accurate are those classifiers?”
To assess accuracy, I took advantage of the benefits of 5-by-25 replication and
quorum coding. I did this by training the classifiers on articles that were only coded
once, and then assessing classifier reliability against quorum averages on documents
that were coded multiple times. To be specific, I treated the text classifier as one
“coder,” and treated the quorum average of up to five human coders as a second “coder,”
then calculated intercoder reliability between the automated coder and the group
coder in the usual way. This approach allows us to assess classifier reliability without
penalizing the classifier as much for noise and mistakes in the novice coding13.
13To be even more specific, I used a random sample of 90 percent of the available five-coded
documents as a training set. I then took the remaining 10 percent of five-coded documents, appended
them to 90 percent of the once-coded documents, and used the joined set as my testing set. This
approach preserves the notion of comparison to a quorum while still allowing cross-validation.
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Figure 3.4: Scatter plot: Novice intercoder reliability versus automated accuracy
The dashed diagonal line has slope of one and passes through the origin. For points above this
reference line, automated coding was more reliable than novice coding.
This approach turned out to work reasonably well. On most of the codebook
items, text classifiers outperformed the novice coders in terms of intercoder reliability.
Where novice coding was in the .20’s, the classifiers typically scored in the .3 to .5
range. For items with better novice scores, the reliability for the text classifiers often
reached into the .4’s, .5’s, and .6’s.
Figure 3.4 shows a scatter plot of novice and classifier intercoder reliability scores.
This graph tells two main stories. First, novice and automated intercoder reliability
scores are correlated across items. Second, automated scores are typically higher
than the scores for individual novices. This evidence suggests that the statistical
methods for text classification tend to balance out the idiosyncracies in different
human judgements. They pick up on the signal in the training data, and filter out
most of the noise.
These numbers also provide strong empirical support for the theoretical argument
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around quorum coding made in section 3.4.3. Our classifiers are trained on individual
coding, and evaluated against quroum coding. If quorums were not more reliable
than individuals, it would be almost impossible to obtain higher accuracy scores from
classifier testing.
3.4.5 Comparing automated and expert coding
The coding system outlined in this chapter is a chain with two links among three
kinds of coders: expert to novice, and novice to automated. Thus far, we have
tested the second link and found that it holds firm: on virtually every codebook
item with reasonably strong novice intercoder reliability, the classifier was able to
meet or exceed that level of accuracy. However, it remains to be seen whether novice
(or automated) coding correlates with expert coding. Although we have seen that
quorums of novices exhibit reasonably high intercoder reliabilty, this only proves that
novices have reasonably high internal reliablilty among themselves. It is still possible
that the novice coding differs in important ways from expert coding. In this final
results section, I carry out an indirect test of the expert-to-novice link in our chain of
evidence.
Unfortunately, our data do not allow for direct tests of correlation between novice
and expert coders. Although each group coded comparable documents from similar
samples, they did not actually code the same documents14. Consequently, we must
rely on a less direct and more difficult test: examining correlations between expert
and automated coding. Essentially, this approach tests both links in the chain at the
same time. If expert and automated coding turn out to be correlated, we can infer
that novice coding is also correlated with expert coding.
As shown in Figure 3.5, two main results emerge from this analysis. First, many of
the correlations between expert and automated labels are respectably high15. These
14See Section 3.3.5 for details.
15Exactly how strong these correlations must be to be considered “strong enough” is a tricky
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Figure 3.5:
Scatter plot: Novice intercoder reliability and correlation between auto-
mated and expert coding, by codebook item
are the points with high values on the y-axis. For these strongly correlated codebook
items, we can be confident automated coding reflects expert coding, and vice versa.
Second, the strength of the correlation between experts and automated coding is
generally at least as strong as the novice intercoder reliability score. That is, there are
no points far below the unit line. If novices were coding for different constructs than
experts, we would expect to see points well below the unit line. The fact that most
codebook items have stronger expert-to-automated correlations than novice intercoder
reliability is moderately strong confirming evidence that the expert and novice coding
are correlated as well.
question, related to the question of what levels of intercoder reliability are acceptable for measurement.
I take up this question in section 3.5.1.
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3.5 Discussion
Stepping back, we now have evidence to assess the effectiveness of this methodology
and relate what we have learned to the practice of large-scale content analysis more
broadly. Accordingly, this section proceeds as follows. The first section compares
reliability across coding methods in order to draw inferences about the strengths
and weaknesses of this methodology. Next, we review assumptions and threats to
validity, focusing on the possibility for bias in our measures. The third section is an
epistemological discussion of ground truth in content analysis—an argument for using
novice coding to ensure transparency and replicability. Last, we discuss implications
and avenues for future work in this area.
3.5.1 Comparison of coding methods and codebook items
This chapter has focused on three coding methods: expert coding, novice coding
(and its extension, quorum coding), and automated coding. Setting other considera-
tions aside for the moment, it is reasonable to ask which of these methods is the most
reliable.
Broadly speaking, expert coding and five-fold quorum coding were the most reliable
methods, with average intercoder reliability scores of .697 and .642, respectively. These
methods are followed by automated coding, where intercoder reliability scores averaged
.385 across all codebook items. Individual novice coding was the least reliable, with
average intercoder reliability of .210 before excluding spammers, and .309 afterward.
Figure 3.6 illustrates this pattern with box plots of item-level reliability scores, grouped
by coding process.
As a a stylized fact, it is fair to say that among the 37 codebook items tested here,
the intercoder reliability of quorums of five novices was comparable to experts. If we
take a Krippendorff’s alpha score of .5 as our cutoff level for acceptable reliability, 33
measures pass the test under expert coding, as opposed to 28 under quorum coding.
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Figure 3.6:
Boxplots of item-level reliability for experts, quorums, novices, and auto-
mated classifiers
Each set of box-and-whiskers illustrates the interquartile range for the 27 cookbook items used in
further analysis. Outliers are shown using the “+” symbol. In general, quorums of five novices
achieve comparable scores to experts, and automated coding outperforms individual novices even
after spammers are been removed.
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Table 3.4: Codebook item counts by coding method and reliability cutoff threshold
Threshold Expert Quorum Automated
.3 36 35 25
.5 33 28 12
.7 21 20 0
On average, expert coding outperforms quorum coding by a small margin.
However, averaging across items oversimplifies the relationship somewhat. If we
compare reliability on a per-item basis, we find quorum coding has higher intercoder
reliability than expert coding on 20 out of our 37 codebook items16. This pattern is
largely explained by a small handful of codebook items with very poor novice reliability
(e.g. “non internet info, ” open-minded, reasonable person,). These items drag down
the average reliability of quorum coding enough to put expert coding in the lead17.
Table 3.4 shows the number of codebook items that are acceptable given different
reliability thresholds. At a somewhat forgiving .5 cutoff level, 33 items passed the test
for experts, and 28 for quorums. Even at a relatively stringent .7 cutoff level, 21 and
20 items (respectively) pass. From a research design perspective, the codebooks were
designed with some redundancy in mind. It isn’t important for every codebook item
to be highly reliable, as long as we can accurately measure the underlying theoretical
constructs. For both expert and former coding, these results are quite encouraging.
Results for automated coding are more mixed. Recall that our text classifiers were
trained on once-coded novice data, and evaluated against five-coded quorum data.
Measured against individual novice coders, the classifiers show up very well. The
16Careful inspection of table 3.3 reveals that quorums outperformed experts on the neutral voice,
public import, and respect for others codebooks. On the other hand, experts did better on information
sources, sources and evidence, and divisiveness. Within the appeals to fear codebook, performance
was mixed. Despite careful searching, I can find no clear predictive patterns for when quorums
outperform experts. The subject matter, question wording, and answer categories of codebook items
all appear to be unrelated to expert-versus-quorum performance. In light of these non-findings, it
seems that the most likely explanation lies in the mix of experts and novices who supplied data for
each cookbook.
17Note that we could easily push quorum coding into the lead by replicating coding more times.
The decision here is really one about acceptable cost: how much redundant content coding is feasible,
given the constraints on our research budget?
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average alpha score for automated coding was .385, compared to .309 for novice coders
with spammers removed. Classifier reliability exceeded individual-level intercoder
reliability for 26 out of 37 codebook items. This echoes results from Chapter I:
text classifiers are capable of synthesizing “the wisdom of crowds” well enough to
outperform individual humans. In Chapter I, we evaluated a single measure—political
content—against individual novices. Now we have replicated this finding across several
dozen measures, with evaluation against quorum coding so that we can assess the
difference between classifiers and individual humans even more accurately.
At the same time, the coding tasks in this chapter are considerably more nuanced
than the simple “political/not political” distinction made in Chapter I. As a result,
the reliability of individual novices is considerably lower. Therefore, even though
automated coding outperforms novices, it still often falls short of ideal levels of
accuracy as measured on an absolute scale.
This begs the question, “When it comes to intercoder reliability (and classifier
accuracy), how high is high enough?” Sadly, the literature does not provide a clear
answer. Krippendorff offers .800 as a desirable standard (“Rely only on variables with
reliability above alpha = .800.”), and .667 as a lower bar for “drawing tentative conclu-
sions.” However, Krippendorff seems reluctant to set absolute standards (“Although
every content analyst faces this question, there is no set answer.” “I recommend
such levels with considerable hesitation.”). Moreover, his theoretical requirements
seem to be much more stringent than what most researchers (and reviewers) use in
practice. Much of the content analysis literature fails to report intercoder reliability
at all. The literature on crowdsourced data collection is similarly ambiguous. Much
of the research in this field reports accuracy, precision, or recall statistics, which are
sufficient to compare methods within a single experiment, but provide no basis for
objective comparison across experiments18.
18When it is possible to calculate measures of reliability, such as Krippendorff’s alpha, the results
often turn out to be quite low. For example, a widely cited paper by Shaw, Horton and Chen (2011)
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If we take a relatively stringent .7 score as our cutoff line, then none of the
automated coding measures are acceptable—a disappointing result. If we step back to
a somewhat more forgiving .5, then 12 automated measures pass muster. If we relax
our conditions further to .3, then we are left with 25 usable measures19.
The decision over what makes an acceptable standard for intercoder reliability
is complicated by the fact that the appropriate level of reliability depends on the
analysis in which the measures will be used. As Krippendorf points out,
some content analyses are robust in that the unreliabilities that enter the
data-making process are barely noticeable in the results. In others, small
differences may tip the scale in important decisions. ... To appreciate this
sensitivity, analysts would have to know how disagreement in the data is
transmitted through the analytical process to its outcome.”
Ultimately, the necessary precision of a measure depends on the effect size one is
hoping to estimate.
3.5.2 Measurement error and validity
This brings us to the issues of measurement error and downstream validity. Two
questions are intertwined here. First, what kinds of measurement error are problematic
for further analysis? Second, what kinds of error are likely to emerge from this
methodology? These two questions are at the core of the emerging discipline of
text-as-data analysis.
This section is organized around answers to the first question. I discuss three types
of error that could distort downstream results: noise, uniform bias, and conditional
reports accuracy statistics ranging from 25.6% to 73.2% for five tasks. The authors do not report
Krippendorff’s alpha scores, but we can calculate the based on administrative data in the paper.
Intercoder reliability scores range from .642 to -.048, and are negatively correlated with accuracy.
19Admittedly, .3 is a very low bar for reliability—more signal than noise. We will discuss implications
for large-scale analysis in the next section.
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bias. My treatment of these errors is drawn from the traditional econometric and
statistical literatures on measurement error. Along the way, I will highlight examples
within the context of content analysis.
By noise, I mean variables where errors in document codes have expected values of
zero, and are strictly independent. In bivariate OLS and related models (e.g. Pearson’s
correlation, large-sample students t-statistic), noise attenuates estimates towards zero.
This property of noisy variables makes statistical tests inherently conservative. In
multivariate OLS, noisiness can have secondary effects on other parameter estimates,
conditional on the correlation matrix. As a rough heuristic, we might say that items
with low intercoder reliability are safe as the objects of direct study, but make for
poor control variables.
In content analysis, noisy variables are ubiquitious. The reliance on subjective
human coding and resulting focus on intercoder reliability make measurement error
difficult to ignore. Among novice coders in particular, incentives to code as many
documents as quickly as possible probably make noisy coding especially prevelant.
For this study, the statistical characteristics of noisy variables come with a note of
optimism. For very large-scale analysis, we can often aggregate and average across
large corpora of documents to cancel out random errors. If this is the case, then
even measures with fairly low reliability at the document level could yield accurate,
valid estimates at the population level20. However, this approach depends on the
assumption that the measures are simply noisy, and not systematically biased.
I define uniform bias as errors in document codes that have nonzero expected
mean, but are otherwise independent of each other and other variables. Somewhat
surprisingly, measurements of this type are unlikely to have much impact on most
analysis. This is because most measures in content analysis are essentially ordinal,
not cardinal: we care about the relative ordering of documents on various dimensions,
20In many ways, this is the core intuition behind Hopkins and King (2010).
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but do not need to place them on an absolute scale. In fact, given the inherrent
subjectivity of civility and newswriting, it is difficult to see how they could be placed
on an absolute scale. As a result, most of the analysis we would wish to perform
will be constrained to comparisons of means and correlations—operations that are
unaffected by additive bias in our measures.
For example, suppose that blog posts in our sample average a score of four according
to some measure of divisiveness. Suppose further that novices’ codes for divisiveness
are biased upwards, with an average of six—perhaps the novices believe that our
study is looking to find that divisiveness is widespread, and obligingly incline their
answers in that direction. Is this a problem? It is if we want to make claims such
as, “The average blog post scored a four for divisiveness.” But since the answer scale
here has no external reference, this kind of statement is meaningless. Instead, we are
more likely to make claims such as, “On average, Democrats write blog posts that
are .3 standard deviations more divisive than Republicans,” or “Divisiveness shows a
slight correlation with blogger age (r=.14).” These kinds of comparative statements
are unaffected by uniform bias. In other words, in most cases, uniform bias is only a
problem for analysis we would not conduct on subjective measures anyway.
In its pure form, this argument only holds for unbounded continuous measures
where bias affects the mean and not the variance of the measure. For measures with a
small range (e.g. five-point ordinal scales), bias could influence not only the mean
but the variance. However, even in this case, we have reason to be optimistic. If
the variance of a variable is affected by bias on a constrained range, the effect will
almost certainly be to decrease the total variance of the measure. The likely outcome
will be for statistical analysis based on the variable to exhibit a conservative biased
towards zero—not ideal certainly, but less problematic than bias in the other direction.
A second line of defense comes from codebook items themselves: many items are
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distributed around the middle of their answer scales21. To the extent that this is true,
the size of possible bias due to a constrained answer scale is limited.
Another surprising feature of uniform bias is that systematic bias by individual
coders (e.g. as in Welinder et al., 2010) does not materially affect our results, as long
as the coders do not all share a common bias, and each coder’s contributed coding is
small relative to the total set of labels supplied by the population. This is because
assignment of documents to coders is strictly random, and therefore uncorrelated with
any other variables of interest. Over many coders, any personal bias will average out.
In effect, individual biases in a large population are actually just a source of noise.
Conditional bias, where document errors have nonzero mean conditional on some
other variable, is much more problematic. In this case, OLS regression and any of
its derivatives can be subject to omitted variable bias. For example, if we recruited
an overwhelmingly Republican group of novice coders, we might discover that they
naturally code blog posts by Republicans as more civil and blog posts by Democrats
as less civil. Any subsequent analysis of the relative divisiveness of Republican and
Democratic bloggers would be biased in favor of Republicans. Even worse, any analysis
of divisiveness alongside other variables correlated with partisanship would also be
biased.
Unfortunately, no simple test can exclude the possibility of conditional bias. Indeed,
if we attempt to absolutely rule out bias with respect to any conditioning variable, we
find ourselves in the impossible position of trying to disprove a negative. Even so, we
can take certain steps to reduce the possibility of conditional bias in novice coding.
Here I suggest three simple precautions to reduce the risk of conditional bias.
Don’t disclose the purpose of the study in instructions. This is standard
practice in most survey research and psychological experiments (King, Keohane and
21This happens for the same reason that many survey items tend to be centered in the middle
of their scales: researchers deliberately write them that way, because this measurement property
simplifies downstream analysis.
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Verba, 1994). It seems reasonable to employ the same precaution in content analysis.
Draw from a “normal” pool of coders. Many of the same arguments used
to defend the notion that college sophomores are a good sample population for
psychological experiments can also be applied to content analysis on MTurk. Although
the population isn’t strictly representative of any larger population, there is little reason
to believe that MTurkers are cognitively different from “normal” adults (Buhrmester,
Kwang and Gosling, 2011, Berinsky, Huber and Lenz, 2011).
Compare novice coding to experts. In the next section, I will argue that novice
coding should be preferred over expert coding as the source of “ground truth” in
content analysis. Still, comparing novices to experts can provide a useful validation
step for measurement. When data collected by experts and novices are strongly
correlated, it becomes harder to argue that conditional bias is at work22.
Let us conclude this section with a last comment about conditional bias and
subjectivity. First, the notion of conditional bias becomes complicated in the context
of subjective coding. Take the example of Republican coders rating Democratic
bloggers as less civil. From the subjective perspective of the coders, those judgements
are correct. Other coders might disagree, of course, but that is the nature of subjective
judgement. It seems strange to call it “bias” when the Republican coders are simply
giving us what we asked for.
As I will argue in the next section, a better approach is to treat the Republican
coders as part of a quorum of novice coders. From this perspective, the conditional
“biases” of each individual coder are actually decision-making heuristics that inform
the collective judgement of the quorum. From an epistemological standpoint, I find
this rationale coherent and satisfying. From a methodological standpoint, I suspect
22This was an notion behind my indirect tests in section 3.4.5. Future researchers would do better
to learn from my mistake and collect data to allow direct comparisons.
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that embracing diverse heuristics in this way will make subjective content coding a
more robust and accurate approach to measurement.
3.5.3 Ground truth in content analysis
In the course of this chapter, we have introduced three different ways of measuring
variables from content. Among expert, novice, and automated coding, each has
different virtues in terms of reliability, replicability, and scale. But of course, they are
not identical. We turn now to an important epistemological question: which measure
is the right measure?
In this section, I will make the case that in subjective coding tasks, quorum coding
by novices deserves to be treated as the “true” measure. To make this case, we will
first define subjective coding tasks. Next, we will consider the relative merits of expert
and novice coding. Finally, we will turn to the relationship between automated, novice,
and quorum coding.
Let us begin by drawing a distinction between “objective prediction tasks” where
the truth can be verified (possibly after some delay) against an objective oracle, and
“subjective judgement tasks” where the only source of truth is human perception.
For example, guessing the weight of a cow at a county fair, or the atomic weight of
cadmium, or the value of the NASDAQ next week are all prediction tasks. Responses
to the statement, “The author shows respect for opposing viewpoints” are much more
subjective, since “respect” is an abstraction that is only meaningful in the eye of the
beholder (or a crowd of beholders).
For prediction tasks, the right combination of coders is an empirical question.
By measuring past performance against the truth as revealed by the oracle, we can
estimate variance and bias by coders and coder types. With estimates for those
quantities in hand, we can pick the optimal balance of experts and novices (Lamberson
and Page, 2012). Even if we can’t measure the exact variance and bias for each
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predictor, we can still make some educated guesses about the composition of the
optimal crowd.
For subjective tasks, we don’t have the ability to measure past performance,
because the measures are inherently subjective – there is no oracle to which we can
directly appeal to assess accuracy. In this context, the word “prediction” doesn’t
really make sense. “Judgement” or “perception” is more apropos, because the “correct”
rating is a subjective, personal decision. Even the definition of “expert” and “novice”
changes when we go from objective tasks to subjective tasks. In objective prediction
tasks, an expert is usually one who has demonstrated high accuracy on past prediction
tasks, or has special training or experience that we expect will make them more
accurate (Ashton, 1986). In the realm of subjective tasks, an expert is simply one
who was involved in the design of the codebooks—a coder who happens to know the
intent of the research design and interact with the other research designers.
Given the choice between expert coding and coding by novices, it’s tempting to
say that the expert coding is the “real” coding. After all, the experts are the ones
who created the codebooks23. This approach becomes even more tempting when (as
is usually the case) the expert coders have higher intercoder reliability.
However, if we believe in the scientific virtue of replicability, then novice coding is
actually superior. The scientific method is fundamentally democratic, based on the
premise of transparency and replication—any observer should be able to replicate
an experiment and obtain the same result. Scientific arguments are supposed to be
grounded in measurement and evidence, not authority and expertise. In the case of
content analysis, this means that we should certainly prefer novice coding over expert
coding, because only novice coding is a transparent, replicable process.
Results in this chapter demonstrate that codebook items with high intercoder
23Actually, this awareness of the purpose of the study gives us another reason to avoid expert
coders. With novices, we worry that they might guess the intent of the study, and thus bias results.
With experts we are certain that they already know the purpose of the study. If our goal is to avoid
corrupting our research through biased coding, the choice of novices over experts seems clear.
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reliability among experts can still generate poor reliability among novices. Such items
stand as cautionary examples for human replication. They warn us that just because
a tight-knit group of colleagues are able to agree on document labels, we should not
yet be persuaded that others outside the clique can do the same. Instead, each item
creates its own implicit hypothesis test: “A small team of experts was able to code
this item with high reliability. Can novice coders do the same?” Very few content
analysis studies validate this hypothesis.
To summarize: in this study, we have good circumstantial evidence that the items
in our codebooks were coded in similar fashion by experts and novices alike. However,
supposing that differences between experts and novices had emerged, it would have
been better to treat novice coding as the “real” data source. Given a choice among
measures, the scientific method dictates that we should use the measurement that is
replicable.
What about automated coding? Automated coding is supremely replicable, and
has the added virtue of scalability. In most cases, automated coding is actually more
accurate than individual novice coding. On the other hand, automated coding isn’t a
single process; it’s an infinite family of possible processes. To see this, consider the
many decisions made in the course of training a text classifiers: which algorithm to
use, which features to include, what parameters to use when training the classifier, etc.
Different choices at any stage of the training process will lead to different classifier
features and weights, and therefore different classifier values. Unless we are willing to
accept all of these potential classifiers as equally valid, we must have some additional
criterion for judging among them. In the case of content analysis for subjective
constructs like newswriting and civility, the obvious candidate for that criterion is
replication of human judgement.
However, there’s some epistemological subtlety to making a claim like this. I have
claimed that (1) human coding is ground truth for text classifiers, and (2) text classifiers
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are often more accurate than human coders. This sounds like a contradiction, but it
can be solved by differentiating between individual and quorum coding. Specifically, I





Other researchers have converged on similar definitions. Conway (2013) also uses
quorum coding on MTurk to measure political constructs in text. Conway makes
heavy use of group averages for inference, and although he generally treats expert
coding as ground truth, he is also critical of known biases and flaws in expert coding.
In his dissertation manuscript, Zhou (2013) advanced a similar notion of “distribution
as ground truth.” In this approach, which is grounded primarily in the discipline of
machine learning, “human coders are not merely an instrument; rather, the coders,
who represent the population if randomly sampled, collectively define the ground truth
of items as distributions by aggregating subjective opinions.”
This definition has many useful properties. Because it is based on novice coding,
the measurement process is replicable and, to some extent, scalable. Although we can
never measure X perfectly, we can use repeated coding to approximate it to any level
of statistical precision we choose. Moreover, we can use small samples of novice coders
and the logic of quorum coding to forecast the necessary level of repeated labeling.
When machine learning algorithms are sufficiently accurate, we can use automated
coding as a highly scalable proxy for quorums of novices.
Now, this might feel dangerously close to abandoning scientific measurement
altogether and just going into politics (”The truth is whatever the majority claims
it is.”) Actually, it’s a call for rigor and replication in content analysis. My claim
is that in the domain of subjective tasks, we must replicate coding with novices in
order to demonstrate validity (”The truthiness of a measure depends on our ability
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to replicate it with high quorum reliability.”) Given the choice between expert and
novice coding, we should prefer novice coding, because only novice coding satisfies the
essential scientific criteria of replication24.
3.5.4 Lessons for large-scale content analysis
As mentioned earlier, I am convinced that large-scale text-as-data research will
be very fruitful in coming years. As more and more texts become available in digital
form, the potential for research using the methods of content analysis will increase
dramatically. At the same time, I expect that generally applicable principles for
developing reliable codebooks and techniques for scaling coding to large corpora
will be studied further and pass into widespread use. The resulting combination of
replicability and scalability, plus the flexibility that comes from human judgment,
will become very powerful. Similar to the explosion in survey methodology 70 years
ago, large-scale content analysis seems poised for growth as a mainstream scientific
methodology.
However, as we have seen in this chapter, large-scale content analysis has many
moving parts, and all of them have to work well in order to arrive at valid conclusions.
Accordingly, I close with thoughts on three areas of focus for productive research
within this emerging field.
1. Design and build better systems for recruiting, training, and incentiviz-
ing coders. Within certain niches of social science, small research teams have been
conducting content analysis for many years (Neuendorf, 2002). This cottage industry
has made important contributions in several fields (e.g. Baumgartner et al., 2003).
However, with few exceptions, these teams have lacked the tools for large-scale content
24The way I’ve phrased the conclusion (“novice coding trumps expert coding”) is a bit of a false
dichotomy. From the perspective of minimizing error, it seems reasonable to combine expert and
novice coding together, as in Lamberson and Page (2012). However, bear in mind that novice coding
isn’t just a substitute for expert coding; it’s an essential step for validating expert coding. We should
be very skeptical of subjective expert coding that has not been replicated by novices.
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labeling, and have sometimes neglected replicability and external validity in the process
of data collection (Mikhaylov, Laver and Benoit, 2008).
The advent of online crowdsourcing platforms opens the door to remedy these
shortcomings. However, platforms like Mechanical Turk are still in their early stages
and suffer from poor design decisions, usability problems, and incentive mismatches
(Ipeirotis, Provost and Wang, 2010). Within computer science, a sizeable literature
has sprung up seeking to alleviate these problems (e.g. Karger, Oh and Shah, 2011;
Sheng, Provost and Ipeirotis, 2008). Although the quality of research in this area is
uneven (Adar, 2011) and we are still far from full solutions (Kittur et al., 2013), I am
optimistic about the general direction that this literature is going.
With that said, much of this research seems surprisingly unconcerned with the
human aspect of crowdsourcing. Although systems for distributing and aggregating
tasks abound, well-designed studies of incentives, communication, and learning are
surprisingly hard to find (Kittur et al., 2013). Given the essential role that human
perceptions and responses play in crowdsourcing, it seems reasonable to suppose that
the field will need to come to grips with how human beings adapt within such systems.
Within the social sciences, there is growing enthusiasm for MTurk as a platform for
surveys (Buhrmester, Kwang and Gosling, 2011; Berinsky, Huber and Lenz, 2011) and
experiments. Given the prevalence of surveys and experiments within social science,
this makes sense. However, the primary intended use-case for MTurk is repeated tasks
by the same workers—a perfect match for content analysis. I have been surprised at
the slow rate of adoption among content analysts, but expect that to change before
too long.
When that happens, we should expect greater synthesis between theories and
methods from social and computer science. Going out on a limb, I would venture that
the microeconomic literature on personnel economics will come to play an important
role in this literature, for two reasons. First, labor economists already have a great
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deal to say about rational approaches to recruiting, incentivizing, and retaining a labor
force (Lazear, 1995). The theoretical models are mature, and have been tested—to
a point—in the setting of human resources in traditional labor markets . Second,
crowdsourcing platforms provide an ideal laboratory to test such theories (Horton,
Rand and Zeckhauser, 2011), because it is one of the few labor markets that is
sufficiently malleable to conduct such experiments. To date, few if any crowdsourcing
studies deal with incentive structure with a level of sophistication that labor economists
would recognize (e.g Mason and Watts, 2010, Shaw, Horton and Chen, 2011), but
there is no reason this state of affairs need be permanent25
2. Develop best practices for codebook development. After close to a century
of public opinion surveys, it is easy to forget that the whole practice of survey research
had to be invented, from scratch. Early survey researchers painstakingly tested different
approaches to their craft, developed best practices that became standard training
for future generations of researchers: standard answer scales (e.g. Likert, semantic
differential), heuristics for question wording (“Avoid double-barreled questions.”),
sampling strategies for door-to-door and telephone surveys, psychometric procedures
for creating valid scales from multiple questions, whole batteries of questions with
standard wordings and known measurement properties (Fowler, 2009; Weisberg, 2009).
This degree of attention to measurement and replication was a huge boon to the
field—a scientific necessity, really.
By all appearances, we are at the same point with content analysis, transitioning
from a cottage industry to a mainstream methodology. As we do so, I strongly suspect
that we will need to develop a parallel body of heuristics and best practices, supported
by appropriate statistical tests. These best practices may share common elements
with survey research, but they will certainly need to be adapted to the unique needs
25The bonus structure used in my MTurk asignments was originally intended as an experiment
with quality-based variable pay. In the interests of time, I set it aside. However, this is a project to
which I certainly intend to return in future work.
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of content analysis. Without this cumulative knowledge, I doubt that content analysis
can become an effective tool for scientific measurement26.
Let me propose two examples from the codebooks in this chapter. First, my results
suggest that codebooks for content analysis should reference the text, not the author.
Among my codebook items, many of the ones that performed poorly were those that
mentioned the author (e.g. “The author is...,” “The author seems to...”) or worse,
the author’s intentions (e.g. “The author tries to...,” “The author sounds like...”).
Apparently, asking coders to speculate about authors and their intentions confuses
the coding process.
Second, my results suggest that examples in direct quotations are very helpful for
coders. For example, “Much of this text is spent criticizing others motives (e.g. ‘he’s
out to get us,’ ‘she can’t be trusted,’ ‘greedy,’ ‘dishonest,’ etc.)” and “The author
talks about threats to personal economic interests (e.g. jobs, income, tax rates, etc.).”
I only included examples of this type for a handful of items, but these were among the
best-performing items in all the codebooks—some of the places where novice reliability
compared most favorably to expert coding. Rather than defining words with more
words, using examples drawn directly from text seems to be an effective strategy for
reducing ambiguity and improving intercoder reliability.
I put these two patterns forward as hypotheses. They seems reasonable, especially
given the post-hoc supporting evidence from this study, but further research is needed
before we draw strong conclusions.
Fortunately, both of these hypotheses could be tested directly by experiment.
Research of this kind would be a productive addition to the literature on content
analysis and crowdsourced data collection. It would build up a cumulative set of
best practices for the discipline, and greatly reduce the trial-and-error burden on
researchers and practitioners. Over time, I expect that the field will follow survey
26I note in passing, that such attention to measurement is largely missing from the field of sentiment
analysis.
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research by developing standard instruments for measuring important quantities, and
standard corpora for validating new constructs.
3. Develop statistical methods that fully support the text-as-data research
pipeline. Within machine learning, there has been considerable interest in algorithms
that are robust to noisy labels (e.g. Prelec, 2004 Welinder et al., 2010; Zhou et al.,
2012; Liu, Peng and Ihler, 2012). This is a good start. However, within the KDD
literature, researchers have largely taken the challenge to be “replicate human coding
as accurately as possible.” However, for content analysis, the goal usually requires
additional steps of statistical analysis. As we discussed in section 3.5.2, replication
of human coding is typically not enough to guarantee valid results in downstream
analysis. As Krippendorff points out in his notes on sensitivity analysis, we must
appreciate how noise and uncertainty propagate from coding through analysis.
Once we understand these facts, we can design our algorithms and estimators
with the specific goal of reducing noise and eliminating bias. In a sense, statistical
techniques accomplishing this would be comparable to survey weights: re-usable
methodology allowing us to efficiently communicate results from early stages of the
data pipeline to the final analysis. To date, I have only encountered one example of a
method that takes this step in text-as-data methodology: Hopkins and King (2010).
Unfortunately, the method is limited to calculating proportions within a population.
The next step would be extending Hopkins and King’s insight to methods such as
OLS regression. For example, we could derive a least-squares estimator that would
accept document-level codes and item-level reliability scores as input, and adjust
estimates for beta values and standard errors accordingly27. Deriving, implementing,
and applying such an estimator would be a non-trivial exercise, but well within reach
27In addition to statistical methodology, this approach rasises some potentially thorny epistemo-
logical issues: given a noisy variable, should we rely on the variable as measured, or impute results
to an idealized, error-free version of the variable? An answer to this question will be necessary to
interpret the result of such an estimation procedure.
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of statistical theory and computational tools28.
Another promising approach is to propagate information from text classifiers back
upstream to inform the data collection process. Broadly speaking, such approaches
would fall under the scope of active learning (Cohn, Ghahramani and Jordan, 1996).
Early research by Sheng, Provost and Ipeirotis (2008), Karger, Oh and Shah (2011),
and others shows how this might be accomplished in crowdsourced data platforms.
I expect that future work will make such approaches even more efficient and cost-
effective.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter has been a long exploration of methodology, technology, and epis-
temology for large-scale content analysis. In contrast to most work in related fields,
I have sought to implement an end-to-end data pipeline with multiple steps to inte-
grate expert, novice, quorum, and automated coding. Doing so demonstrates that
a combination of methods from traditional content analysis and natural language
processing can enable valid analysis of very large-scale content analysis, even in the
case of highly subjective constructs like civility and newswriting. It also demonstrates
the complexity and difficulty of getting all the pieces to work in tandem.
This chapter makes contributions in two main areas. One contribution comes from
the epistemological argument in Sections 3.3.2, 3.4.3, and 3.5.3. I have made the case
that—for subjective coding tasks, at least—novice coding isn’t just a substitute for
expert coding; it’s an essential step for validating expert coding. Despite the new
availability of technologies like MTurk, very few studies in content analysis cross the
critical bridge to replicate analysis with novice coders.
The second set of contributions is methodological. This chapter has introduced
28If we are willing to make a few simplifying assumptions (e.g. errors in coding are normally
distributed), then a modified sandwich estimator for heteroskedastic consistency would probably
suffice.
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several practical methods for improving reliability and scaling up online content
analysis. In particular, the combination of 5-by-25 replication, methods for filtering
spammers on MTurk, proofs for estimating quorum reliability from individual reliability,
heuristics for codebook wording, and training automated classifiers on novice coding.
The individual pieces may be foreshadowed in existing research, but to the best of my
knowledge, applying them together in this way is unique. I hope that these techniques







A.1 What makes this research design difficult?
In the preface, I introduced a set of key questions about political bloggers and,
more broadly, political activists. In order to answer these questions, we must sastify
several rather stringent data requirements. First, in order to make claims about the
blogosphere at large, our data must be drawn according to a representative sampling
strategy. Second, our data set must include information about bloggers’ attitudes,
demographics, and social influences. Third, our data must also include observed
content from online activism itself, in as much detail as possible. Fourth, our data
must be collected in a way that allows comparisons to the general U.S. population,
and other U.S. activists. Finally, our data must allow comparisons within the blogging
population itself. Only a body of evidence with all of these characteristics can fully
answer our intended research questions.
This appendix describes a data-collection process to fulfill those requirements,
following three major steps: constructing a sampling frame, surveying political bloggers,
and collecting corresponding content for their blogs. All three of these data elements,
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Figure A.1: Research design schema
linked together, are necessary for the research design to be complete. The structure of
this chapter reflects its three-part organization.
This appendix procedes as follows. The next section describes how to construct
a sampling universe spanning the whole political blogosphere. Section A.3 details
procedures for administering an opinion survey to a representative population of
bloggers1. Section A.4 outlines a process for downloading and parsing a large panel of
posts from the same blogs sampled for the survey. Finally, section A.5 concludes with
a summary of the advantages of this research design, and a brief celebration of the
potential of interdisciplinary research.
A note on technical material: this appendix touches lightly on technical issues
such as algorithm design and sample weighting. My goal is to present enough detail
for readers understand the chain of evidence so they can assess the validity of the
arguments, without bogging down the argument with technical specifications. Readers
interested in replicating these methods can find full details in the other appendices.
1This section is an abbreviated version of Chapter I.
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A.2 Sampling strategy
A.2.1 Scope and definitions
The population of interest for this study is authors of active, English-language
blogs about politics in the United States. I define content “about U.S. politics” more
precisely as content discussing what government in the United States is doing or should
be doing. At a practical level, this definition is close to common intuition about what
constitutes political blogging. It includes content about elections, public opinion,
public policy, public officials, and so on. State and local politics are included, as is
U.S. foreign policy. So is content that mixes politics with other topics, such as religion,
humor, or pop culture. Content mainly about politics outside the United States
is excluded. At a theoretical level, this definition is closely related to the classical
concepts of exercise and control of the authority of the state. It sits at the intersection
of Hobbes, Key (1961), and Habermas (1991), and interfaces nicely with most existing
work on representation, persuasion, opinion formation, discourse in the public sphere,
and so on2.
Following past research (e.g. Drezner and Farrell, 2008; McKenna and Pole, 2008),
I define blogs in terms of format: a blog is a web site on which the main content is a
series of posts displayed in reverse-chronological order. An active blog is one with at
least one post in the last six months.
A.2.2 Sampling universe
In the past, no complete index of political websites existed. Lacking a sampling
frame, previous studies of political blogs have been based on convenience samples
2Of course, other definitions of political content are also possible. We might include any content
that is “about power relationships,” or “evokes political topics in readers’ minds.” These are perfectly
valid theoretical definitions, but in practice I have found that such definitions are hard to measure
accurately. The first definition is subject to widely different interpretations, and therefore seems likely
to be unreliable. The second definition is even more problematic, because it locates the definition in
reactions to content, rather than content itself.
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of one kind or another (e.g. McKenna and Pole, 2008; Davis, 2009). To solve this
problem and create a representative sampling frame, I use a novel recombination of
two technologies from computer science—automated text classifiers and web crawlers3.
Automated text classifiers were originally developed by linguists and computer
scientists working in the fields of natural language processing, machine learning,
and information retrieval. The basic problem is to sort documents into predefined
categories based on their contents. Categories can be defined in any way researchers
choose, giving text classifiers a remarkably degree of flexibility. (See Manning et al.,
2008 for a good introduction to text classification.)
Standard procedure in text classification is to hand-code a “training set” and
“testing set” of a few hundred documents, calibrate the classifier on the training set,
and then assess the level of intercoder agreement between human and computer coding
on the testing set. I applied this procedure to train a classifier to recognize political
content. Trained using text from 1,000 hand-coded sites, and evaluated against 200
more, the computer achieved higher intercoder accuracy and reliability than the
human coders themselves. Human-computer agreement was 81.0 percent, slightly
outperforming the 80.9 percent human-human agreement (Krippendorf’s alpha =
.733). This is impressive, but not too surprising, since a well-trained text classifier
can learn to split the difference between human coding styles.
Web crawlers, also called web spiders, are computer programs designed to follow
hyperlinks on the World Wide Web, scan web pages, and store interesting content.
They are commonly used by search engines, such as Google or Yahoo, to catalog web
sites.
To solve the problem of constructing a sampling universe for political blogs, I
3Studies on topical web crawling (a.k.a focused or directed web crawling) often combine classifiers
and web crawlers as well (Menczer, Pant and Srinivasan, 2004; Chakrabarti, Van den Berg and Dom,
1999; McNamee et al., 2002). In general, these efforts have favored high precision over high recall,
making them inappropriate methods for constructing sampling universes. See Noren’s 2011-2012
food blog study for a research design more similar to mine (Noren, 2012).
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have written software that combines text classifiers and web spiders to conduct an
“automated snowball census” of the political web. Guided by the text classifier described
above4, this program exhaustively explores the World Wide Web in search of political
content, using the following algorithm.
1. Start from a seed batch of political sites.
2. Download and classify each site in the batch.
3. For English-language political sites, harvest outbound hyperlinks and add unvis-
ited links to the next batch.
4. Repeat from step 2 until no new links are found.
Any political website with at least one in-link from another political site in the
snowball will be included in the final census. Since political sites are most likely to
link to other political sites, this method rapidly and effectively charts the boundaries
of the political web. Of course, sites without any in-links will not be found, but since
such sites would not be found by search engines’ crawlers either, they are effectively
invisible and therefore outside the public sphere.
To construct the sampling frame for this project, I ran the snowball program in
August 2010. It executed in 20 hours, crawling 1.8 million sites, of which 789,818 were
political sites and some 42 percent were blogs. Based on the error rate of the classifier,
these sites comprise an estimated 84.2 percent of the English political web. This
sampling frame is far superior to anything existing previously, making it an excellent
starting point for a representative survey of political bloggers.
Additional technical details for this census can be found in Chapter I.
4Note: I use an additional classifier to identify English text. Following standard practice, this
classifier takes character trigrams as input and classifies with extremely high accuracy. In a testing
set of 200 documents, all were classified correctly as “English” or “other.”
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A.2.3 Filtering and Stratification
The snowball software gives us a census of all political web sites. However, our
sampling frame for this study is a specific subset of that universe: active, English-
language blogs about U.S. politics. Filtering for these additional criteria takes some
additional work.
Some of this work can be automated. As it happens, most blogs can be readily
identified by the HTML tags used to format the site. Consequently, a simple classifier
making use of those tags can identify blogs versus other sites with remarkable accuracy.
Applying this classifier allows us to efficiently filter our list of “political sites” to down
to “political blogs.”
Next, we wish to draw a stratified sample, based on the popularity of political
blogs. One useful side-product on the snowball census is a list of all the hyperlinks
connecting political sites. Since the number of links directed to a site is a reasonably
informative proxy for site traffic (Hindman, 2010), we can use this value to stratify
political blogs by popularity. In network theory, this value is called the in-degree for a
given site.
Based on site in-degree, I separated the sample into three rough strata: the top
5,000 political blogs, the next 45,000, and the remaining 422,0005. These values
effectively capture very large differences in popularity. By oversampling on popular
sites, we are able to increase variation on a set of key variables (popularity, traffic,
level of participation, and level of professionalization) without ignoring the “long tail”
of less active and less linked-to sites.
Following this stratification scheme, I drew samples from each of the samples.
I drew approximately 5,000 sites from all three strata, with an extra 3,000 from
5These values are approximate. To save bandwidth and computation, I estimated in-degree cutoffs
for each stratum (530 in-links for the first stratum; 213 for the second) before selecting samples to
crawl. The net effect is that the exact counts for each strata were a little imprecise, but the strata
still provide an accurate ranking of site popularity. For example, the top stratum turned out to
contain 4,722 blogs instead of 5,000, but these are still the top-linked blogs in the census.
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Table A.1: Sampling, eligibility, contacting, and response rates by stratum
Strata 1 Strata 2 Strata 3 Total
Universe ∼ 5, 000 ∼ 45, 000 ∼ 422, 000 ∼ 472, 000
Sampled 4,722 8,186 5,523 18,431
Eligible 2,248 3,389 1,216 6,853
Contacted 1,142 1,476 449 3,067
Responded 303 362 109 774
Percent eligible 47.6 41.4 22.0 37.2
Contact rate 50.8 43.6 36.9 44.8
Cooperation rate 26.5 24.5 24.3 25.2
Response rate 13.5 10.7 9.0 11.3
the second stratum, on the hunch that bloggers is this category would be roughly
representative of the full population, but more likely to respond to my invitation. The
exact counts for sampled sites by strata were 4,722; 8,186; and 5,523 respectively.
This “pre-screening pool” of 18,431 likely blogs was then handed off to a team of
research assistants for final screening and collecting of contact information6. Each site
was checked to verify that it met my criteria to be classified as a blog, had at least
one post in the previous six months, and was focused on U.S. politics rather than
politics in the U.K., Canada, Australia, India, or elsewhere. Table A.1 show results




After sampling and filtering political blogs, the last major difficulty was gather-
ing contact information. Many bloggers list contact information (especially email
addresses) on their blogs, but this information is not listed in any standardized format:
6Some of this work was done using Amazon’s mechanical turk, a popular crowd-sourcing service.
See the recent paper by Berinsky, Huber and Lenz (2012) for discussion of applications of mturk in
research settings.
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even if an email address is there, it can be hard to find. During the filtering phase,
the research team searched each blog thoroughly for an email address to contact the
blogger. Email was my primary means for reaching out to bloggers.
When contacting bloggers, I followed best practices in survey administration as
closely as possible. I sent a series of four emails inviting and reminding bloggers to
complete the survey7. These short messages explained the purpose of the study in
general terms (e.g. “This study looks at how the blogging community thinks about
and responds to important issues and current events.”), provided a link to the survey,
and suggested a variety of reasons to participate: the survey is a chance to share
ideas and experiences, we need everyone in the sample to participate to make sure
results are representative, the survey is only 20 minutes long, etc. To the extent
possible, I tried to personalize messages to make it clear that my invitations were
not auto-generated spam. I also tried to invoke descriptive norms (Reno, Cialdini
and Kallgren, 1993) and norms of reciprocity from social exchange theory (Dillman,
2007) by expressing appreciation, supporting group values, making the questionnaire
interesting, etc. Appendix B includes the text of all contacting messages.
Because one of our goals was to enable comparisons between political bloggers
and the population at large, I carefully replicated many aspects of the Evaluations
of Government and Society Survey (EGSS). This nationally representative survey
was conducted by the American National Election Study around the 2010 midterm
elections. To reduce the threat of timing and mode effects in cross-sample comparisons,
I conducted my survey at roughly the same time, in the same format (online, self-
administered), and with many of exactly the same questions as the EGSS.
All told, I was able to gather contact information for 44.7% of sampled bloggers,
and achieve a cooperation rate of 25.3% , with an effective response rate of 11.3% .
7To be more precise, the survey was administered in three waves with small differences in timing,
incentives, non-email contacting, and contact messages. These differences had little or no measurable
impact on survey responses, and are documented in Appendix B
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These response rates are quite strong for unsolicited online surveys. It seems likely
that much of the non-response is being driven by inactive email accounts.
In the end, this contacting strategy was successful, yielding a final sample of 774
respondents, drawn with known probability from the general population of active,
English-language U.S. political bloggers.
A.3.2 Survey instrument
The survey itself was conducted online, deployed using the Qualtrics survey software
package. In a series of pretests and cognitive interviews with a convenience sample
of political bloggers, I revised and refined the survey instrument until it took most
respondents about 20 minutes to complete.
Survey items were chosen with two purposes in mind: to explore the motivations
of political bloggers, and to enable comparisons between bloggers and the population
of U.S. adults at large. For this reason, I borrowed heavily from important “surveys of
record” when writing the survey. Four out of five of my survey items are taken with
little or no modification from the American National Election Study (ANES); Verba,
et. al.’s classic study of political participation; and technorati.com’s annual State of
the Blogosphere.
The final questionnaire includes 337 items covering a wide array of topics: blogging
habits, reasons for blogging, news and media consumption, attitudes towards groups
and issues, political participation beyond the blogosphere, and demographics. Care
has been taken to ensure that key variables from important empirical theories are all
included: canonical theories of participation (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993) (Verba,
Schlozman and Brady, 1995), retrospective voting (Fiorina, 1981) and macropartisan-
ship (MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson, 1989), Zaller’s (1992) RAS model of opinion
formation, network theories of social influence (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995) (Mutz,
2006), selective exposure (Sears and Freedman, 1967) (Prior, 2007). Measuring the
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same variables in the same ways as previous studies should enable future researchers
to replicate important results from the field, an essential step in synthesizing these
theories in the context of the political blogosphere.
A.4 Blog post panel
One of the most exciting opportunities in this project is our ability to observe the
content of blogs alongside survey responses from their authors. I do so by downloading
the full content of blogs in the sample, in panel format. All told, the full panel includes
nearly 10 million blog posts, including full text, hyperlinks, and timestamps. This
panel is an incredibly rich source of insight into behavior in the blogosphere—one of
the largest and most detailed data sets on political speech and activism ever assembled.
A.4.1 Blog post parsers
Since their introduction in the late 1990’s, blog posts have proven to be a remarkably
stable genre. Virtually all blog posts include most, if not all, of six fields: body content,
date, title, author, tags (or labels), and number of comments8. For downloading
content, my goal was to capture these fields for as many of the sampled blogs as
possible9.
These fields can be extracted from any given blog by reverse-engineering the format
of the blog and writing a small piece of software, called a screen scraper. Screen
scrapers designed for blogs have two main parts: a mapper that identifies a unique
URL for every post on the blog, and a parser that extracts relevant fields from each
post. From a programming perspective, the mapper must understand the blog’s routes,
8Another possibility would be to collect comments from blog posts. The scope of data collection
was already so extensive that I decided not to attempt to parse any comments themselves.
9For administrative reasons, the target sample for blog parsing was limited to bloggers eligible for
contact in the third wave of the survey. This reduces our effective sample size somewhat, but should
not introduce any bias, since wave 3 blogs were sampled using the same stratification approach as in
previous waves.
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and the parser must understand the blog’s HTML/CSS template.
Writing custom scrapers for thousands of different blog formats would simply not
be possible. Fortunately, the majority of blogs follow a handful of common formats.
In particular, a large fraction of blogs are served either by Google’s Blogger service or
by WordPress. Blogger is the most popular blog hosting service, comprising 41.0% of
blogs in the sample. For publicly accessible blogs served by Blogger, an API exposes
content in a common format, so we can map and parse with them with 100% coverage.
WordPress is also a very popular blog hosting site, making up 26.2% percent of
our target sample. For these blogs, all routes follow one of two formats, so we can
map posts with perfect accuracy. In addition, within WordPress blogs, most page
layouts fall into a small handful of templates, so we can achieve a reasonably high
degree of coverage (89.6%) in parsing.
Outside of Blogger and WordPress, things get more difficult. I was able to identify
three other route schemas that collectively cover 180 blogs. In addition, to boost
the number of bridge cases between survey results and blog posts, I wrote 96 custom
mappers for otherwise unmappable blogs of survey respondents. These two sets of
mappers bring our collective map rate up to 72.1% percent for all blogs, and 96.5%
percent among survey respondents10. Table A.3 reports coverage statistics for mapping
and parsing various blog formats.
Unfortunately, the templates of these “Other” blogs (and the 10.4% of unparsed
Wordpress blogs) were so varied that parsing our target fields was impossible. This
imposes a serious penalty on our parse rates, which come out to 89.6% overall and
74.0% among survey respondents. At the end of the day, the effective response rates
(i.e. the percent of blog that were successfully mapped and parsed) are still reasonably
high: 65.2% for all blogs and 71.5% for survey respondents. Table A.3 reports mapping
10This map rate excludes 53 blog sites that were abandoned and deactivated between the survey
administration in late 2010, and blog parsing conducted in early 2012. If we include the 53 broken
sites in the denominator, the effective map rate is 88.1%.
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Table A.2: Map and parse rates by blog type
Blogger Wordpress Other Total
Eligible 2,356 1,506 1,876 5,738
Mapped 2,356 1,506 276 4,138
Parsed 2,356 1,350 0 3,706
Map rate 100.0% 100.0% 14.7% 72.1%
Parse rate 100.0% 89.6% 0.0% 89.6%
Response rate 100.0% 89.6% 0.0% 64.6%
The map rate equals mapped blogs divided by eligible blogs. The parse rate equals parsed blogs
divided by mapped blogs. The responses rate equals parsed blogs divided by eligible blogs.





Map rate 88.1% 96.5%
Parse rate 74.0% 74.0%
Response rate 65.2% 71.5%
53 blogs were deleted between the time the survery was administered, and the final blog post crawl
was conducted. These blogs are excluded from the “available” column.
and parsing statistics for the blogs of survey respondents.
In addition, we can salvage content from the 276 blogs that were mapped but not
parsed using a technique I call diff-based parsing. It works as follows. First we create
a full inventory of blog posts using the appropriate mapper. Second, we download the
full HTML content of each post page. Next, we clean each post to remove non-HTML
elements (e.g. CSS, Javascript) and nonstandard HTML attributes, but not the
essential HTML structure of the page. As a last preprocessing step, we select a small
reference set of blog posts at random.
With these preliminary steps complete, we apply two steps to each post within
each blog. First, we apply the diff operator against each post in the reference set to
generate the list of edits required to change the reference post into the target post.
Second, we re-create the unique elements of the target post by taking the union of
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edits from diffs against the full reference set.
This approach effectively strips out any formatting and page elements that are
held in common among blog posts, leaving only the unique elements of each post.
This will typically include the title, date, labels, body text, and comments of the post.
Diff-based parsing doesn’t allow us to associate these bits of content with specific
fields, but it does allow us to isolate the raw content of each post from the overall
format of the blog. The main drawback to diff-based parsing is that it doesn’t capture
dates or disassociate comments and body text. Still, it helps us recover data that
would have otherwise been completely lost from analysis.
A.4.2 Panel characteristics
In terms of total sample size, the result is staggering, especially when compared to
the sample sizes of previous studies of political activism. On average, the blogs in the
sample had 1,891 posts each, yielding a total corpus of 7,825,649 mapped posts and
6,831,429 parsed posts.
Figure A.2 shows the percentage of blog posts by year. As shown in the graph,
2010 was the year with the single most blog posts in our panel. Post volume falls off
on either side. It’s tempting to jump to conclusions about the intensity of the 2010
election cycle or the popularity of political blogging. However, the peak in 2010 is
actually caused by our sampling strategy: the sampling universe was constructed in
2010 and the peak in 2010 is a natural reflection of that fact. A significant fraction
of active bloggers in 2010 had stopped maintaining their blogs by 2012. Since more
recent blogs are not included in the sample, the data show a dropoff in 2011 and 2012.
Figure A.3 illustrates the richness of this data set, using a cross-section of blog
posts around the 2008 Presidential elections. For each day leading up to and fol-
lowing the election, I searched all blog posts for keywords corresponding to the four
Democratic frontrunners (Obama, Clinton, Edwards, and Biden). The graph shows
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Figure A.2: Blog post volume over time
each candidate’s day-over-day trend as a separate line, with captions corresponding
to the dates of important campaign events, such as the Iowa caucus, super Tuesday,
Clinton’s concession speech, the Democratic convention, and election day itself. Even
this very basic analysis reveals trends in attention to specific candidates, as well as
bursts of interest to the campagin in general. On election day, fully one in three blog
posts mentioned Barack Obama!
This example is intended as a simple illustration of the richness and scale of the
blog post panel. Chapter III introduces more systematic methods for extracting valid
measures from this vast corpus of content.
A.5 What makes this research design special?
As I’ve talked to people about this dissertation, the label that seems to stick most
often is “Big Data.” As shorthand, I accept the label. But we should note that from
the persepctive of scientific inference, “big” matters far less than “carefully structured.”
At best, more observations allow us to tease out patterns and variation that would
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Figure A.3:
Mentions of Democratic Presidential hopefuls during the 2008 campaign
have been too noisy to see otherwise. At worst, more observations let us achieve the
same results after a lot more work. The key feature of this research design is not its
scale, but its structure: combining a sampling frame, survey, and content analysis.
Following are four characteristics that make this combination unique and valuable.
First, the design allows us to compare and contrast populations. In sampling
and surveying bloggers, my goal has been to construct a representative sample of
political bloggers and enable comparisons with the population of U.S. residents in
general. Several previous studies have mined large amounts of web data to make
social inferences. However, lacking a well-defined sampling universe, they are unable
to make claims about the composition of online activism as a whole. In contrast,
my methodology produces results that generalize to the whole political blogosphere.
For the first time, we can get a clear picture of how bloggers—including little-read
bloggers in the tails of the distribution—compare to the U.S. population in general.
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Second, the design enables us to link different aspects of behavior. Given the
option to directly analyze the content of political blogs on a massive scale, it might be
tempting to forgo the expense and difficulty of contacting bloggers with a survey. But
such a research design would dramatically limit our ability to connect old theories
with new data. Many of our best existing social theories are expressed primarily in
terms of the best previously existing data sources: survey responses. They have little
to say directly about the kinds of behaviors that are newly observable in blogs. Only
by observing both kinds of data, side by side, can we relate well-established principles
from opinion research and participation theory to the rich new data available online.
Third, this research design allows us to observe behavior over time. Lacking the
ability to conduct experiments, observations over time are one of the best ways to
imbue observational data with causal significance. For that reason, panels are an
especially fruitful data structure. In many ways, the real advantage to collecting a
very large panel of blog posts is our ability to observe differences in behaviors at
fine-grained time scales—days, rather than months or election cycles.
Finally, this research design draws on two very different methodological traditions.
In order to collect these data, I was forced to mix and match techniques from social
and computer science. Broadly speaking, social science is better versed in issues of
sampling and measurement, while computer science is more adept at problems in data
processing and scalability. As we will see, methods from these two disciplines turn
out to be much more powerful together than they are individually. In my opinion,
demonstrating the combined analytical power of these tool sets is one of the most




Because this was the first time a representative survey had been conducted among
political bloggers, many of the mechanisms for administering such a survey were
untested. Accordingly, a series of waves gave me opportunities to test and improve my
methods, while expanding the effective sample size. This appendix provides details
about the goals and timing of each of the survey waves (B.1), details about contacting
(B.2), the full text of contact emails (B.3), and the survey FAQ linked from the emails
(B.4). Appendix C contains the full survey instrument.
B.1 Survey waves
Wave one was conducted in October 2010, just prior to the midterm election. This
was essentially a pilot wave, meant to test my apparatus for contacting bloggers, as
well as the survey instrument itself. This wave was based on a small sample of 172
bloggers, of whom 65 were contacted, and 26 responded.
Wave two was conducted about six weeks later, in November. This wave expanded
the respondent sample to 173, providing enough statistical leverage to conduct tests on
effects of incentives and contacting methods. Finding no important effects from either
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Table B.1: Changes in survey administration by wave
Wave Date Incentives Method Sample Responses
Wave 1 October 2010 Yes Email 172 26
Wave 2 December 2010 Yes Email and other 961 147
Wave 3 May 2011 No Email 5,738 603
treatment1, I decided to economize by removing incentives and non-email contacting
from the last wave of the survey.
Wave three was the largest of the waves, with an eligible sample of 5,738 and 603
respondents2. Fielded in May 2011, the questionnaire was modified slightly so that
the battery of political knowledge questions would reflect changes in office-holding
and the composition of the House and Senate.
Except for non-email contacting, incentives, and the few questions already men-
tioned, all aspects of survey administration were identical between waves. Table B.1
shows adjustments in survey administration by wave.
B.2 Contacting
Gathering contact information for bloggers was perhaps the most difficult part
of conducting the survey. During the filtering phase, the research team searched
each blog thoroughly for an email address to contact the blogger. Some blogs are
co-authored by multiple bloggers. In these cases, we used a Kish grid to randomize
selection of one blogger for email contacting. This process is almost identical to the
process for selecting members within households in door-to-door contacting.
More commonly, we confronted the opposite problem: no email address at all. Only
about one in three political blogs includes an email address to contact the author(s).
This is similar to the problem of cellphone-only households that is currently disrupting
1In pairwise tests against every variable in the survey, incentives and contacting methods showed
“significant effects” in a handful of cases, but no more than would be predicted by the natural rate of
false positives.
2This figure is pessimistic, excluding 291 partially completed surveys.
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telephone surveys.
Arbitrarily excluding two-thirds of the sample would present a serious threat to
the validity of the study. To alleviate this problem, I adopted the following system
in the second wave of the survey: prior to final screening, I randomly assigned each
blog to one of two contacting conditions: “email-only” or “by any means.” Eighty
percent of blogs were assigned to the email-only condition. Within this set, bloggers
with email addresses were invited to participate in the study; other were left out of
the survey, but retained in the sampling frame.
The other twenty percent of blogs were contacted by any means available. For
convenience, we used email when possible. When no email address was available, we
next looked to send the invitation using a “drop box” for posting comments privately
to the blogger. When no drop box was available, we posted the invitation as a comment
to the most recent blog post, even if the comment was publicly visible. A few of the
sampled blogs did not even allow comments and could therefore not be contacted.
This protocol economizes on effort spent on contacting and sample recruitment
without excluding hard-to-contact bloggers from the sample entirely. Accordingly, in
the second wave of the survey, 384 bloggers received survey invitations by email, and
79 bloggers received invitations by drop box or comment. Only a handful of bloggers
could not be contacted at all.
As shown in Table B.2, this approach resulted in a moderate improvement in
effective response rates. However, after analyzing results from the second wave, I
saw no important differences between respondents contacted by email and by other
means3. Given that non-email contacting was far more expensive than contacting by
email and didn’t seem to have much impact on the substantive results, I decided to
forgo non-email contacting in the final wave of the survey.
In addition, for email invitations in the second wave, I included randomized
3These tests were based on sample sizes with admittedly low statistical power. Still, the results
suggest that any biases induced by excluding bloggers without emails addresses are likely to be small.
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Table B.2: Eligibility, contacting, and responses by survey wave
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 2 Wave 3 Total
Email-only Any means
Eligible 172 777 184 5,738 6,871
Contacted 65 256 142 2,609 3,072
Responded 26 104 43 603 776
Contact rate 37.8 32.9 77.2 45.5 44.7
Cooperation rate 40.0 40.6 30.3 23.1 25.3
Response rate 15.1 13.4 23.4 10.5 11.3
incentives. At the time of the first email contact, bloggers were randomly assigned
offers of no incentive, $10, or $20, as “a small thank-you for participating.” These
offers were persistent, with reminders in subsequent emails and the instructions to
the survey itself. At the end of the survey, respondents in either of the two incentive
conditions were able to fill out a form to receive an Amazon gift card by email. As with
non-email contacting, incentives proved to have little or no effect on survey responses,
so I did not use incentives in the final wave of the survey.
My contacting strategy for drop boxes and comments was similar to email contact-
ing, with two exceptions. First, I sent only one follow-up message—since these bloggers
had decided not to provide contact information, I felt that sending two unsolicited
messages was stretching the no-spam etiquette of the Internet far enough. Second,
Qualtrics’ system of authentication made it difficult to match non-emailed links with
incentives. Therefore, I only offered incentives to respondents contacted by email.
All told, I was able to gather contact information for 44.7% of sampled bloggers,
and achieve a cooperation rate of 25.3% , with an effective response rate of 11.3% .
These response rates are lower than we might like, but are still quite strong for Internet
research. It seems likely that much of the non-response is being driven by inactive
blogs and email accounts. Moreover, tests based on randomly assigned incentives
and modes of contact give us some evidence that sample bias due to non-response is
likely to be small. Finally, the availability of full blog content opens the possibility
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for unusually good sample weighting to adjust for potential issues in the sampling
process. I describe methods for taking advantage of this useful feature of blog data in
Chapter II.
In the end, this contacting strategy was successful, yielding a final sample of 776
respondents, drawn with known probability from the general population of active,
English-language U.S. political bloggers.
B.3 Contact emails
A note on [used name]:
If we know a blogger’s first name, then used name is the same as first name: “Ted”
Otherwise, if we know a blogger’s psuedonym, then used name is the pseudonym:
“M1dn1ght Bl0gger” Finally, if we don’t have either, then we just use the name of the
blog: “Random Progressivist Thoughts”
B.3.1 Initial contact
[Used Name] -
We are writing to ask for your help in a survey of bloggers being conducted by
the University of Michigan. This study looks at how the blogging community thinks
about and responds to important issues and current events. As [Authors Plural] of
[Blog Name], you are invited to visit the link below and complete the survey. It will
only take about 20 minutes.
We hope you will find the survey interesting and enjoyable. Simply click on the
link below, or cut and paste the entire URL into your browser to access the survey:
[Survey Link]
We appreciate your participation – it is only by hearing from nearly everybody in
the sample that we can be sure the results are truly representative. Your responses
will be kept strictly confidential, and we will be happy to share our results with you
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once the study is complete. [Incentive Text]
Thanks in advance for your willingness to share your ideas and experiences.
Abe Gong and Nancy Burns
University of Michigan
P.S. If you have questions or comments about this study, please direct them to
Abe Gong (agong@umich.edu). Thank you!
B.3.2 First reminder
[Used Name] -
A few days ago, we sent you a link to a survey seeking your opinions as a blogger
about issues and events in society today. If you have already completed the survey,
please accept our sincere thanks. If not, please do so today by following the link below.
[Survey Link]
The survey is only 20 minutes long, and all your responses will be completely
confidential. [Incentive Text 2] Our goal is to assemble a clear picture of ideas,
opinions, and demographics in the blogosphere. We are grateful for your participation,
because every response will make the final results more accurate.
Abe Gong and Nancy Burns
University of Michigan
P.S. If by some chance we have made a mistake and you are not [Used Name]
[Last Name] from [Blog Url], please answer at least the first three questions of the




About a week ago, we sent you a link asking for your help on a survey of bloggers.
This email is a quick reminder to complete the survey, before it closes next Monday,
Dec. 20. We know you are busy, and appreciate your participation in this study of
opinions and habits in the blogosphere.
[Survey Link]
Thank you and enjoy the survey!
Abe Gong and Nancy Burns
University of Michigan
P.S. A comment on our survey procedures. Although we use your name and email
address to verify survey completion, those fields are deleted and replaced with a
random identification code number once you take the survey. Consequently, all survey
responses are completely confidential. We are happy to share aggregate results, but
we will never release results or data that could be used to identify individual survey
respondents. Protecting the confidentiality of people’s answers is very important to
us, as well as the University.
B.3.4 Thank you
[Used Name] -
Thanks again for responding to our survey of ideas and opinions in the blogosphere.
We appreciate your participation – the only way to learn what bloggers think is to
ask bloggers themselves!
This study will be in the field until the end of April next year. In the meantime, if
you have questions or comments, please let us know. We’re interested in improving
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the survey for future respondents, and welcome your feedback.
Please remember to not talk or blog about this study until after April. We want
to make sure that the survey experience is consistent for everyone. Once the study is
complete, we will be happy to share the results, and you will be completely free to
talk about it.
If you have further questions or comments about this study, please contact Abe
Gong (agong@umich.edu). Thank you!
Abe Gong and Nancy Burns
University of Michigan
B.4 Frequently asked questions
Who are you?
I’m a graduate student studying political science at the University of Michigan.
Nancy Burns is my dissertation advisor. You can find my bio and webpage through
the department website.
Why are you doing this project?
This survey is part of a dissertation project seeking to understanding how people
discuss current events and social issues online. There is no commercial or political
agenda behind the project. I’m just trying to get a clear picture of who participates
in the blogosphere.
How did you find my blog?
I found sites for this survey as part of a ”snowball sample,” following links between
web sites to identify bloggers who post on topics related to current events. The overall
sample will include about 700 bloggers, with the goal of getting a balanced picture of
the views and ideas in the blogosphere.
Does this project have IRB approval?
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The survey protocol has been reviewed and approved by the University of Michigan
IRB.
How can I know this isn’t some kind of scam?
You can find me on the list of current University of Michigan political science grad
students at http://polisci.lsa.umich.edu/grad/currentGrads.html. You can also email
me at agong [at] umich [dot] edu, and I’ll respond as soon I can.
How long will the survey take to complete?
About 20 minutes. I know that you’re busy and 20 minutes is a lot to ask. I
appreciate you time and opinions.
Are there any incentives to complete this survey?
Sadly, as a graduate student working on a grad student budget, I can’t pay people
to participate in this survey. If it helps, I’m not making any money from the project
either. Once the survey is complete, I’ll be happy to share (anonymized) results.
In the meantime, this survey is a chance to make sure that your views and opinions
on blogging and current events are represented. Our goal is to get a clear and balanced
picture of who participates in the blogosphere – it won’t be complete unless almost
almost everyone invited participates.
I didn’t receive an invitation to the survey. Can I still participate?
Yes, but not right now. Send me an email agong [at] umich [dot] edu, and I’ll let
you know about future surveys.
How will my confidentiality be protected?
Although we use your name and email address to verify survey completion, those
fields are deleted and replaced with a random identification code number once you
take the survey. Consequently, all survey responses are completely confidential. We
are happy to share aggregate results, but we will never release results or data that
could be used to identify individual survey respondents. Protecting the confidentiality
of people’s answers is very important to us, as well as the University.
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Some of the questions are a little personal. What if I’m not comfortable
answering them?
Most of the questions come from mainstream surveys like Gallup, Pew, and the
General Social Survey. That said, we respect your privacy, so if there are questions
you’re not comfortable answering, you’re welcome to skip them and go on.
There was a mistake on my name, or the name of my blog.
I’m very sorry if we got your name wrong. A team of research assistants was
responsible for collecting names and contact information for this survey, and they
make some mistakes in the process.
My blog doesn’t get a lot of traffic. Do you still want me to respond?
We’re trying to get a balanced picture of the views and ideas in the blogosphere,
and that includes small blogs as well as big ones. It won’t be a balanced picture if we
only hear back from the people with a lot of readers.
I’m not from the U.S. Should I still respond to the survey?
The survey definitely has a U.S. slant, mainly because so many bloggers are
American. That said, we’d appreciate your responses on the questions that are
relevant. You’re welcome to skip the others.
I’m interested in the survey results. How can I learn more?
The survey will close in mid-June 2011. I’ll be working on analyzing the responses
throughout the summer and fall, publishing results along the way. If you have questions,
comments, or other feedback, please contact me at agong [at] umich [dot] edu. My
goal is to learn what theories of participation and communication can teach us about

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Supplementary materials for Mechanical Turk
D.1 FAQ
What is OPSP?
OPSP stands for Online Political Speech Project. We are a University of Michigan
research team studying political speech on the Internet. There is no commercial or
political agenda behind the project. We’re just trying to get a clear picture of how
people discuss current events and social issues online.
What bonuses do you award?
We award bonuses based on your accuracy score and the total number of HITs
you complete. We try to be generous with bonuses so that quality counts as much as
quantity. If your answers are very accurate, you can more than double your pay per
HIT.
How much do these HITs pay per hour?
Amazon makes it hard to figure this out in advance, but we’ve ballparked the
hourly rate at $4 to $6 base pay, and double that after bonuses. Since bonuses are
directly tied to accuracy, the more accurate your answers, the more you get paid.
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Where do accuracy scores come from?
We compare your answers to previous answers by experts and other turkers. You
get points depending on how closely they match. Since even the experts sometimes
disagree, we award lots of partial credit. If your answers are just as good as the
experts’, your score will be 100 points. If it looks like you’re just guessing, your scores
will average out close to 0.
How many HITs do I need to complete to get an accuracy score?
20 to 30 HITs will usually be enough. However, the more HITs you do, the more
precise your accuracy score will be, so don’t hold back!
How often do you calculate accuracy scores?
We compute accuracy scores as fast as we can—usually overnight—so that you
don’t have to wait too long to find out how you’re doing.
Do you ever reject HITs?
Sadly, some turkers try and cheat on HITs by guessing at answers without really
reading the articles. We can pick out these cheaters based on low accuracy scores. Our
policy is to give a warning, then start rejecting HITs if a turker’s accuracy doesn’t
improve.
The good news is that if you’re reading and answering carefully, this should never
be a problem.
Where do the articles come from?
All over the place. We draw articles from newspapers, transcripts from TV and
radio programs, posts from blogs, and comments from discussion boards. All articles
are from the public domain.
I like these HITs. Where can I find more?
We’re glad you like them! We will post links to the batches here as soon as we can.
Also, turkers with high accuracy scores may receive email invitations to new batches
as we create them.
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